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    ABSTRACT 
 
In search of a corpus: book and body in the Satires of Persius 
 
Kate Meng Brassel 
 
This dissertation treats Persius’ book of satires as a physical object, as a text to be read aloud, as 
a literary artefact that has a fundamental total structure, and as a text that is interested in its genre 
and in how satire can position itself against tired philosophical and literary traditions and tropes. 
It seeks to diversify the intellectual contexts in which the satirist may be situated—both literary 
and philosophical, ranging from Hipponax to Ovid, Plato to Cornutus. In the first chapter, we 
struggle to track down a poet who compulsively avoids identification in his Prologue. It turns out 
that he is best identified by a reactionary Hipponactean meter and very misleading birdsounds. 
Without addressee or self-identification or occasion, the poem is labeled a carmen at the same 
time that we are told that carmina are to be distrusted. In the second chapter, the poet introduces 
his libellus to us—or, rather, it turns out that he is not interested in us at all—he talks to his book 
or to some fiction that he has invented for the occasion of Satire I. The book itself may be read 
or not, he doesn’t mind. The poet focuses his attention on the poetry-reading practices of others 
in performance, alighting upon their every intimate body part, but denies us a view of him—he is 
merely the concealed spleen. In Chapter Three, the poet continues his exploration of 
performative speech (prayer, this time) in Satire II, while maintaining his self-concealment. We 
see only his inner, highly unappealing raw heart on a platter. A body part further to the spleen is 
added to our plate: the heart, uncooked. His last words hint at what he has to offer; but we’ll be 
sorry that he does soon enough. Chapter Four shows that in the central poem, Satire III, the poet 
swings vastly in the other direction. Rather than a disembodied critique of others, the poem’s 





than we would ever wish to see—splitting and gaping open, it becomes a giant pore. At the same 
moment, his book comes physically into our view, but it is as split as he is. The hardened critic 
turns out to be a leaky vessel, a failing proficiens who cannot catch up to his Stoic lessons. In the 
fifth chapter, the poet picks up another book, Plato’s Alcibiades, which shares his interest in the 
morally underdeveloped youth and the hazards of ethical progress. In Satire IV, his rendition of 
that dialogue, Persius offers a theory of dialogue as fiction that frames his engagement with 
philosophy. The result is that the Stoics may find that they have a very bad student on their 
hands, one who raises the specter of Socrates’ misbehavior and failures. The sixth chapter 
expands the discussion of Persius’ relation to the Platonic corpus in Satire V, which sustains and 
develops Platonic questions of desire, slavery, and praise, and confuses its own genres. Finally, 
Chapter Seven addresses Persius’ retreat, projected death, and reincarnation in Satire VI. He 
reflects upon the fate of his body. He is unconcerned about what happens to bodies and poets—
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This is a small offering on a small book. It takes as its premiss that Persius’ libellus—as the poet 
calls it—ought to be read as a book. This dissertation, therefore, treats Persius’ corpus as a physical 
object, as a text to be read aloud, as a literary artefact that has a fundamental total structure, and as 
a text that is interested in its genre and in how satire can position itself against tired philosophical 
and literary traditions and tropes. These poetic tropes, satirical but also lyric, are not cast aside, 
but mobilized ultimately to exceed and negate their conventions. Philosophical discourses and 
rhetorical practices, both Platonic and Stoic, turn out to be fictions. The book is framed by 
recusatio and disengagement in its first and last poems; unconcern for the fate of the book and its 
reception becomes unconcern for the fate of the poet’s body and legacy. 
I have made an effort to treat each of these seven poems (one choliambic prologue, six 
hexameter satires) with equal attention and in order, a practice which reflects a book-oriented 
methodology and one which has the added benefit of taking seriously the often under-served 
Prologue and second and sixth satires. Given that certain fundamentals of several of the poems are 
much disputed in the scholarship, in each chapter I first illustrate my basic understanding of the 
piece in question. I address in particular questions of structure and voice in order to underpin my 
subsequent analyses of that poem alongside illuminating comparanda. Those comparanda have 
been chosen with a particular view to broadening the literary and philosophical questions we may 
ask of the book at hand.  
In seeking to diversify the intellectual contexts in which we may situate Persius and his 
meagre corpus, I have turned quite deliberately to extra-Horatian literary comparanda. This is not 
to downplay the weight that Horace’s corpus exerts upon this book, but rather to show how other 
Roman and Greek literary traditions complement and even ironize that influence. Persius’ artistic 




Hooley in his The Knotted Thong: Structures of Mimesis in Persius (1997), a monograph on the 
poet that has not been surpassed in rigor or nuance. Likewise, I have turned quite deliberately to 
philosophical literature that has not previously been critically brought to bear upon the Satires, 
which have generally been subjected to elucidation by Stoic trivia. Similarly, this is not to 
downplay the rigor of Persius’ manifest training in the standard precepts of Stoicism, but rather to 
examine Persius’ conceptual engagement with philosophical writers and teachers that is as diverse 
as possible and plausible.  
In service of these twin ends, the poets and philosophers upon whose work I have drawn 
vary widely; each is keyed to a particular question that the libellus demands. Frequently Persius 
invokes the authority of these figures only to deflate it, enacting a recusatio not only of his own 
literary persona, but those of his forebears.  Callimachus and the character of Hipponax help us to 
understand the invective territory that Persius is claiming for his book. Ovid appears frequently 
throughout this examination of Persius’ extra-Horatian engagements. Significantly, the 
Metamorphoses are important to understanding the prologue and final poem, two framing pieces 
which both capitalize upon and debunk the idea of transformation. The Tristia along with 
Propertius’ elegies throw into relief Persius’ conception of his book as a material object. Seneca 
the Elder and Epictetus exhibit for us the types of rhetorical and ethical pedagogy that Persius 
lampoons even as he demonstrates his intimate competence in those discourses—as a sort of 
intellectual double agent. Cornutus—a character in the Vita and Satire V of whom scholars have 
long made much—is adduced as an interlocutor through his extant written work, an etymological 
theology called Epidrome, rather than through a spectre reconstructed from “evidence” that the 
fifth satire provides. Plato occupies considerable territory in my assessments of how Persius 




and young man. Finally, the perennial voice of Ennius tells us how little we should care about 
literary-traditional posterity.  
In the first chapter, we struggle to track down a poet who compulsively avoids 
identification in his Prologue. It turns out that he is best identified by a reactionary Hipponactean 
meter and very misleading birdsounds. Without addressee or self-identification or occasion, the 
poem is labeled a carmen at the same time that we are told that carmina are to be distrusted. In 
the second chapter, the poet introduces his libellus to us—or, rather, it turns out that he is not 
interested in us at all—he talks to his book or to some fiction that he has invented for the 
occasion of Satire I. The book itself may be read or not, he doesn’t mind. The poet focuses his 
attention on the poetry-reading practices of others in performance, alighting upon their every 
intimate body part, but denies us a view of him—he is merely the concealed spleen. In Chapter 
Three, the poet continues his exploration of performative speech (prayer, this time) in Satire II, 
while maintaining his self-concealment. We see only his inner, highly unappealing raw heart on 
a platter. A body part further to the spleen is added to our plate: the heart, uncooked. His last 
words hint at what he has to offer; but we’ll be sorry that he does soon enough. Chapter Four 
shows that in the central poem, Satire III, the poet swings vastly in the other direction. Rather 
than a disembodied critique of others, the poem’s opening lines are highly focalized through the 
poet’s experience. He exposes more of his body than we would ever wish to see—splitting and 
gaping open, it becomes a giant pore. At the same moment, his book comes physically into our 
view, but it is as split as he is. The hardened critic turns out to be a leaky vessel, a failing 
proficiens who cannot catch up to his Stoic lessons. In the fifth chapter, the poet picks up another 
book, Plato’s Alcibiades, which shares his interest in the morally underdeveloped youth and the 




dialogue as fiction that frames his engagement with philosophy. The result is that the Stoics may 
find that they have a very bad student on their hands, one who raises the specter of Socrates’ 
misbehavior and failures. The sixth chapter expands the discussion of Persius’ relation to the 
Platonic corpus in Satire V, which sustains and develops Platonic questions of desire, slavery, 
and praise, and confuses its own genres. Finally, Chapter Seven addresses Persius retreat, 
projected death, and reincarnation in Satire VI. He reflects upon the fate of his body. He is 
unconcerned about what happens to bodies and poets—and, implicitly, their texts—after death. 
The poet’s book and the body are merged in their insignificance.  
Although he received praise and generated commentary soon after his early demise,1 
Persius has sometimes been an isolated poet, in part because of his studied difficulty, but also in 
no small part because of the more popular Juvenal’s aggressive neglect of him in his own 
construction of the history of Roman satire. This dissertation therefore also offers an implicit 
intellectual recontextualization of the poet. If Persius is not a satirist, as his successor would have 
it, what is he? In spite of Quintilian’s placement of Persius among the greats of the “wholly” 
Roman genre (Inst. X, 1.93), Persius also declares that there is no room for him in that tradition. 
At the same time, the poet is also clearly interested in engaging the tropes and forms of other 
genres, philosophical modes (dialogue, diatribe, paradoxa) in particular, but also comedy,2 elegy, 
and iambic. The resulting generic struggles, in turn, manifest in the difficulties of book-writing 
and book-reading that Persius thematizes.  
My use of Ovidian, Propertian, and Callimachean comparanda does not require much 
                                                          
1 Vita 22; the proliferation and consolidation of commentary would be sustained for centuries, Zetzel (2005: 
1-9). 
 
2 Jennifer Ferriss-Hill (2015) provides a comprehensive study of the influences of Old Comedy on Roman 





defense, so well documented are the intertextual interests and practices of poets. Franco Bellandi 
(1988) has offered a monograph on Persius’ own engagement with the Ovidian, Propertian, and 
Callimachean tropes in the first satire. For Bellandi, Persius’ use of Ovid and Propertius, 
especially, throws into relief his motivating aesthetic-ethical principle: literary technique must be 
subordinate to the moral ends of literature. Propertius’ efforts in erotic elegy were underpinned by 
questionable morals; Ovid was entirely responsible for the trivialization and vulgarization of poetic 
activity. Persius rejects the “commodification” of literature: a poetics once invested with gravitas 
has been divested of its moral value. I will argue that Persius does indeed have Ovid and Propertius 
very much in mind, but that he shares several of their poetic concerns—inspiration and textuality, 
and, in the case of Ovid, transformation, fiction, and immortality. 
Persius’ Stoic affiliations have been thoroughly investigated and synthesized recently by 
Shadi Bartsch (2012). The philosophy-centered investigations presented here may reflect upon the 
intellectual activity of the Roman Stoics of the period by presenting Persius’ Satires as an 
alternative (and complementary) “take” on both contemporary and classical philosophy. This work 
is in tandem with the current re-evaluation of Cornutus, the poet’s “real life” teacher, especially by 
George Boys-Stones (2003, 2007, 2009, forthcoming), who has treated (and continues to treat) the 
once shadowy figure as an active philosopher, who commands a seriousness of attention, in line 
with his high repute among the ancients. We know, for example, that in addition to the extant 
Epidrome, a theological-pedagogical text upon which I shall draw, Cornutus wrote in response to 
Aristotle’s Categories and authored an On Properties, on a metaphysical topic.3 There is no reason, 
therefore, that we should suppose Persius’ education or philosophical awareness to be narrow. 
Persius had a complete collection of Chrysippus. From a young age, he associated with a diverse 
                                                          





crowd of intellectual luminaries, including the Stoic dissident Thrasea Paetus, the poet Caesius 
Bassus, historian Servilius Nonianus, and the physician Claudius Agathinus. He knew Seneca, but 
was not exactly taken with that writer of ethics and pedagogical letters.4 
 The question of what Platonic texts are available and circulating in this period is a more 
complex one. But recent scholarship reflecting the fresh engagement with the Roman Stoics has 
shown that their use of and relation to the Platonic corpus was one of rigorous, critical engagement 
rather than one of hostility, ignorance, or indifference.5 While “citations” of Plato in the period 
sometimes seem insufficiently specific to be unequivocally first hand—perhaps through extracts 
or some secondary work—the critical mass of scholarship on Platonic readings in the period has 
accrued to the extent that we may now take the ideas and discourses that span the Platonic corpus 
to be available to as serious a reader of philosophy as Persius appears to have been from both 
internal and external evidence. 
Of course, the philosophical and the literary are inextricable. Following the suggestion of 
Reckford,6 I make use of Epictetus as contemporary comparandum significantly useful for 
negotiating amid the seemingly bewildering crowd of voices that appear throughout the satires. 
The sheer implausibility of the range of the philosopher’s interlocutor-addressees makes it clear 
that ostensible narrative incoherence was not only navigable but meaningful to ancient readers. 
The diatribes move (and return) from topic to topic, subsuming the discourses that range from the 
Aesopic to the Platonic, from syllogism to gymnasium, all while turning constantly from person 
                                                          
4 Vita 25-29.  
 
5 Some exemplary work includes: Setaioli (1985), Griffin (1989), Bonazzi and Helmig, eds. (2007), Sorabji 
and Sharples, eds. (2007), Boys-Stones on Cornutus and the Timaeus (2009) and per litteras, and A. G. 
Long (2013) among many others.  
 





to person, raising and answering all and any objections.7 
John Henderson’s work on Persius’ didactic satire (1991) points us to the conclusion that 
the voices presented across the satires are ambivalent and multi-interpretable in a way that tells us 
something significant about the text itself. Any attempt authoritatively to restrain the labored 
confusion—even illegibility and unintelligibility—of the voices presented in the satires makes for 
not only a rather flat reading but also ignores the absolute fundament of Persius’ project: Quis 
leget haec? min tu istud ais? (Sat. I, 2). I nevertheless advocate particular identifications of 
speakers, especially in Satire IV, keeping in mind the notion that to read a text in private—even 
silently—with the attendant capacity of second visits and revisions, is an utterly different activity 
from reading the satire at a recitatio—with the vocal cues and gestures required when reading for 
others. To read privately and to read publicly are activities that make possible equally meaningful 
insights, but it is the performative Roman lectio that is my interest here and that is my present tool 
for navigation. It is an exercise in which Persius himself disavows interest—early on he tells us 
that he doesn’t care for it—but I take the poet’s patent anxiety about the event as permission to 
theorize around it.  
Finally, I have a great sympathy with Kenneth Reckford’s (2009) Recognizing Persius. 
Although our satirists turn out to be rather different men, we both seek to recover and reconstruct, 
in a way, Persius’ corpus, a corpus that has been too often dismembered by more single-minded 
investigations of allusion, intertext, and metaphor that are less interested in a sense of the whole. 
Reckford’s poet is a man of duty in the world, a man with a real life and a real personal history 
that meaningfully underpin his poetics. Persius emerges in admirable condition “with unblinking 
                                                          
7 For a recent thorough re-evaluation of the discursive strategies and structures of the diatribe “On Freedom” 
(IV, 1), which is most useful, see Willms (2011). For the best comprehensive view of Epictetus, see A. A. 




awareness of the human condition, one’s own especially, and the will to keep striving in the face 
of innumerable obstacles, both without and within.”8 My Persius, by some contrast, emerges a 
smart but mean creature—an unrelenting critic of himself, of others, and of the possibility that the 
human condition could ever be anything other than the infinite regress it has always been. This is 
surely a difference between our own worldviews and of the satirist that we think readers of classics 
need in the twenty-first century.
                                                          




CHAPTER ONE: Choliambics and the Greco-Roman Bird Call (Prologue) 
Poetic prologues are often elusive. Written to establish a fictive persona and generic expectations 
that might serve as rubrics for interpreting the work to come, they are equally written to deceive. 
But Persius’ riddling prologue is exceptionally misleading. Persius goes out of his way not to 
introduce himself or his work, and even resists the generic expectation that the author will identify 
with a coherent fictional persona at all. Instead, Persius constructs an extraordinarily evasive poetic 
persona that identifies itself only by negation, by what it is not. In its place, he introduces metrical, 
aural, and etymological riddles to construct ways of self-identifying without identifying, thus 
obstructing and frustrating his reader’s search for meaning from the very start. While Persius defies 
the reader’s search for aitiology and meaning by refusing to construct a coherent poetic persona, 
his use of etymological sound-play throughout the poem stimulates and rewards other forms of 
reading attuned to his highly allusive and referential style. 
The prologue—the first poem of Persius’ little book—is carefully structured yet totally 
enigmatic, obscured by its brevity and its peculiar features. The poem is written in choliambics, a 
meter originating in the invective of Hipponax that developed through Hellenistic and Roman 
practitioners. Using choliambics is a conspicuous choice. Horace’s Sermones have no such 
separate prefatory poem; the hexameter satires are introduced by a hexameter satire that is 
addressed, of course, to Maecenas—immediately positioning the text in its social milieu (Serm. I, 
1.1). Persius’ choice suggests that he deliberately sought a subversive literary precedent for his 
own prologue. Choliambics—identified with Hipponax, Callimachus, and Catullus—lead the 
reader to presume that just by virtue of its form (if not its content), the poems to come will be some 
sort of invective. By directly invoking Hipponax as that poet transmitted through Callimachus’ 




in both Roman satire and Callimachean iambic, at the very outset of his Satires, evading—if not 
negating—his own major poetic predecessor. Beyond marking his separation from Horace, whose 
Sermones are frequently “flagged” by allusion in the Satires, Persius’ use of choliambic asserts an 
aggression that has something in common with the practice of Catullus and perhaps other Roman 
writers of choliambic (unfortunately insufficiently extant to provide meaningful comparanda) and 
pointedly with the aggressive practice of Hipponax as literary-historical character. The dark and 
obscene humor of Persius’ caustic hexametrical Hipponacteanism will re-invigorate Roman satire, 
a genre civilized through the comparatively docile “wit” of the Horace of the Sermones. 
The prologue’s metrical deviance from the standard hexameter of Roman verse satire, 
together with its brevity—just 14 lines—has often resulted in its marginalization from full and 
sustained treatment—or in its treatment as a mere précis of themes that are better developed in the 
first satire, which is more intelligibly programmatic and includes a parody of a poetry reading. 
This marginalization has persisted in spite of the enormous amount of work achieved in the early 
20th century by Italian scholars who focused on textual and metrical issues9 and the remarkable 
interpretive 1988 monograph of Franco Bellandi, Persio: dai verba togae al solipsismo stilistico: 
studi sui Choliambi e la poetica di Aulo Persio Flacco, which treats the Prologue in conjunction 
with the first satire. Some further progress has been made especially in Charles McNelis’ 
innovative interpretation of the prologue from the perspective of choliambic history and also 
through Kirk Freudenburg’s insights into its poetics.10 Nevertheless, the relation of the prologue 
to the corpus of satires has usually been considered a tenuous one. Perhaps it does not belong to 
                                                          
9 Paolucci and Zurli (2007) provide an overview of these debates. 
 




the book at all. Perhaps it serves as an epilogue (which does nothing to solve its problems).11 
Perhaps it refers to the iambic prologues of Roman comedy—an idea intriguing and not without 
merit, but since comedic prologues are written in senarii I omit them from my present inquiry.12 
Perhaps, finally, this little poem belongs precisely because it does not belong: Persius demands 
from his readers disproportionate interpretive work to bridge the gap between the prologue and the 
satires, in keeping with the disjointedness and elusivity of his satire more generally.13 
   
Digest  
Nec fonte labra prolui caballino   
nec in bicipiti somniasse Parnaso 
memini, ut repente sic poeta prodirem. 
Heliconidasque pallidamque Pirenen 
illis remitto quorum imagines lambunt          5 
hederae sequaces; ipse semipaganus  
ad sacra uatum carmen adfero nostrum. 
quis expediuit psittaco suum ‘chaere’  
picamque docuit nostra uerba conari?   
magister artis ingenique largitor                   10  
uenter, negatas artifex sequi uoces.  
quod si dolosi spes refulserit nummi,  
coruos poetas et poetridas picas  
cantare credas Pegaseium nectar. 
 
No, I haven’t dipped my lips in the Horsey 
Spring, nor do I remember having dreamed on 
twinpeaked Parnassus so presto I could turn out 
(prodirem) this way to be a poet. The ladies of 
Helicon and pallid Pirene I reject and leave 
(remitto) for The Greats (Illis), whose statues the 
clingy ivies lick. Myself a semipagan, I offer our 
song to the rites of the bards. Who enabled the 
parrot to do his own chaere, and taught the 
magpie to try our words? The Master of Art and 
Gifter of Genius, Stomach, the artist at pursuing 
voices denied. But—if the hope of underhanded 
coin will’ve glimmered—you’d believe that 
crow-poets and poetess-magpies sing Pegasus’ 
nectar.  
 
                                                          
11 The two important transmissions diverge, with profound implications. P places the choliambics before 
the Satires in a second hand; A and B place the choliambics after the Satires. See Reynolds (1983: 293-
294). Pasoli (1968) places the choliambics at the end of the collection; its programmaticism does not 
automatically forbid its being an epilogue. To follow AB and leave the choliambics at the end of the book 
ignores the obvious allusions to the proemial passages of Hesiod, Propertius, and others, which I shall 
consider here in my own treatment. Also see Parker (2009: 158-161). 
 
12 cf. especially the idea of the Terentine polemic/parabasis-like prologue. For this, see Korzeniewski 
(1978).  
 





The poem is generally seen to fall into two halves (1-7 and 8-14): the first offers a recusatio from 
the league of great poets, and the second a critique of contemporary poetry as mimicry. The first 
line anchors the work we are about to read in a low register: prolui, McNelis observes, only appears 
in satire. Caballus, meanwhile, “nag,”14 is not a nice name for any horse, especially for one of 
divine parentage: the fons caballinus refers to the Muses’ sacred spring that gushed forth when 
Pegasus struck the ground on Mount Helicon, the Hippo-crene, as the scholiast reminds us. 
Inspiration from the Muses occupies the first four lines, introducing a question—where the 
motivation to write will be found—that will recur again and again throughout the book. Here, the 
convention of dreaming on their mountains has been familiar since Hesiod who opened Theogony 
with a confluence of references to Helicon and the Hippocrene. That story was itself recounted by 
Callimachus in his Aetia I (fr. 2), where the poet also represented himself as a friend of the Muse 
by contrast to the Telchines (fr. 1.2, 24), associating himself with divine singing through his 
connection with Apollo (29-33). The place of Callimachus’ “dream relocation” was, apparently, 
Helicon.15 Persius’ somniasse also recalls Ennius’ dream of Homer qua peacock (fr. 9 Skutsch) 
and Propertius’ vision on Helicon at the waters of Bellerophon’s horse at the opening of his Book 
III, where he asserts his work’s affiliation with the divine sisters (opus hoc de monte Sororum, El. 
III, 1.17). In that poem, Propertius makes his human inspiration divine, calling upon Callimachus 
and Philitas as divinities whose sanctum he wishes to enter as sacerdos (El. I, 1.1-4). In elegy III, 
3, Propertius recounts a dream in which he drank (admoram ora, El. III, 1.5; cf. Persius’ labra 
prolui, Prol. 1) at the Hippocrene (Bellerophontei… umor equi, El. III, 1.2). He had started to sing 
                                                          
14 McNelis (2012: 243); the term is used in satires by Lucilius 153 W (163 M), Varro Sat. Men. 388, 478.1, 
and Hor. Serm. I, 6.59 and 103. 
 





of great Rome until Apollo rebuked him for attempting epic (carmen heroi, El. III, 3.15ff.). 
Propertius then moved from the Hippocrene to a cave of the Muses proper, where Calliope gave 
him his non-martial programme and re-moistens his lips from the font (El. III, 3.39-52), a 
relocation of inspiration not so far afield from where he started after all.  
But the tropes of inspiration that Persius summons are entirely framed by negation: I did 
not wash, I did not dream, I reject. Recusatio, too, of course has its tradition; both Ovid and 
Propertius supply salient points of comparison for the movement away from a major genre in favor 
of the minor. In Amores I, 1, Cupid changes the poet’s scheme (metrical and thematic). The poet 
complains that the vates and Helicon belong to the domain of the Muses, not to that of Cupid (Am. 
I, 1.1-15). Ovid nevertheless submits to the new god, relinquishing his Vergilian potential (Am. I, 
1.1). Similarly in Ars Amatoria, the poet says that his poetry has not been inspired by neither 
Apollo nor the Muses coming upon him Hesiodically tending sheep (servanti pecudes vallibus, 
Ascra, tuis, I.28), but rather by Venus.16  
Although Persius draws upon the same set of tropes as his predecessors, he importantly 
diverges from both the Propertian and Ovidian forms of recusatio: in spite of their denial of certain 
types of inspiration and generic affiliation, both earlier poets assert new sources of inspiration and 
create new mythologies for their work—Propertius moves from the Hippocrene to the Muses 
themselves, Ovid from Apollo and the Muses to Cupid and Venus. Persius offers no such re-
direction in the lines that follow his remittance. The expectation of realignment is thus subverted 
and the work left incomplete as Persius lumps the divinities (Heliconidas) and their singing 
converts, responding irreverently to poetic self-sanctification: this is my offering… the parrot’s 
                                                          
16 Kenny (1970: 372-380) has argued for placing Lucretius in this tradition, running from Hesiod through 
Persius. This would dovetail nicely with Lucretius’ prominence in the first line of Satire I. If this is the 
case, then we have a nice literary-genealogical frame built out of the Prologue and the book’s end, as 




chaere. Persius’ prologue, then, is not only a recusatio from grand inspiration, but also a recusatio 
from the (almost as grand) tradition of recusationes.  
 The only positive identification of the poet is the neologism semi-paganus, a favorite site 
of argument. Glosses for this neologism have ranged widely: The scholiast proposes semipoeta; et 
hoc verbo humili satirico modo usus est. Other interpretations include “half-rustic,”17 “half-
provincial,”18 “half-civilized outsider,” referring to Persius’ Etruscan origins in Volaterra,19 “a 
half-member of the pagus,” i.e. of the company of vates,20 “something of an outsider,”21 even 
“half-caste.”22 But to identify yourself solely with a neologism is, of course, no identification at 
all, but rather an instigation to the reader to play with words and engage in the manufacture of 
meaning.  
For his own version of generic realignment, Persius supplies only the parrot’s squawk and 
its magister, the stomach. We are greeted by the noise (not song) of a bird that, with its semi-human 
voice, is itself not even fully a bird. Like lines 1-7, the second half of the poem contains only 
repudiation—this time not of self but of other “poets.” While in the first half of the poem, the 
rejection of the fount of inspiration is not met by the assertion of a new source, in the second half 
of the poem inspiration does appear: it is the inspiration of bad poets, who, like trained birds, are 
                                                          
17 Bellandi (1988: 48).  
 
18 Jenkinson (1990: 33-34) sees the term as having to do with Persius’ status as landowner: “The existing 
compaganus ‘normalised’ the invention, and indicates its administrative reference.” 
 
19 Reckford (2009: 39, 56). 
 
20 Harvey (1981) ad loc. argues that the metaphor of lines 6-7 comes from the Paganalia, in which each 
pagus made sacrifices “and P. represents himself as an interloper” who “does not have the unqualified right 
to be in the company of the vates. 
 
21 McNelis (2012: 240). 
 





led to mere mimicry by their uenter. Birds dominate the second half of the poem: the psittacus, 
the pica (magpie), and the coruus (the crow, or rook, or raven, in any case one of these related 
birds known for intelligence and trainability23). The parrot can be taught Greek (chaere, 8), since 
it has a Greek-sounding name, while the magpie can be taught Latin (verba nostra, 9), since it has 
a Latin name. The teachability of poetic production, of ars and ingenium, in lines 8-9, presents the 
first example of pedagogy in a book in which pedagogy will form a recurring and central interest. 
Here the stomach is the magister artis and ingeni largitor, antithetical gears of artistic production 
deriving from the same source: art may be taught and creative genius bestowed.24 The idea that 
poverty is the motivation to create is not an original one, but a particularly interesting precedent 
exists in Plautus’ Stichus, where the parasite Gelasimus is the son of Fames: persistent hunger is 
specifically comic inspiration. Gelasimus will perform any joke for his next meal: it is paupertas 
that makes him ridiculus (Stich. 159-160, 177ff.).   
The prologue’s final three lines are regarded by Harvey and Bellandi as a question.25 But 
this sentence is usually taken as a straightforward continuation of the previous idea, the diagnosis 
of poetic inspiration as the uenter. It is taken to mean that these are mercenary poets, poets who 
sing for their supper, or for money in the final case. Conington’s translation gestures to this: “Only 
let a bright glimpse of flattering money dawn on their horizon, and you would fancy jackdaw poets 
and poetess pies to be singing pure Pierian sweetness.”26 The offer of money, in other words, is 
                                                          
23 Arnott (2007: 90). 
 
24 Conington (1893) ad loc. observes an oxymoron in ingenique largitor—the inborn cannot be bestowed. 
Nevertheless, stomachs, too, are native to poets! 
 
25 Harvey (1981) ad loc.  
 





made to the poets. There is an interpretive problem in the Latin, however, as there is in English: 
Does credas refer to a generalized, anonymous “you” or to a particular you, the audience of 
Persius’ song? Persius himself uses credas in Satire III in a way that is more intelligibly 
generalized: “I’m belching so much you’d think that herds were braying” (findor, ut Arcadiae 
pecuaria rudere credas, Sat. III.9). On these readings, credas is a sort of parenthetical “wouldn’t 
ya know” or “you’d a thunk.” 
But in the prologue, the condition belongs to credere—If there’s something in it for you, 
you would believe that these terrible poets are singing heavenly stuff—not to the birds’ cantare. 
The emphatic protasis exerts more pressure upon credas. Credas here may be used in the sense 
that it is used frequently by Ovid—that you would surmise one thing looking at a scene but in 
reality some other thing happens.27 Ovidian examples of (dis)belief deal with transformation from 
the ordinary to the extraordinary. Illustrative examples include the petrification of Nileus 
(adapertaque velle/ ora loqui credas, Met. V.193-4) and the shipwreck of Ceyx and Alcyone 
(inque fretum credas totum descendere caelum, Met. XI.517). Most significant for our purposes 
here is in the Pygmalion episode where, as in Persius’ prologue, credas is contingent: misgiving 
or hesitation would stop a witness to the changing form of the statue from surmising that it was 
indeed in motion  
uirginis est uerae facies, quam uiuere credas, 
et, si non obstet reuerentia, uelle moueri. (Met. X. 250-1) 
 
It is the face of a genuine girl, who you’d believe were living and—
if propriety weren’t in the way—were wishing to be in motion.  
 
                                                          
27 The examples from Ovid are especially pertinent, but credas appears at a particularly high frequency in 
other corpora that are related by humor (Terence, e.g. Andr. 499), familiar language (Cicero’s letters, e.g. 
ad Fam. XIII, 29.4 or XVI, 8.2), or milieu (Seneca, e.g. Ep. ad Luc. 58.2.3). In these instances, credas 
seems not to be used in the generalizing sense. My point here is not to exclude a generalizing credas, but 




Ovid puts forward that the audience in their imagined roles as viewers might believe that a 
simulacrum is the real thing. On Andrew Feldherr’s reading, credas in the Pygmalion episode is a 
crucial element for understanding Ovid’s theorizing of fiction and mimesis: “realistic art 
transcends its own essential artificiality to become what it represents.” Ovid’s credas is at the 
center of Pygmalion’s encounter with his own art work, between knowing and not knowing what 
it is. The artist Pygmalion at first knows and glories in his creation as a creation. The hazard of 
belief is all the province of literary viewers. The problem with the statue is that Pygmalion himself 
becomes its viewer and believer.28  
From his anti-art perspective, the question of belief for Persius has not so much to do with 
the miraculous power of art to move and transform the real but rather with the traps that art can set 
for gullible audiences who imagine a heavenly song where there are only poets for hire. For 
Persius, the Pygmalion phenomenon is an exercise in the ridiculous: Art fools the artist; he is 
seduced by his own creation, as the climaxing poet of Satire I will be, overcome at his own poetry-
reading. This theory that belief is crucial to the viability of mimesis will frame Persius’ own 
imitation of a Platonic dialogue (itself a famously mimetic genre): Persius’ use of crede in Satire 
IV, as we shall see, is a pointed reference to audience “buy-in.” 
Moreover, what is the audience willing to believe about poetry?  On the reading of the more 
generalized credas: If the poets think they will be paid, their singing will be so good that you’d 
think it were inspired. But on the reading of a more specific, pointed credas, we might understand 
the conditional to mean: If you think you’ll be paid, then you’d be willing to believe that their 
(bad) poetry is inspired. The audience, in other words, may be bought off. Persius implicates the 
audience alongside the poets in the bad-poetry industry. This question will persist through the first 
                                                          




Satire: To whom is it that the hack poets seem to sing divinely? Is it the poets themselves (they 
fancy that they are great) or an obliging (even mimetic) audience? Are the real fakes the poets or 
the listeners? Are we hearing properly?  
The self-negation and other-repudiation that persist through the prologue leave us little to 
hang onto. But recitation of the poem reveals the prominence and pervasiveness of the aural p: the 
final Parnaso (2), re-pente sic poeta prodirem (3), pallidamque Pirenen (4), semi-paganus (6), 
poetas et poetridas picas (13); initial picamque (8), psittaco (9);29 and the significant reformulation 
in the penultimate Pegaseium (14) of fonte caballino (1), each one “step” in from the bookends of 
nec (1) and nectar (14). P is most importantly, of course, for Persius. This marking of the text by 
p is a poetic signature for the Satires. The persona that advertises that it may have nothing behind 
it is, at least, a sound, a carmen (7).30  
 
Hipponax 
The rejection of divine inspiration (the fons caballinus) by our poet, whoever he is, is an assertion 
that the entire tradition of great literature (Pegaseium nectar) from Hesiod through the Romans is 
wholly contingent on audience buy-in. In a like manner, the capacity to be inspired by Muses 
seems to be linked with hexameter verse itself—Callimachus’ elegant and Propertius’ gently 
ironizing elegiacs—but is left behind along with them. The dead-end, clipped, and crippled 
choliambic, the iamb that limps, by contrast, has no room for such niceties. Since the activity of 
                                                          
29 The MSS have psittacus, though spellings of the word in some later Greek literature indicate that the 
sound ps- had been largely reduced to s- (e.g. sittakos, in Arrian, Ind. 15.8). An archaizing emphasis in oral 
performance of the text seems within reach, especially given the archaic topoi of the first seven lines and 
the Grecisms of the latter seven.  
 





the poetic “persona” has thus far been abdication, leaving behind only Persius’ “initial,” we must 
look elsewhere for interpretive bearings: the principal formal interest of the poem is its meter—
choliambic (scazons)—one rooted in the personality of the sixth century Hipponax of Ephesus, 
traditionally credited in antiquity with its invention. The choliamb is so called because the final, 
non-substitutable spondee is cholos by comparison with the trotting iamb—and it drags along with 
it a particular disagreeable metrical ethos.31 Charles McNelis has noted that Persius signals his 
Hipponactean position with that final caballino, further to the same word’s signaling of a “low” 
(and thus satirical) linguistic register, as discussed above: the long penultimate syllable indicates 
that this is choliambic rather than pure iambic, in which the last foot is fixed as an iamb.32 But of 
course the caballus, the horse, also refers us to his human, Hippo-nax. 
Persius’ composition in choliambics has elsewhere been interpreted as a fundamentally 
“Horatian” move, reflecting Horace’s attitude towards Callimachus and experimentation with 
iambic themes and forms in the epodes.33 Horace, however, never used pure scazons in the epodes, 
whereas the Alexandrian wrote five of his thirteen Iambi purely in that meter, including, 
significantly, the first and last. Persius’ first line is, therefore, an assertion of an alignment with 
Callimachus that metrically bypasses Horatian iambic.34 Given Persius’ extensive use of allusion 
                                                          
31 See Rotstein (2010) also on the larger vs. narrower sense of iambic as invective. 
 
32 McNelis (2012: 244). 
 
33 Cucchiarelli (2005: 64-65). 
 
34 How do the meters of Horace’s Epodes stack up against Callimachus’ Iambi? Iambi I-IV and XIII are in 
choliambics; poem V alternates choliambic trimeter and iambic dimeter; poems VI and VII alternate iambic 
trimeter and ithyphallics; poem VIII has only one line preserved, in iambic trimeter; poem IX is probably 
in catalectic iambic trimeter; poem X is in iambic trim, poem XI in brachycatalectic iambic trim, and poem 
VII in catalectic trochaic trim. See Trypanis (1975) ad loc.  Horace follows Callimachus’ use of meters in 
frequently alternating iambic meters, but never choliambics. Epode XVII alone is stichic and in iambic 





to the Horatian corpus throughout the libellus, this must be construed as a self-conscious move. 
Moreover it is a specialized type of “iambic” writing. Horace’s meters are diverse, overlapping 
with the metrical practices of Archilochus, whom he pairs with Callimachus as a model for his 
own behavior in Epode VI. Archilochus almost certainly did not write choliambics—and, in any 
case, in the ancient tradition it was certainly Hipponax who was the genitor of the form. It is 
Hipponax to whom Callimachus brings to our attention in his own choliambic endeavor in his first 
few Iamboi.  
To be clear: Hipponax is by Persius’ time as much, or perhaps more, a character in the 
tradition as an extant poet. This character was said to be a small, but punchy, brainy manipulator 
of speech.35 And as inventor, he and his aggressive persona are particularly identified with this 
meter, in spite of the fact that there are a few epodic fragments, (frr. 115-18W) and a parody in 
hexameters (fr. 128 W).36 Testimonia to Hipponax attest specifically to his conflict with Bupalus 
and Athenis, sculptors who had once lampooned Hipponax’s appearance. The sculptor creates a 
blunt kind of criticism in cartoon. To this portraiture, Hipponax responded with insults and 
condemnations, resulting in the story that presents the figure imagined by Callimachus and Horace 
in their later iambic practices. The significance of Persius’ identification with Hipponax is thus 
two-fold: the meter formulates for the poet a legendarily reactionary and invective voice; the meter 
asserts the poet’s claim to a humor and world-view that is more rigorous than those of his 
immediate predecessor.  
 
                                                          
35 For the coherence of the ancient biographical tradition and Hipponax’s self-presentation, see Rosen 
(1988b). 
 






Through meter, Persius identifies with Hipponax, but this identification is likely to be largely 
through Callimachus’ “Hipponax,” the character who inducts the later poet’s Iambi. Through an 
examination of the Iambi of Callimachus, we can see how Persius both aligns his Hipponacteanism 
with that of Callimachus and differentiates himself from Callimachus. In the first Iambus, 
Hipponax is announced at once with his characteristic meter, the position of ἥκω —“I have 
returned”—signaling the choliambic line.  
 Ἀκούσαθ’ Ἱππώνακτος· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ’ ἥκω  
ἐκ τῶν ὅκου βοῦν κολλύβου πιπρήσκουσιν, 
φέρων ἴαμβον οὐ μάχην ἀείδοντα  
τὴν Βου̣π̣άλε̣ι̣ο̣ν̣ [.].ν̣ά̣.[... ἄ]νθρωπος  
     ]..β[ |                    ].ειν                           5 
        ὦ]νδρες οἳ νῦν [ |         ]κ̣έπφ[  
       κα]τηύλησθ’ οἱ με̣[ |   Διω]ν̣ύσου 
         ]τε Μουσέων .α[ |      ]. Ἀπόλλωνος  
ἐς τὸ πρὸ τείχευς ἱρὸν | ἁλέες δεῦτε,  
οὗ τὸν πάλαι Πάγχαιον ὁ πλάσας Ζᾶνα   10 
γέρων λαλάζων ἄδικα βιβλία ψήχει.  
 
Listen to Hipponax. For indeed I have come 
from the place where they sell an ox for a 
penny, bearing an iambus which does not 
sing of the Bupalean battle…. man … 
O men of the present day …. as the seabirds 
you are crazed at the sound of the flute of 
Dionysus… and of the Muses… of Apollo 
here in a throng to the shrine before the wall, 
where the old man who fashioned the 
ancient Panchaean Zeus chatters and 
scratches out his unrighteous books.  
Callimachus, Iambus I.1-11 trans. Acosta-Hughes 
 
Persius echoes this first poem in several ways in his own prologue. Hipponax indicates that he is 
addressing a scene before a sacred wall (Iamb. I. 9).37 Persius, in lines 6-7 of his prologue, 
curiously describes himself making an offering to the rites of the bard-priests, to the sacra vatum. 
Freudenberg has astutely observed that Persius’ carmen adfero may be an echo of Callimachus’ 
pheron iambon (Iamb. I.3).38 But what kind of Hipponax is Persius aligning himself with here? 
Although Callimachus’ Hipponax says that he is not at that time offering a “Bupalean” critique, 
                                                          
37 In any case a sacred space, perhaps a shrine in front of a city wall or perhaps the wall of a temple itself. 
  





i.e. a critique that is not quite Hipponactean, this praeteritio of course reminds us of the classical 
characteristics of Hipponax’s iambicism and the type of virulent attack into which a more vitriolic 
instantiation of the old poet could launch.39 Callimachus’ Hipponax pointedly refrains from the 
kind of attacks on the sculptor which tended toward the obscene—depictions of Bupalus’ gluttony 
and sexual appetite.40 There’s a group of men: the first or second century Diegete tells us that they 
are philologists, possibly philosophers — either way, some group of self-styled intellectuals who 
are κέπφοι, sea birds, boobies, “bird brains.” To this flock, Hipponax tells a tale. Callimachus’ 
rejection of Bupalean critique for his Hipponax therefore represents a choice for didacticism over 
pure aggression.  
If Persius’ caballino marks the text as Hipponactean, then carmen adfero marks the text as 
an echo of the “Hipponax” of Callimachus in particular. This may point us further towards Persius’ 
embodiment of the role of Hipponax, one that is simultaneously more firm and more elusive than 
the citations of Callimachus. It is said that Callimachus opens the poem in the voice of Hipponax, 
but this is not quite accurate.41 Callimachus explicitly names the speaker of Iambus I “Hipponax” 
in his first line, “Listen to Hipponax.” Hipponax is framed as a character within a poem that 
belongs to Callimachus. This figure is a substitution for the Muse whom he invokes in the Aetia—
a generic marker that signals a change in meter, register, and subject.42 We might therefore see 
Persius reading the first line of Callimachus’ first Iambus in this way when we find him writing 
                                                          
39 Acosta-Hughes (2002: 32-35). Although the attack on Bupalus was motivated by personal animus, 
sculptors as a group seem to have been attacked by Hipponax as well: the fragments of exhibit a particular 
dislike of the craft. We might even see this rejection of sculpture in Persius’ rejection of the ivies that adorn 
the sculptures of the greats: illis remitto quorum imagines lambunt/ hederae sequaces (Prol. 6). 
 
40 Rosen (1988b). 
 
41 Morrison (2011: 330). 
 





the Muses out of his script in the first lines of his Prologue. Callimachus also later rejects the figure 
of the older iambicist in order to signal his own innovation within that tradition: reference to 
Hipponax becomes a site of poetic independence when, in the choliambic conclusion to a 
collection which displays greater metrical diversity in its later poems—he asserts some distance 
from his predecessor by saying that he has not gone to Ephesus, Hipponax’s hometown.43  
Callimachus started making this shift away from his Hipponax-narrator as early as Iambus 
II and more firmly in Iambus IV. In Iambus II, the bird-man returns when Aesop, a fabulist instead 
of an iambicist, tells us a fable in which primordial animals shared in speech with humans.44 When 
Zeus took speech away from them—for some impiety on the part of the fox, the Diegete says—
animal utterances made their homes in humans. Perhaps these are Persius’ negatas uoces.45 
Callimachus uses the pretext of fable to attack his competitors: Eudemus has a dog’s voice, Philton 
that of an ass, tragedians are, somewhat incomprehensibly, fish (perhaps their mouths resemble 
the tragic mask?), and someone is a parrot.46 Iambus II represents a half-step away from Hipponax, 
which becomes a full step away in Iambus IV, in which he casts aside the crutch of a character 
Aesop and launches straight into fable. Olive and Myrtle have a sort of agon and foolish crows 
chatter, but the explicit comparison to contemporary humans has vanished. Persius goes only as 
far as the project of Iambus II, to layer the animal over the human. He won’t leave critique for 
fable, and he commits his persona to the conservative Hipponax that Callimachus flagged for us 
but proceeded to soften. 
                                                          
43 Acosta-Hughes (2002: 71). 
 
44 The fabular and the iambic are connected through the figure of the fox. See Steiner (2010).  
 
45 McNelis (2012: 245). 
 





Catullus and Petronius  
Choliambics hobbled into Latin literature. The meter is significantly extant in Catullus; there is a 
suggestive fragment of Varro47 in addition to reports of republican contemporaries Matius and 
Laevius using the meter.48 For the present purpose, Catullus and Petronius provide sufficiently 
substantial comparanda. Catullus’ choliambics formally underpin poems of aesthetic criticism—
poems 22 (Suffenus) and 44 (Sestius)—of obscene aggression—poems 37 (ad contubernales), 39 
(Egnatius’ urine-scrubbed smile), and 59 (Rufus’ Rufa).49 Catullus deploys the critical pose 
associated with the meter of Hipponax against Suffenus’ copious verses and ornately bound books: 
Suffenus writes libri (22.6) rather than a libellus and in so doing reveals that he is a goatmilking 
gravedigger in spite of all his pretension to be bellus (22.9). Catullus uses a maimed, crabby meter 
to critique an overblown style. Poem 44 in particular may provide some insight into Persius’ 
Prologue and is itself particularly Hipponactean; Sestius is a terrible writer—so bad that his 
writings make Catullus sick. His symptoms include a chill which is “metrically… and lexically 
equivalent” to a fragment of Hipponax: rigeos (Hipp. fr. 43 Dg, 34 W) and frigus (Cat. c. 44.20).50 
                                                          
47 A fragment from the Bimarcus exhibits some features of choliambic meter and is suggestive of metapoetic 
content. Contrast the confident interpretation of Fiske (1908) with the cautious edition of Astbury (1985). 
 
48 On Fiske’s reading, pedatus (propped up) is a play on the “limping” meaning of choliambic. If Fiske is 
right, Varro’s choliambics are about choliambics and the meter enters Latin poetry with a certain self-
consciousness. Varro’s introduction of choliambic is concomitant with Cn. Matius and Laevius. Matius’ 
Mimiambi, extant in several fragments, follow Herondas, another writer of choliambics, and Hipponax; 
Laevius’ choliambic is extant in just one fragment, but apparently addresses a controversy on poetic style. 
On Matius cf. Volkmann (1901: 248). Fiske (1908: 337-340) argues against Vahlen’s argument that the 
fragment is about the prose/meter mix of Menippea; Vahlen has reconstructed Bücheler’s (1862) fragment 
57, which is “very corrupt.” On Laevius, see Morgan (2010) on the fragmentary Latin scazons. 
 
49 For the present, I leave aside the Sirmio poem (31) and Miser Catulle (8), though the former concludes 
ridete quidquid est domi cachinnorum, some “key words” for Persius and the latter exhibits bitterness that 
is at least adjacent to invective. 
 
50 Jones (1968) reads the choliambic O funde noster (c. 44) as a parody. Vine (2009: 213-216) advocates 




In spite of the aches and pains, Catullus still wants those dinner invitations: his uenter—that organ 
which will be the magister of Persius’ parrot—causes him to read and praise, rather than to write 
bad poetry, including himself in the critique by styling himself as a mercenary audience member.51 
Perhaps Catullus is one of the lot in which “you” may be Prol. 14. For both Catullus and Persius 
as choliambicists, then, audiences are equally implicated in the industry of bad literature, where 
even you’d believe in bad poetry if there were something in it for you.  
Poem 59 choliambically informs Rufus about the graveyard behavior of the Ruf-a who is, 
apparently, his fellator. Poem 37 sophisticatedly combines obscenity with the act of writing: 
Catullus threatens the moechi with scrawling sopiones on the tavern’s face, among other activities. 
We might see obscene Catullan choliambicism surfacing in Persius’ almost Priapic attacks. As 
Persius moves into hexameter, he excoriates the words, style, hypocrisy, diseases, and even the 
intimate grooming habits of the city around him. In Satire IV, for example, his diatribist sends up 
a sunbather who plucks out his pubic hairs thus to show off his other sprout—his gurgulio, 
actually, a windpipe standing up out of the groin. Catullus’ written (graphic) phallic aggression 
points us in the direction of Satire I, in which literature and sex are conflated: Persius presents us 
with a hip poetry reading in which he likens recitation and reception to anal sex.  
 
Petronius 
The choliambics of Petronius, roughly contemporary to Persius’ and also placed in a broadly 
“satirical” context, provide an important point of comparison. No argument about the priority of 
                                                          
echoes a Hipponactean fragment (43 Dg, 34 W.) in which “line-final rigéos (disyllabic, with synizesis) is 
metrically and… lexically equivalent to frigus” in c. 44.20. Also compare fragment 42a.2-4 Dg, 32.2-4 W). 
 
51 Also compare Archilochus iambic fragment 78 against Pericles misbehaving at a banquet and drinking 





one text to the other is strictly speaking necessary here, although I am inclined to agree with 
Edmunds among others that it is Petronius who mimics Persius, and not Persius who mimics 
Petronius.52 The generic and thematic features that are shared between the Satyricon and the 
Satires—metrics, parody, pedagogy, and excess—are enough to warrant close scrutiny of the 
poems as a pair, but if we accept the appearance of Eumolpus as a critique and parody of Lucan, 
there is no reason not to accept Agamemnon as a parody of Persius and take Petronius’ to be the 
later text.53 The rhetor Agamemnon offers these lines as a carmen (Petr. Satyr. 4; cf. carmen 
adfero, Pers. Prol. 7).  
Artis seuerae si quis ambit effectus 
mentemque magnis applicat, prius mores 
frugalitatis lege poliat exacta. 
Nec curet alto regiam trucem uultu 
cliensue cenas impotentium captet,                  5 
nec perditis addictus obruat uino 
mentis calorem, neue plausor in scaenam  
sedeat redemptus histrionis ad rictus. 
     Sed siue armigerae rident Tritonidis arces, 
seu Lacedaemonio tellus habitata colono      10 
Sirenumue domus, det primos uersibus annos 
Maeoniumque bibat felici pectore fontem. 
Mox et Socratico plenus grege mittat habenas 
liber et ingentis quatiat Demosthenis arma. 
Hinc Romana manus circumfluat et modo Graio 15  
exonerata sono mutet suffusa saporem. 
Interdum subducta foro det pagina cursum 
et furtiua sonet celeri distincta meatu; 
dein epulas et bella truci memorata canore 
grandiaque indomiti Ciceronis uerba minetur.      20 
His animum succinge bonis: sic flumine largo 




If any man seeks for success in stern art 
and applies his mind to great tasks, let 
him first perfect his character by the 
rigid law of frugality. Nor must he care 
for the lofty frown of the tyrant’s palace, 
or scheme for suppers with prodigals 
like a client, or drown the fires of his wit 
with wine in the company of the wicked, 
or sit before the stage applauding an 
actor’s grimaces for a price. 
     But whether the fortress of armoured 
Tritonis smiles upon him, or the land 
where the Spartan farmer lives, or the 
home of the Sirens, let him give the years 
of youth to poetry, and let his fortunate 
soul drink of the Maeonian fount. Later, 
when he is full of the learning of the 
Socratic school, let him loose the reins, 
and shake the weapons of mighty 
Demosthenes like a free man. Then let 
the company of Roman writers pour 
about him, and, newly unburdened from 
the music of Greece, steep his soul and 
transform his taste. Meanwhile, let him 
withdraw from the courts and suffer his 
pages to run free, and in secret make 
                                                          
52 Edmunds (2009: 84-85). For an overview of the arguments surrounding the identification and dating of 
Petronius, see Courtney (2001: 4-11). 
 
53 Eumolpus in Satyr. 118 will make critiques of epicists these days in terms similar to those of Persius: 












Petronius, Satyricon 5 
ringing strains in swift rhythm; then let 
him proudly tell tales of feasts, and wars 
recorded in fierce chant, and lofty words 
such as undaunted Cicero uttered. Gird 
up thy soul for these noble ends; so shalt 
thou be fully inspired, and shalt pour out 
words in swelling torrent from a heart 
the Muses love. 
Heseltine et al. ed. and trans. 
 
These lines are recited by Agamemnon who indicts contemporary oratorical education: if 
only parents would have the boys take time to be imbued in serious reading, to labor at the harsh 
selection of words. Agamemnon proceeds to illustrate the point of education in a poem composed 
of 8 scazons followed by 14 hexameters, a Menippean of sorts. The teacher asserts in choliambic 
verses that a man in the pursuit of artis severae must adopt the code of severe frugalitas to prevent 
himself from being under the influence of tyrants and undesirables, or from indulging in dinners 
sponged off undesirables, excessive drinking, or, finally, as a bought-off plausor at the theater—
to prevent himself from being a compromised, mercenary audience member, in other words.  
The comparison that we might make between Persius’ movement from choliambics to 
hexameters to Petronius’ parallel movement might be seen as merely formal.54 Setaioli argues 
against this comparison on the basis that the Prologue and Satire I, though related, are distinct 
compositions. If, however, we take Petronius to be the later poet, we may see him playing with 
this very shift in meter that appears in Persius’ book. Upon starting his hexameters, Agamemnon 
strikes a different tone: once the orator has strengthened himself with philosophical learning, he 
                                                          





may drink from a font of inspiration (Maeonium… fontem) and write on epic subjects with the 
approval of the Muses (Pierio… pectore). Petronius’ parody in these lines clearly align with 
Persius’ attitude both to poetic inspiration from founts and Muses in the Prologue and to his send-
up of grand themes in Satires I and V.55 Agamemnon’s claims about what is decorous in the work 
of an educated literary aspirant are clearly ironized by Petronius: the switch to hexameters follows 
the trajectory which he envisions from judicious orator to great writer—just like the career of 
indomiti Ciceronis. He sings epic excess with a host of tetrasyllabic words, in the manner criticized 
by Persius in the fifth satire. Perhaps Petronius is lampooning Persius’ own epic pretension, which 
emerges in spite of himself, in the same satire, when he throws in the towel and uses epic tropes 
to fill out his hexameter (Sat. V.21ff.).  
Latin choliambic literature looks forward directly to themes in the body of the satires: style, 
education, somatic symptoms for consumption of literature, the obscene. Llewelyn Morgan has 
argued that Catullus set choliambic and iambic programs for Latin poetry that Horace would 
classicize. Persius, by way of contrast with Horace, chooses not to back off from choliambic 
aggression but engages fully with the form’s obscene associations in his aesthetic and ethical 
critiques. Nevertheless, the Latin poems reviewed here are importantly different from Persius’ 
prologue. Catullus’ and Petronius’ choliambics provide us with a “back story”: we have a narrative 
implicit within or around each poem according to which we may construe the poetic “persona.” 
Persius’ choliambics identify the author as a choliambicist, and betray nothing more. But as we 
have seen this is far from a neutral identity. His best identification is as a meter, but even this meter 
is dropped in the following poem. The search for the poet will have to continue.  
                                                          
55 Compare Persius’ Ilias Atti/ ebria ueratro, Sat. I.50-51; res grandes nostro dat Musa poetae, I.68; Vatibus 
hic mos est, centum sibi poscere uoces,/ centum ora et linguas optare in carmina centum, V.1-2. For a more 





Horace’s avoidance of pure choliambics is all the more conspicuous in light of its use in 
previous Latin poetic critique, whether literary, instructive, or aggressive. I have suggested above 
that Persius’ metrical choice is un-Horatian. But it is not the case that Horace does not invoke 
Hipponax. Although Horace does not write in pure choliambics, he does compare himself to 
Hipponax in Epode VI (qualis… acer hostis Bupalo, Ep. VI.13-14). Epode VI is an aggressive 
poem, in which Horace and his unnamed adversary, an offensive guest, are figured as dogs, and 
he makes his attack against the offender like Archilochus or like Hipponax. Qualis is a gesture to 
a more generalized iambicism than Hipponactean chol-iambicism.56 Horace is interested in what 
it is to be an enemy: both Archilochus and Hipponax are named by their enemy status rather than 
by name, the former is the enemy of his intended father-in-law, Lycambes, and the latter the enemy 
of the sculptor, whom he makes infamous. 
Persius’ choliambicism—his metrical ethos—imagines the poem as Hipponactean in a way 
that is meaningfully different from Horace’s and even from Callimachus’. His choice of the 
Callimachean iambic meter that Horace avoided calls attention to his departure from his ever-
present immediate predecessor in Roman satire. Instead of being qualis Hipponax, like Horace, 
and instead of introducing a character called “Hipponax,” like Callimachus, Persius speaks as 
Hipponax, without Callimachus’ framing device, and without Horace’s qualifier. Put another way: 
he marks his form as more rigorously Hipponactean than either of his predecessors. When in his 
final Iambus, Callimachus disavowed Ephesus, even as he returned to choliambics; he separated 
himself from Hipponax not only geographically but also generically, opening the poem with a 
libation to the Muses and Apollo, returning to a relationship typified in the Aetia, where Apollo 
                                                          





reminds him to keep an elegant Muse (Aetia 1, 22-24). Callimachus ends up in that place whence 
Persius definitively departed. Persius’ exercise in Hipponacteanism is brief but rigorous. 
Why should Persius so methodically map out a Hipponactean identification for himself and 
avail himself of this backward-looking choliambic tradition and Catullan art rather than other 
freely available Roman invective practices—the epodic practice of Horace and the elegiac 
invective of Ovid’s Ibis?57 The answer lies in understanding the Hipponactean view of the world 
as much as a broader tendency to invective. As the choliambic Catullus would inscribe the world 
with sopiones, Hipponax saw the world in obscene sexual terms turning a proper name like 
Βούπαλος into an animal phallus symbol (Βου-φαλλός), for example, and using this word play as 
an opportunity to put his enemy in sexually compromised positions.58 A Hipponactean worldview 
thus looks for opportunities for sexual humor. We may keep this—and his fragments—in mind if 
we are to look for Hipponactean jokes in the Satires. The platters of sausages, for instance, offered 
in Satire II, for example, may recall the type of “sausage” joke to which Hipponax gravitates.59  
The sneer that appears in the first and third satires (Sat. I.62 and Sat. III. 91)—sanna—may recall 
Hipponax’s pun on the name of Σάννος as σάννιον (“penis”), the type of onomastic etymological 




                                                          
57 I leave aside the controversial matter of Ovid’s Ibis and that poet’s adoption of a Hipponactean persona. 
See Schiesaro (2011) and Rosen (1988a), who both follow La Penna’s (1957) text, on the difficulties of the 
text and its interpretation. 
 
58 Rosen (1988b: 32).  
 





The importance of the metrical identification is reiterated by one of the poem’s major strategies—
etymological word play. The coincidence of caballino in the metrical position that identifies the 
verse as choliambic with its “translation” into Latin of the name of that meter’s inventor suggests 
that etymology plays a significant role in the prologue. We might see Persius’ etymological 
practice as having two, mostly separate, lines of descent: the one poetic and the other philosophical. 
James O’Hara’s methods for distinguishing significant poetic etymology from among all possible 
embedded etymologies include two that are immediately applicable here: that etymological 
components appear in marked, especially framing, positions; that the presentation of multiple 
names for the same person or entity often calls attention to the constitution of names. Persius’ 
caballino for Hipponax falls precisely under the rubric of the first principle. From the latter 
principle, we may take the confluence of associated names—of Parnassus, Helicon, and Pirene—
in lines 2-4 similarly to draw attention to etymological interest. I take these two patent features as 
an indication that etymological wordplay is an important feature of this short poem and therefore 
seek its broader significance throughout.60  
As Glenn Most has remarked in his work on Persius’ teacher Cornutus, fonte… caballino, 
also draws upon etymological practice.61 The caballus-fons is the Hippo-krēnē. The words’ 
positioning at the beginning and end of the line conform to O’Hara’s principle of framing—that 
etymological wordplay in Latin poetry is often signaled by placement at these structurally 
important line locations. The difficulty of this reading is that the poetic device that Persius deploys 
in fonte…caballino is a “dead end” for the reader: the practice of etymology, while relevant, 
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clarifies nothing about the poet’s programme because the poem has rejected it: it is after all nec 
fonte… caballino. This type of frustration characterizes Persius’ corpus more generally. But 
caballino as hippo- appears in a second, perpendicular frame in the Prologue: as the word in the 
final position of the first line it functions in an etymological word play with the word in the final 
position of the last line, nect-ar, yielding Hipponact-. Through bilingual etymology, Hipponax 
literally frames the prologue from start to finish.  
Ancient etymology was a practice of discovering or asserting multiple meanings and 
aitiologies for the same word; it did not seek to cleave to the single-minded discovery of “root.” 
Rather, multiple etymologies contribute to the meaning of a word. A poet might offer multiple 
meanings himself or offer them in complement to or competition with the etymologies of other 
poets. On the philosophical side, the truth sought through etymology was cosmological rather than 
linguistic. Cornutus’ Epidrome is intellectually comfortable with an idea that modern linguists 
would reject: that etymologies of a single word ostensibly at variance with one another may equally 
reveal truths about the universe. A Stoic might allow for aitiologies of the name Ἄιδης that are as 
distant (from a modern perspective) as ἀϊδής (unseen) and ἁνδάνω (by antithesis).62 Glenn Most 
puts it: “Ancient etymology often seeks to establish as many relationships as possible between one 
word and others, as though it were following the principle of the more relations the better.”63 A 
feature of the practice in Latin that distinguishes it from the Greek is that the scope of Latin 
etymology includes Greek, where Greek etymology is exclusive to Greek. Any particular Latin 
etymology may therefore seek to uncover the origin of its object in the other language.64 The 
                                                          
62 As in Cornutus, Epidrome 5. 
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relevance of bilingual wordplay (paronomasia in translation) to Persius’ prologue is signaled by 
the Greek chaere of the foreign psittacus. In the context of Stoic, Alexandrian, and Roman 
practices, any word that is etymologically marked may therefore participate in multiple aitiologies 
and languages and therefore multiple significances. Any particular bit of wordplay may, from a 
modern perspective, appear to be based on soundplay, but from an ancient perspective it may 
nevertheless fall within the scope of etymology.   
Armed, then, with this understanding of the breadth (and capriciousness) of Stoic and 
Roman etymologies, we may approach the hazardous, but important semi-paganus, the mysterious 
word which has been given a variety of Latin- and Roman-centric treatments (discussed above). 
That word of dubious interpretation may equally be formed from the Greek πᾱγά, a spring, the 
motif which both opens and closes the poem (fonte, 1, and Pegaseium nectar, 14). Pindar uses the 
form and motif in the final line of Pythian IV (παγὰν ἀμβροσίων ἐπέων, Pyth. IV.299). The 
possibility of this etymology for paganus within the Prologue is affirmed by Pegaseium (line 14). 
On this reading, Persius is half-inspired, half taking from a stream, even as he declares his 
departure from tradition. The relevance of bilingual wordplay (paronomasia in translation) to the 
prologue is also signaled by the Greek chaere of the foreign psittacus. 
 Vergil provides a helpful comparison here. For him, the poetic utility of etymology is to 
provide a local device that formally parallels the theme of origins. The Eclogues, therefore, contain 
comparatively few instances of etymological wordplay, while the Aeneid contains a great deal. In 
the case of Persius, the Prologue treats the problem of origins and at the same time dismisses them. 
The formal device of etymology appears and (alongside meter) asserts his source in Hipponax. 




another, the composition of aggressive attack. It is rejection and engagement by halves, half Latin, 
half Greek, half inspired, half disgusted.   
 
Cheeping Choliambics   
Etymology is, obviously, but one method of soundplay, which proves an important device of the 
prologue, functioning in tandem with the programmatic statement that the semipaganus will 
offer a song. The significance of the carmen and singing in Latin poetry and singing in general 
alludes to other proems, epic (e.g. Vergil, Aeneid I.1, Ovid, Met. I.4), obviously, but also to 
poetry that is trying to get away from epic (e.g. Ovid, Am. I, 1.5 and 3.19-21 and Propertius, El. 
I, 1.24 and 2.27). Acts of singing are standardly understood as metapoetic (e.g. the songs of 
Homer’s Demodocus and Ovid’s Orpheus). Song’s appearance in a prologue, of course, must be 
programmatic. Persius knows all this as well as any student of literature, so carmen closes the 
first half of the poem (Prol. 7), cantare the latter (Prol. 14). Both carmen and cantare may be 
used for ritualized speech and birdsong, human, oracular, or avian singing65 (e.g.Vergil, Aen. 4. 
462, Ovid, Met. 5.387), but carmen but is an unusual word for the “low” genres, appearing only 
in special circumstances.66 The linguistic distance between carmen and caballinus is the 
ideological between Persius the semipaganus and the self-sanctifying uates whose work he is 
disrupting.  
In those significant positions, both words should tune our ears for the songs that appear 
throughout the short poem. The poem develops Callimachus’ casting of despised contemporaries 
as birds. In Iambus 1, “Hipponax” bemoans the foolishness of intellectuals, calling these 
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philologues or philosophes κέπφοι (Iambus 1.6).67 The κέπφος is none too bright in the tradition, 
especially in comedy, where it stands in for the flighty and gullible in Aristophanes (Peace, 1067), 
and also serves an insult, something like “twit” (Wealth, 912). This bird continues to stand in for 
the scattered mind during the Roman period: Cicero writes in a flustered note to Atticus that he 
has become bird-brained (κεκέπφωμαι, ad. Att. XIII, 40.2).   
The parrot as imitator hardly needs introduction. Ovid valorizes its well-known talent for 
producing human sounds in his mock eulogy for the bird: Psittacus, Eois imitatrix ales ab 
Indis,/ occidit… (Amores, II, 6.1-2). The range of related birds represented by the coruus and pica 
were considered remarkably intelligent and trainable, like the psittacus.68 The magpie and the crow 
or raven—there is some dispute as to their identity—were similarly noted for their capacity for 
speech. Ovid’s coruus is loquax and garrulus, similar to Callimachus’ κορώνη (Iambus IV.82). 
Pliny tells us that a crow greeted Tiberius, Germanicus, and Drusus by name (NH X.121); and, in 
his own time, some Roman knight owned a specimen that could imitate several words together 
and was even then learning more and more (NH 10.124). Aelian (NA 2.51) has the magpie as the 
bird that speaks with the greatest variety of tones (πολυκλαγγότατος), which can be taught to speak 
like a human. The pica has her Ovidian pedigree, too: The Pierides challenged the Muses. When 
the Pierides sang, the cosmos darkened; when the Muses sang, it levitated and it was up to Pegasus 
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68 Bellandi (1988: 99-104) observes the transformation of psittacus into corui and picae through a felicitous 
uariatio that additionally imports to the imitative speech of the parrot the idea of the vulgar croaking of 





to restore it to order by striking the ground, whence arose the spring. For punishment, the Muses 
turned them into magpies, picae.69  
McNelis and Bellandi have observed that the boobies, the foolish birds from Callimachus’ 
poem, become the psittacus, corui, and picae of Persius’ prologue, figures of mimicked speech.70 
But Persius further amplifies the transformation of birds in a yet more interesting and pervasive 
way, one that capitalizes upon the aurality of the poem. As we have seen, p-sounds are prominent 
throughout the prologue—the poet’s signature. Psittacus is central to the poem. The frequency of 
p increases: of the nine words in the final two lines of the poem, four begin with p. The repetition 
of p throughout the poem is itself a Greco-Roman birdcall: Aristophanes used πιππίζειν for the 
approaching avian chorus in his comedy, who enter with their call ποποποποποποποπο (Birds 310). 
The Latin pipiare is of course famous from Catullus’ tongue-in-cheek lament on the death of 
Lesbia’s sparrow, a lament which Ovid’s parrot elegy parrots. Moreover its variant pipare is used 
of the gallina by Varro in his satire on the nature of men (Menipp. 3.2 =Non. 156M).  
Persius’ dispersal of p-sounds throughout the prologue, in place of simply making use of 
the verb pipiare, is clever onomatopoieia. But it does not come without cost to the reputation of 
                                                          
69 The scholiast to Persius offers a different story: that the Hippocrene sprang from Pegasus’ stamping the 
ground in his thirst. 
 
70 There has been a great deal of confusion and imprecision in “translating” bird names across geographical 
regions and between Latin and Greek, due to the broad similarities in the birds’ appearances and perhaps 
less than expert knowledge on the part of an urban writer (then as today) on the differences among the 
raven, crow, rook, pie, and jay in terms of habits, calls, and speech-capacities. Wedgwood explains the 
confusion of crows and ravens in his short article “On the Confusion of Meaning between Coruus and 
Cornix” in the inaugural volume of Transactions of the Philological Society (1854: 107-108). The coruus 
(Greek κόραξ) is the raven, a solitary bird that croaks, an identity that is apparently clear from description 
of its sound in Pliny. Ovid must have confused the coruus for one of its cousins when when he described it 
as loquax and garrulus (Met. II, 547). The cornix (Greek κορώνη) is likely the crow (in spite of most modern 
translations of Persius, in which the corvi are “crows”) or its smaller cousin the rook, a more “talkative” 
bird that travels in groups. Vergil, it seems, shockingly confused the traits of the coruus and cornix in 
Georgics I, 388. The pica (possibly Greek κίσσα or also κόραξ) is the magpie or the jay (Pliny HN 10.21 





the poet of the prologue, since it leads to a possible interpretation of his own poetry as mere 
mimetic bird-call. It is Persius after all who has composed the present poem as a bird-call, which 
comes to a close that is overloaded with cheap poetic devices and participates in the industry of 
Callimachean allusivity.71 Persius’ participation in bird-songs and raucous poetry may even have 
been intimated when he calls himself ip-se semi-paganus in the sentence preceding the 
introduction of the psittacus (6-8)—72 a sort of aural identification between the lines. Moreover, 
the Italic pica’s language is uerba nostra—Roman—not unlike Persius’ well-known (if not well 
understood) programmatic phrase uerba togae (Sat. V.14). And from yet another perspective, 
Persius’ ubiquitous mimesis of Horace—some say slavish imitation—would seem to be portended 
here. Persius anticipates his own worst critics—that he has read (and only read) too much, that he 
is allusive without substance, that his thought is unoriginal, his words too compressed. 
The significance of the production of peeping by the prologue is that the sounds made by 
these “birds,” or poets, are not only inane and imitative but also incoherent. The voice of Ovid’s 
late parrot in Amores II, 6 was not just ingeniosa and loquax (Am. II, 6.16 and 37), but it was also 
lisping and babbling (with its blaeso…sono, 24, it is garrulus, 26). The poet here plays with both 
the verbal (“chattering”) and non-verbal (“babbling”) senses of garrulitas, in the case of this 
talking parrot who had, apparently, a speech impediment! Ovid’s lisping parrot cannot even say 
his own name, psittacus.  
That man with the voice of the parrot in Callimachus’ Iambus II signifies those men who 
are both verbose and babbling (πολύμυθοι καὶ λάλοι, 14). Among the throng of the birdbrains that 
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72 West does not mention the psi- in the section on the oversimplification of consonants in his later 





“Hipponax” confronts before the sacred wall is Euhemerus, a writer of nasty books (ἄδικα βιβλία), 
who babbles (λαλάζων, Iambus I.11). In Persius’ prologue, Notice the c-sounds around the final 
lines: cra-cra is the coruus’ raucus cry.73 The specious words of Persius’ poetae and poetridae are 
ultimately non-verbal, but so, too, is the sound of Persius’ own poem. The prologue, which peeps 
throughout its 14 lines, looks forward to the incoherence of Persius’ muttire and cacchini in the 
first satire (Sat. I.12 and 119) and even to the animal sounds emitted from his body in the third 
satire (findor, ut Arcadiae pecuaria rudere credas, III.9). His budding satirist is frequently 
criticized for being unintelligible (e.g. quid istas/ succinis ambages? Sat. III.19-20).  
Both the babbling and the stomach of the bird resurface as metaphor in the morning 
hangover scene in the third satire:  
… a, cur non potius teneroque columbo 
et similis regum pueris pappare minutum 
poscis et iratus mammae lallare recusas? Sat. III.16-18 
 
Oh, why not instead demand to eat in little bites like some soft dove 
or like princes and angrily reject your nurse’s lullaby? 
 
The images and riddles of the Prologue thus extend far into the Satires. This will be seen to be the 
case even in the matter of Persius’ Stoicism. The prologue is susceptible to its own critique: Persius 
may himself be one of the birds: would you believe that (credas)?  
 
Conclusion  
Persius’ Prologue omits the trappings that in Latin poetry books tell a reader what he holds in his 
hands: something (notionally) biographical, some situating comment on his addressee, some 
suggestion of the quality of the text itself. These are preliminary starting points for interpretation 
of the rest of the book, even if they prove insufficient. Persius has none of that. His prologue’s 
                                                          




stablest point of identification is the meter, which, with its established literary history, offers 
more by way of character than the oblique and evasive utterances of the poet. The etymology 
strengthens the poet’s identification with another poet. But at the same time the Hipponactean 
identity limits itself by participating in the poem’s self-negation: the etymological play 
caballino-nect- for Hippo-nact-  is also part of the poem’s framing aural negation: nec (1) and 
final nec-tar (14). We are very much left where we started, with no information.  
 From Ovid’s tale of the Pierides, the picae already represent the consequences of 
challenging poetic authority. By composing a song that peeps and thus positioning his poetics as 
subject to his own anti-bird critique, Persius incorporates the anxieties of imitatio—of following 
Horace’s Sermones too slavishly, as he is sometimes accused, or even of following Hipponax. The 
scope of Hipponactean aggression as formulated in Persius’ book is therefore expanded to include 
the self as an object. Persius mocks his own poetic labor when he positions himself among the 
birds. In the hexameter poems, he will represent his speech as pointless and birdlike (e.g. Satire 1, 
cum scrobe, line 119; Satire 3, teneroque columbo, line 16). The verses of the semipaganus who 
struggles to write (Sat. 3.9) are unhappily split between poetry and philosophy, split between life 
as he lives it and the life that philosophy intends him to lead.  
 But what remains puzzling about Persius’ invocation of the choliambic ethos is that the 
Hipponactean persona—the defective, aggressive critic—emerges more clearly in the Satires than 
in the Prologue itself. There is a way in which Persius is more “iambic” in the Satires than he is in 
the choliambics, which remain oracular and impersonal in the sense that the persona is absent. 
Through his choliambic practice, unframed and unqualified, Persius makes it possible to resurrect 




also participates in soundplay: nectar not only belongs to Hipponax but also to nec. The first and 
last words of the poem are the same; the poem begins and ends with negation. 
 Iambic came, in ancient generic thinking, to be not just a set of meters or even an ethos 
appearing with that set, but a mode of invective that might be applied to literature74 that is ethically, 
if not metrically, iambic. It is in Persius’ hexameter satires, rather than the choliambic prologue, 
that we find parody and invective. Persius’ unpleasant, reactionary hexametrical Hipponacteanism 
re-invigorates Roman satire, which had been made palatable for a principate by Horace. 
  
                                                          




CHAPTER TWO: Who’s reading this stuff? (Satire 1)  
Through the prologue’s indictment of poets as mimes and of imitatio as parroting, the poet denied 
that he would participate in mere literary convention. If, then, we thought that this prefatory, 
“programmatic” piece promised us something unconventional, we are sorely and immediately 
disabused in the first line of the first satire: O curas hominum! O quantum est in rebus inane! (Sat. 
I.1) echoes Lucretius, Persius’ predecessor in verse philosophy in Latin—for whom inane is a 
signature code word.75 We are reading (or hearing) Roman didactic poetry. But this O tempora, o 
mores-type expression is interrupted by, “Who’ll read this?” (2). The interrupting voice implies 
that the philosophical didact’s own verse is inane: his words are as vain as the Epicurean cosmos 
is void. Philosophical didactic is functionally irrelevant: nemo will read it (2). The rejection of the 
philosophical-didactic overture results in terse satires that eschew both the epic exposition of a De 
Rerum Natura and the honey on the cup of medicinal philosophy (DRN I. 935-50).  
Quis leget haec? raises the fundamental pursuit of this chapter: to read the first Satire and 
the libellus in the context of early Imperial Roman reading practices, broadly construed: The first, 
apparent meaning—“To whom is reading Persius relevant?”—frames the first satire, where, by the 
end, Quis leget haec? will not only ask “Who is the implied reader of Persius?” but also “Will the 
implied reader be acceptable to Persius?”—even “Can anyone read this stuff?”  
 Previous scholarship on the first satire has revealed a great deal about where in the literary 
world Persius positions the aesthetic objects of his ire and about the poem’s erotic metaphors.76 
The present chapter situates Persius’ first satire within the context of early Imperial Roman reading 
and performance practices. Indeed, this poem is itself used as a crucial piece of evidence in the 
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increasing scholarship on Roman lectio and recitatio as social activities and sites of social 
criticism.77 A close reading attentive to the satire’s Roman audience, genre, and parodies of 
contemporary poetry leads to a discussion of the range of possible readers that arises from the 
content and the structure of the satire: the performers of contemporary poetry represented within 
the text, the idealized lector imagined by the satire, and the implied, ironically drawn reader of this 
Satire. Persius’ critical attitude toward lectores and poetic performance at Rome has a great deal 
in common with the values of writers on oratorical training and performance. A comparison with 
salient passages from Seneca’s Controversiae clarifies which points of Persius’ critique conform 
to traditional criticism and which aspects of his satire innovate. I shall argue that the terms and 
effects of Persius’ parody are such that his satires are implicated in the very reading and 
performance practices that the satire maligns. Persius is terribly concerned about our aural hygiene, 
and so this chapter offers a full treatment of ears in the corpus. Finally, the ears lead us in to a 
concluding discussion of the physiognomy of satire—a set of correspondences between types of 
humor and body parts.  
 
Digest 
The first verse of the satire takes its tone and content from philosophical didactic poetry, but is 
quickly interrogated by another “voice” questioning the relevance of that genre in the 
contemporary literary scene (1-7). The poet goes on to interrupt his own self-defense, speculating 
whether it is fas to say what he’s saying, and characterizing his own helpless laughter when he 
looks at Roman (nostrum, 9) life. The first example of nostrum istud uiuere triste is how Romans 
write in private both poetry and prose for public consumption (13). Persius quickly moves on to 
                                                          




the ridiculousness of public performance, satirizing both poet and audience in erotic terms (13-21) 
and inveighs against the poet of the scene directly, uetule: his misunderstanding and abuse of 
learning (24-30). He returns to poetry performance, but this time to a dinner party, emphasizing 
Romans (Romulidae, 31) who style themselves as symposiasts (30-40). 
 An interlocutor accuses Persius of hypocrisy in his ridicule of poets who aim to please. 
Persius responds by refining his own position relative to praise (40-49)—it’s not that he doesn’t 
want it, it’s that he doesn’t want yours. The poet gives the interlocutor’s understanding of praise 
and desire for honest a good shake down: what does it mean to seek and receive a “How pretty!” 
(belle) for composition and performance? The interlocutor has slight and superficial good qualities 
as poet and dinner host. The interlocutor knows how to compose poetry that perfectly adheres to 
the vogue and the standards that Romans currently teach. According to these standards, the self-
medicated Iliad of Attius and ubiquitous dilettante verses (50-53) qualify their composers for a 
very complacent belle.  
 The contemporary poet aims for verses that softly flow in perfect alignment—too softly and 
too seamlessly. These are the poetic values that Persius’ verses reject. Perhaps this is reflected in 
his choice of meter in the Prologue, where the limping iambics are specifically those which cannot 
flow with gentle rhythm (molli… numero, 63-64). In particular, contemporary poets fail to adapt 
their meter and poetic ideals to their genres: moralizing, erotic, festive, and epic verses are taught 
to be written all alike, by and for people who have been inundated with lightweight Greek 
literature. It is written with the kind of conventional “inspiration” that Persius rejected in the 
Prologue (63-78). The prevalence of these poetic values—including in education—should make 
the current state of language no surprise. Bad literature and teaching has resulted in a sartago of 




those in the public sphere whose oratory has become inclined towards receiving applause for 
niceties, towards poetic devices rather than substantive argument (83-87). The desire for the 
evaluation bellum has come to govern all speech. 
 Persius moves on from satirizing the misguided motives and social impact of contemporary 
poetry to parody—lines that are meant to be particularly reflective of the Euripidean-degenerate 
themes that allegedly dominate the scene (92-106). The interlocutor warns Persius against parody 
of this type: it will have social consequences for him, too (107-114). The types of humor that 
Lucilius and Horace provide are misunderstood at the present moment. Lucilius’ humor is a 
crackdown (genuinum fregit, 115), Horace’s a more subtle poking fun (omne uafer uitium ridenti 
Flaccus amico/ tangit, 116-117). Today’s pompous magistrate is proud of having cracked down 
on city finances (fregerit, 130), and knows how to laugh at bad odds (risisse uafer, 132). Social 
norms have changed: Persius is not allowed the type of sneering that was allowed to Horace 
(‘rides,’ ait, ‘et nimis uncis/ naribus indulges,’ 40-41; cf. [Flaccus] callidus excusso populum 
suspendere naso, 118) and is shown the door (‘… extra/ meiite.’ discedo, 113-114). If Lucilius is 
characterized by a jaw and Horace a nose, Persius’ identifying body part is a spleen (sum petulanti 
splene, 12)—importantly an internal organ rather than one that faces his audience. Persius claims 
the rights of the satirist from Lucilius and Horace to critique those around him: Why should he not 
laugh, even in private? Where can Persius find his audience? His ideal reader must be versed in 
Attic comedy, but in a particular way. He rejects those who appreciate humor in the common way 
(126-134). Lightweights should read Time Out and bestsellers/bodice-rippers/grocery store novels 






Two Satires  
To follow Persius from topic to topic (as in my digest above) is to miss the major structural feature 
of the satire: his poem is crucially and decisively de-routed, even sidetracked and subverted, by 
the conspicuous interruption of his opening discussion. The question nam Romae quis non… (8) 
will not be completed for more than 100 lines. The question started in line 8, nam Romae quis 
non…, is finally completed by auriculas asini quis non habet? (121). The (non-metrical) 
complementarity of these half lines is signalled by verses that frame the interrupting excursus: a, 
si fas dicere—sed fas/ tum cum… /aspexi… (8-10) and me muttire nefas?.../ … uidi, uidi ipse, 
libelle (119-120).78 The first satire “proper,” which consists of only twenty one and a half lines (1-
8 and 121-134), addresses the question of audience, the parenthetical, at over 100 lines, the 
question of poetic production. The first satire, then, reads thus:  
O curas hominum! o quantum est in rebus inane! 
quis leget haec? min tu istud ais? nemo hercule. nemo? 
uel duo uel nemo. turpe et miserabile. quare? 
ne mihi Polydamas et Troiades Labeonem 
praetulerint? nugae. non, si quid turbida Roma                5 
eleuet, accedas examenue inprobum in illa 
castiges trutina nec te quaesiueris extra. 
nam Romae quis non…      
auriculas asini quis non habet? hoc ego opertum,  121 
hoc ridere meum, tam nil, nulla tibi uendo  
Iliade. audaci quicumque adflate Cratino 
iratum Eupolidem praegrandi cum sene palles, 
aspice et haec, si forte aliquid decoctius audis.      125 
inde uaporata lector mihi ferueat aure,    
non hic qui in crepidas Graiorum ludere gestit   
sordidus et lusco qui possit dicere ‘lusce,’   
sese aliquem credens Italico quod honore supinus 
fregerit heminas Arreti aedilis iniquas,              130 
nec qui abaco numeros et secto in puluere metas 
scit risisse uafer, multum gaudere paratus 
si cynico barbam petulans nonaria uellat. 
his mane edictum, post prandia Callirhoen do. 
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Oh, the woes of humanity! Oh, how great is the void in the universe! 
Who’ll read that? You talking to me? No one, I swear. No one? None 
or two. Miserable rot. Why’s that? Afraid that the Trojan Women 
and Polydamas prefer Labeo to me? Lightweights. No—if crowded 
Rome lifts something up, you shouldn’t go and straighten the 
inferior balance on that scale—and don’t make your investigations 
outside yourself. For who at Rome doesn’t… who doesn’t have ears 
of an ass? That’s my secret, that’s my laugh—this nothing of mine, 
I won’t sell it to you for a whole Iliad. Whoever you are, inspired by 
bold Cratinus, you lose sleep over irate Eupolis and the Great Old 
Man, you: have a look here, too, in case you hear something a bit 
denser. From that point let my reader, with a steam-cleaned ear—
not the dirt-bag who goes around making fun of Greek-style shoes 
or the guy who can muster a “Hey, one-eye!” at a one-eyed man, 
thinking he’s something, since standing on Italic ceremony he 
cracked down on short measures as the aedile of Arretium, nor the 
sly fox who knows how to laugh at numbers on the abacus and 
goalposts on the cleaved dust, all ready to make merry if some hussy 
yanks a Cynic’s beard. To them I recommend the daily bulletin in 
the morning and Callirhoe after lunch.   
        
The bulk of this satire is a “parenthetical” or digression that overwhelms the original dimensions 
and motive of the poem. On this reading, the first line—Lucretian didactic—is not rejected because 
it is wrong, but rather because it seemingly has no audience; it is wholly out of step with what 
Persius portrays as contemporary literary taste (or lack of taste). A different type of diatribe will 
later be sought: but that philosophical mode will be demoted from the contemplation of the 
rhetorical woes and the contemplation of the universe to the examination of particulars: The acidity 
of Persius’ work replaces the honey of Lucretius’. 
For the remainder of this chapter, lines 1-8 along with 121-134 will be referred to as the 




A troublesome beginning  
The interchange of voices that the first satire offers in its first 7 lines presents various interpretive 
challenges for its reader. The identification of these voices has drawn diverse interpretations, not 
only because of its inherent flux but also because of an apparent attribution by the Commentum of 
the second line to Lucilius—which seems, upon examination, more likely to be a reference to the 
Lucretian quality of line 1. Regardless, since antiquity, the first line has been read as a “quotation.” 
The problem of interpreting the subsequent lines, which introduce the question of readership, has 
persisted for as long as the lines have had readers. Medieval manuscripts exhibit a variety of 
accounts for the seeming dialogue. The writing-reader of L marks the lines as a dialogue between 
the Vox Persii and the Vox Saturae, reflecting a sophisticated notion of who or what can speak.79 
Satura as a speaker makes sense once we take out the parenthetical diatribe: the putative addressee 
for lines 1-8 and 121-122, I argue, is Persius’ libellus; it is the libellus that objects to its author.  
 The remarks on voices in L reflect the mechanics of lectio that persisted from classical 
antiquity: that to read the navigation devices that control the flow of the text is predicated upon 
understanding the text, perhaps a counter-intuitive notion from a 21st century perspective, in which 
you might read in order to understand: intellegere is requisite for legere. The ancient practice of 
marking the text in ways that much anticipated standardized punctuation was a practice of readers, 
not of authors, though a particularly acute reader might mark a text for another as a favor.80 Lectio 
is the practice for which, Quintilian advises, Unum est… quod in hac parte praecipiam, ut omnia 
ista facere possit: intellegat (Inst. Orat. I, 8.1-2). Similarly, Aulus Gellius tells us his response to 
a suggestion from an homo inepte gloriosus that Gellius read Varro’s satire in order that he (the 
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gloriosus) interpret it: Quo nam, inquam, pacto legere ego possum quae non adsequor? Indistincta 
namque et confusa fient quae legero. (Noct. Att. XIII, 31). Legere here must lean heavily towards 
“reading aloud,” but it is important to note that there is no qualifier in the Latin and it is Gellius’ 
fool who puts the cart before the horse. 
The reader of L indicates that the first line, the echo of diatribe, emanates from Persius’ 
profound philosophical knowledge: Persius ex intima philosophia.81 The interruption, for this 
reader, is the voice of Persius’ own satire—the voice of the genre against what has been said—in 
an apostrophe to the book we are reading, or the book we thought Persius was writing when we 
read O curas hominum!: Vox Saturae apostropha ad librum. The retort “You talkin’ to me?” is 
Persius’ and the answer “No one will read it” is the return of the Vox Saturae. The reader takes the 
first line as the earnest, if aborted, attempt of “Persius” to write properly philosophical literature. 
The difference is not an arbitrary assignation of “A” and “B” to what is evidently a dialogue being 
born from the half lines. Rather, the difference is one of where we place “Persius” and the generic 
and ideological position of the author implied in and by the Satires. Is the “real” Persius the 
philosopher or the satirist? Is satire a conversion of abstract critique into common currency or is 
satire the only option left once philosophy has proven its own bankruptcy? For that medieval 
reader, “Persius” is a philosopher-didact who is forced to change genres by the voice of Satire. The 
evolution of philosophy within the Satires is reflected in a poetic voice whose first business is self-




                                                          






How many readers does the first satire have? legere means at least two things in the first satire. It 
means “to read” in a general sense (Quis leget haec? Sat. I.2); it shortly acquires the sense “to 
recite literature to an audience” (sede leges celsa, 17). Persius’ performing lector, paradoxically, 
simultaneously recites and listens to his own recitation; his performance affects others and he 
himself is affected by his own utterance. This means that by the time we get to lector at the close 
of the poem, who is, as we shall see, an elusive creature, legere means “take in,” “to listen,” “to 
read,” “to recite.”  The seemingly jarring equation of listening and reciting is supported by Roman 
reading practices more generally, in which to listen to literature was equally a form of reading.82 
And indeed, Persius specifies that his reader must have a very particular ear (126).  
 The terms of Persius’ critique are reasonably situated alongside prose works on rhetoric from 
the early imperial Roman context. Here, for the sake of expediency, the set of commonalities and 
sympathies across Roman texts on oratory and rhetoric (and the pedagogy of reading and listening 
directed thereto) is referred to as  “traditionalist” discourse, including for the present purpose the 
tradition that runs from the Rhetorica ad Herennium through Dionysius of Halicarnassus to 
Quintilian; the Elder Seneca appears as a comparandum reasonably representative of that tradition 
and useful as an index for Persius’ critique, not as a site of direct allusion. While that tradition, of 
course, takes as its object the theorizing and teaching of oratory, it shares with Persius an interest 
in the ethics of performance. The proximity of the performances of poetic and oratorical works is 
apparent especially through the concern exhibited in the Controuersiae and the Ad Herennium that 
the gestures and voices of performers of declamation or oratory not verge on the histrionic or sing-
songish.  
                                                          




Reader no. 1: The Painted Reader  
The embedded satire stages a recitatio. The lector in this case is the performing poet. This lector 
is effeminate, watery, overtly stylish.  The effect upon his audience is sexually arousing, even 
aggressive. Both he and his audience experience the recitatio erotically. The lector is affected by 
the words coming out of his own mouth as the carmina take on a life of their own. Although the 
poet has composed these morsels to bait others (Sat. I.22), the act of reading his own verse is so 
moving that it leads the poet-reader himself to orgasm.83 After the public recitatio scene, Romans 
have degraded to giant (mere) Tituses made to quiver at poetry’s vibrations. After the embedded 
recitatio, Persius takes us to a party with sympotic pretensions, where the elite conuiuae (38) 
consume literature as they consume food (ecce inter pocula quaerunt/ Romulidae saturi quid dia 
poemata narrent, 30-31); listening to poetry is concomitant with drinking and eating (as it always 
was in the sympotic tradition). The scene piles up more and more grecisms, first in the narration 
(hyacinthia, 32) then through the sympotic lector’s voice (Phyllidas and Hypsipylas, 34). These 
affected gestures are verbalized (nasalized?) through a defect: an implausibly stuttering, lisping 
nose (33). This lector’s vocal affect is achieved by straining his words (eliquat, 35), recalling the 
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ocellus of the poet is the singular “eye” of the “head” of the penis. Interpretations vary widely. Adams 
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medical principle found in “Galen, Celsus, and Aristotle. Not only is semen (in Aristotle, Generation of 
Animals 725a) a residue made from food, blood, and pneuma, but it is the region around the eyes that is 




Reader no. 2: An Ideal Lector  
In the frame satire, the interrupting voice demands to know who the lector of the present verse 
satire could be. The poet answers that it is virtually no one (uel duo uel nemo, 2-3). Persius pursues 
the idea on the other side of the embedded satire: “Who doesn’t have the ears of an ass?” Recitatio, 
as we have seen, affects a broad spectrum of Romans, from middling Tituses to elite Romulids: 
readers and listeners are oversexed and oversaturated by literary consumption. By contrast, 
Persius’ ideal lector is not stuffed but rather prepared to hear something distilled (decoctius, 125) 
through a well cleaned ear (inde uaporata lector mihi ferueat aure, 126). This lector’s ear is 
discerning, distinguishing slapstick (non hic qui… gestit, etc., 127-133) from… But Persius does 
not tell us what it is that his lector distinguishes. It is presumably this that we are meant to listen 
for throughout his satires, satires that are particularly interested in aures.  
 The 112-line parenthesis compromises the aural tenability of the satire; the syntactic 
continuity of line 8 and line 121 is unlikely to be picked up without the text before the lector’s 
eyes or without a second oral reading. This observation is important because it means that while 
Persius defines his ideal lector as an auditor, he makes his own poetry unlistenable.  
 Persius’ reader—the none or two—is not at Rome. The reader of Persius is a reader of old 
Attic—not one who goes for the obvious humor directed at Greeks (qui in crepidas Graiorum 
ludere gestit, 127) but for the joke that is internal to clear-eared Greek readers. The scarcely 
existent lector (nemo, 2) is one who lives and breathes for the comedians of classical Athens, but 
who read those texts in a particular way. I take this passage differently from Ferriss-Hill, who takes 
the address to  
Audaci quicumque adflate Cratino 






“You, whoever are inspired by bold Cratinus and lose sleep  
over testy Eupolis along with giant Aristophanes…”84   
 
to mean that we have to go back to Aristophanes and Greek Old Comedy. This is partially right: 
that the ideal reader of Persius is one schooled in Greek Old Comedy,85 and schooled in a particular 
way. The formulation Cratinus-Eupolis-Aristophanes in satire is also Horatian (Serm. I, 4.24-25), 
so this may mean that the reader is one who reads them in a Horatian way.  
 But if we recognize and interpret the frame proposed above, we realize that this “ideal” 
reader, whoever he is, is ultimately no one—he is as fictive as Persius’ interlocutor, a strawman 
whose fictiveness the satirist calls out in line 44, with quisquis es, o modo quem ex aduerso dicere 
feci (“Oh, whoever you are that I just created to argue for the opposition”).  This discerning reader 
who possesses the well-calibrated ear, who will burn for Persius’ condensed decoction, has already 
been identified as nemo. This decoction is itself hypothetical: it is not even clear that what the 
satirist is writing will be decoctius: si forte aliquid decoctius audis, “if per chance you hear 
something better boiled down,” 125). Like his profession of the rara auis of the fitness of his 
composition (si forte quid aptius exit… si quid tamen aptius exit, 45-46), his decoction is 
conditional and therefore tentative; Persius takes care to remind us of this contingency.  
 
Reader no. 3: The Ironized Lector  
Persius’ critique of the contemporary lector shares much with the positions offered in prose works 
on rhetoric, which also offer narratives of decline and appeals to education. For example, Seneca’s 
Controuersiae is motivated to provide models of rhetoric for an age in which cotidie ingenia 
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decrescant et nescio qua iniquitate naturae eloquentia se retro tulerit (Contr. I, praef. 6). While 
Seneca focuses on the habits of orators, poets are also involved in his discussions: the two share 
principles of style as well as vices. Ovid and Montanus, for example, are both given to unnecessary 
repetition (Contr. IX.17). The same Arellius Fuscus about whose skills Seneca was ambivalent is 
also discussed as the teacher of Ovid (Contr. II.2.8). The concerns that Persius raised, while not 
coextensive with Seneca’s, are meaningfully related to his elder’s—and so are the terms of their 
critiques. Persius’ objections to the effeminate, oversexed poet are much the same as the Elder 
Seneca’s objections to the effeminate orator: both targets have abandoned the virility of Roman 
heritage. Seneca attributes the decline of ingenium to luxury or to a downhill vying for anything 
that is turpe but profitable, the universal law of decline. The ingenium and industria of the youth 
of the Controuersiae are affected by sleep and sloth, much like the young writer who will awaken 
in Persius’ third satire; but, even worse, their pursuit of singing and dancing renders them 
effeminate (Contr. I, praef. 8); the ideal state for adolescents has become sweetness and softness 
(Contr. I, praef. 8). 
Cassius Severus had earned his reputation as an orator through qualities associated with 
manliness (Contr. III, praef. 1-6): ualetudo, uigor, and uirtus. But even orators of the recent past 
might be of uneven quality: Arellius Fuscus is praised for explicatio…splendida but comes under 
fire for compositio uerborum mollior (Contr. II, praef. 1). But the contemporaries of Seneca’s sons 
have no redeeming qualities: they have been fully unmanned (emolliti eneruesque, Contr. I, praef. 
8), like the detesticled Romans of Persius’ ire (haec fierent si testiculi uena ulla paterni/ uiueret in 
nobis?, Sat. I, line 103-4) and the emasculated word of the performing poet (delumbe, Sat. I, lines 




whose habits anticipate the hairless target of Persius’ fourth satire (quinque palaestritae licet haec 
plantaria uellant…, Sat. IV, 39).  
 Seneca positions himself as one of the final auditores of a class of declamatores of a past 
and better age (Contr. I, praef. 25). Old age may be dimming Seneca’s own memory from its 
brighter state (Contr. I, praef. 2-3), but the examples of rhetoric that this senex will offer are given 
authority by his very situation at the end of a great tradition. The profession of the decline of the 
phenomenal memory of his youth, on the one hand, renders the 10 books of recollections that he 
writes all the more impressive and, on the other hand, it implicitly leaves room for his own 
[inuentio] to arrange and rework the rhetoric of the past. Moreover, the prefaces to the later books 
guide our assessment of the evidence that Seneca presents: not all the orators were equally good 
in equal ways; Seneca makes sure we know, for example, Arellius Fuscus’ shortcomings as well 
as his areas of excellence and, further, that we know how one of his students sought to repair the 
gaps in his model for the purposes of his own oratory, noticing that Fuscus’ splendida oratio was 
lacking in anything acre (Contr. 2.1)—which will be an important term for Persius as well. 
   I suggest that, while he adopts aspects of “traditionalist” discourse for his critique of 
literary performance, Persius implicates himself—the critic—in the familiar narrative of Roman 
socio-literary decline in a way that is importantly different from his predecessor. In the preface to 
his Controuersiae, Seneca positions himself advantageously in this story, as a representative 
upholder of a venerable tradition, capable of representing, recreating, and assessing models of the 
past to and for his eager and corrigible sons. By contrast, a morally-minded poet has neither 
audience nor genre. Persius includes his own work in the narrative of decline: the literary-ethical 
quality—the fittingness—of what he offers is doubtful (si forte quid aptius exit… si quid tamen 




offers a re-enactment of idealized oratory, providing model rhetoric through his putative lector, 
Persius fully re-enacts a recitatio that both forces his lector to perform degenerate poetry through 
“quotations” and forces his audience to listen to an aggressively eroticized narration of a recitatio. 
The oral recitatio of Persius’ first Satire before his own audience thus becomes a performance of 
precisely that literature that he—and his audience—are supposed to reject. Persius excels at that 
which he condemns. In effect, the re-performance delivered in the first Satire is a challenge to his 
audience in a way that the performance of Seneca’s libellus (Contr. IV, 1) is not: Seneca’s audience 
is challenged to listen, admire, and adopt; Persius’ audience is challenged to listen, to be tempted, 
and to resist.  
 Persius thus presents a further, highly ironized lector of Satire I. Even if Persius has 
managed something aptius and decoctius, it is nevertheless virtually impossible that you have the 
prerequisites to be his ideal reader. But beyond this, in the very act of performing the first Satire, 
the lector is his own undoing: if you are the lector of Satire I, you are put into the awkward position 
of reperforming what neither you nor your audience are supposed to enjoy: the erotics of the 
reading scenes and the parody or quotations of contemporary poetry elicit responses that are the 
subject of their critique. If you are a Roman in the audience, implicated in nostrum istud uiuere 
triste, you are captivated by gesture and style that characterizes recitatio and its more private 
counterpart, the conuiuium—and you end up laughing at yourself: Persius parodies a literary 








Reading with your ears 
The lector-as-reciter is ironized by the impossibility of performing the first Satire in a way that 
conforms to the poem’s own literary-ethical standards. Similarly, the lector-as-listener is ironized 
by the aural unintelligibility of the performance: the chasm between line 8 (nam Romae quis 
non…) and line 121 (auriculas asini quis non habet?) is too great for the two lines to be construed 
reasonably at first hearing. By the time the satirist returns from the excursus of the embedded 
satire, the syntax of line 8 has been lost. Relative to the Prologue, the first Satire appears to have 
a much lower density of obvious sound devices. In a significant way, then, the ear is not a useful 
organ for understanding Persius’ first satire, and yet, as we have seen, the Prologue itself primed 
the poet’s audience to listen for aural devices such as etymological and onomatopoetic signposts, 
aural devices that fundamentally contribute to meaning. And in spite of the relative absence of 
soundplay and difficulty of listening to the poem, however, the ear itself becomes an important 
motif in the first satire; at the same time the activity of hearing is presented as a decidedly non-
aural one. It turns out that the ear (auris, auricula) is often not a useful organ for hearing within 
the satire, either.  
 
Soundplay  
Just as proper names drew attention to etymological wordplay in the Prologue, the ear and hearing 
flag sound- and wordplay in the frame satire. The auriculas asini may be a reference to Asinius 
Pollio, popularizer of the recitatio that has been corrupted by Persius’ contemporaries and is the 
subject of the first satire.86 Pollio’s association with the recitatio—probably of inviting an audience 
to listen to one’s own new or in-progress literary productions—is attested since the elder Seneca 
                                                          




(Contr. IV, praef. 2). Similarly, the sentence describing Persius’ reader (quicumque) is framed by 
sound repetition—audaci… audis (123-125)—involving the verb of hearing. The “book ends” of 
the frame satire are aurally coordinated: nam romae quis non… and auriculas asini quis non… (8 
and 121). The latter line must also recall demitto auriculas, ut iniquae mentis asellus in Horace’s 
Sermo I, 9 (20). More obviously, line 125 recalls lines 45-46, connecting the poet’s contingent 
output between the frame and the embedded satires: … si forte aliquid decoctius audis and … si 
forte quid aptius exit/…si quid tamen aptius exit.  
 Within the embedded satire, sound repetition emphasizes, for example, the private parts and 
unseemliness of macho men in this most hazardous of positions: ingentis…/ intrant… intima uersu; 
similarly the loss of control of their bodies is emphasized by the aural parallel in the same metrical 
positions between those lines in their first and second feet: ingentis trepidare…/ intrant et 
tremulo…. The lines are further implicated by sound repetition over the caesurae: … Titos cum… 
and tremulo scalpuntur… (20-21). Persius plays the same joke on one of his lectores that Ovid 
played on his poor blaesus psittacus, urging him to recite lisping and aspirating Grecisms: … balba 
de nare locutus/ Phyllidas, Hypsipylas… (33-34). 
 
Ears 
More significant than the soundplay in the first Satire, are the motif of the ear and the 
representation of hearing throughout the poem. The ear appears five times: in line 22 little ears 
(auriculae) are the object of the contemporary poet’s efforts at composition; in lines 59 and 121 
they are the ridiculing, behind-the-back “donkey’s ears” (auriculae albae) that Janus manages to 
avoid but to which everyone else at Rome is apparently subject; in lines 107-108 they are the ears 




auriculae); finally, in line 126 the uaporata auris is that of Persius’ ideal reader. The terminology 
change from auriculae to auris is significant: the diminutive auriculae, appropriately, belong to 
the sphere of ridicule; auris to the sphere of Persius’ reflections upon the potential of his own work.  
 The answer to the question Nam Romae quis auriculas asini non habet? is—like the answer 
to Quis leget haec?—surely nemo. The thesis of the satire is that everyone is subject to ridicule: 
everyone at Rome has ass’s ears except for the god Janus (and that only because the eyes on the 
back of the god’s head make it impossible, not because of some inherent good quality). When 
Persius suggests that everyone at Rome has the auriculas asini, it is he who gives everyone ass’s 
ears, who marks out all Romans barring none. Since the assertion of the ancient biographer that 
Persius inculpated Nero along with his reviled poets and orators, and since the suggestion of the 
ancient commentator that in particular the ending of line 93 and the entirety of 99-102 belong to 
Nero, the idea that the princeps is also indicated by allusion to the Midas story has gone in and out 
of fashion.87  
 It is possible, however, not to see Nero here, but nevertheless to see that Ovid’s story of 
Midas in Metamorphoses XI is surely alluded to in Persius’ poem.88 Although an allusion to Midas 
does not necessarily have to be a direct “hit” at Nero, such an allusion does not of course exclude 
a king who takes his own shameless position vis-à-vis Apollo, the god in whose image Nero 
fashioned himself starting in the year 59.89 The frame satire is also affiliated to Ovid’s tale: Persius’ 
auriculae asini mirror Ovid’s aures aselli (Met. XI, line 179), each formulation containing one 
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diminutive. The laughter of Midas’ famulus in Ovid’s telling is prompted by what he has looked 
upon with his own eyes (aspexerit, Met. XI, line 186). The verb aspicere is an important principle 
for Persius—the satirist laughs because he has looked upon life and his lector must look with him 
(aspexi, 10; vidi, vidi ipse, 120; aspice haec, 125). Ovid’s barber, unable to keep the secret, digs a 
hole in the ground (effodit, 186; cf. Pers. Sat. I, hic tamen infodiam, 120). Persius, too, has a secret 
(opertum, 121) which he wishes to confide in a ditch (nec cum scrobe? Sat. I, line 119; cf. scrobibus 
tacitus… opertis, Met. XI, line 189). Persius’ opertum is all the more opertum because the lector 
with whom he shares his understanding (that to laugh is to laugh at the non-obvious) is non-
existent.  
 And yet Persius positions himself as the famulus and his book as the reeds that must disclose 
his joke. The image of the famulus whispering in the grove moves forward with the poem. Ovid’s 
barber immurmurat (Met. XI, line 187), yet the secret escapes; the pray-er of the second Satire 
similarly murmurat, mistakenly believing that uttering his vicious desires in a murmur will protect 
him from ethical critique (Sat. II, lines 6-9). The satirical mode mobilized in the first poem is 
written in the third with an uncooperative harundo (Sat. III, line 11; cf. Met. XI, line 190). The 
allusion to Ovid’s Midas is important because it sharpens the more general point that everyone is 
susceptible to critique, to the more particular accusation that everyone lacks judgment: the asses’ 
ears are a punishment upon Midas for his failure to discern between the playing of Pan and Apollo, 
for not hearing poetry properly (Ovid, Met. XI, lines 146-193).  
 Indeed, ears in the first Satire are depicted as doing anything but listening. As we have seen, 
ears in the first Satire are objects of mockery. They are also sites of disfigurement. The weak ears 
of Persius’ targets are tortured: his speech is the act of scraping (as though warts90) with truth them 
                                                          




unused to critique (radere, 107). Even in its best instantiation, the ear is not represented as 
listening; the ear of the ideal lector is steamed and the lector himself must be boiling (uaporata… 
ferueat aure, 126). If ears are not useful listening tools for either listening to (given the syntactic 
strain that the embedded satire places upon the poem as a whole) or listening within the first Satire 
(these organs do non-aural activities in both the embedded and frame satires), what happens to 
listening itself in the poem?  
 
Hearing  
If ears are disfigured by Persius’ verses, other organs are refigured for “listening.” The poet of the 
recitatio scene produces carmina as food for the ears (…auriculis alienis colligis escas, Sat. I, 22). 
This is the appearance of the ear that most closely resembles listening—and yet poetry must be 
turned into a dish for consumption. It is consumed even by the poet himself as food— articulis 
quibus et dicas cute perditus, ‘ohe’ (23)—to the point of being stuffed. The undiscerning auriculae 
of the audience are abandoned as tools for hearing and substituted implicitly by the gullet. 
Explicitly, even the intima and lumbus (21) may substitute for the ear as points of entry for poetry, 
which must get into the body somehow, if not by the ear, then, apparently, by any other orifice.  
 Finally, you may indeed hear something: si forte aliquid decoctius audis (125). But compare 
this more carefully with the lines with which it resonates (as I have discussed above): non ego cum 
scribo si forte quid aptius exit/ …si quid tamen aptius exit (45-46). Aptum is a quality of address; 
decoctius a quality of a food, drink (Gowers), or medicine (Bartsch). Persius may write in a way 
that is evaluatable according to an oratorical criterion, but you cannot hear it without its 
transformation into something edible or imbibible (decoctius), like the audience of the recitatio 




The Physiognomy of Satire 
Four of Horace’s Sermones provide important context for Persius’ first satire: 1, 4 (a history of 
comic writing), 1, 6 (to Maecenas), 1, 10 (a defense of Horace’s satire), and 2, 8 (a dinner party). 
These satires provide salient evidence for the use of the nose and of commentary within satire on 
the genre’s own literary tradition. Persius mobilizes Horatian expressions against Horace himself: 
whereas the older satirist avoided associating himself directly with the nose of disdain, the younger 
poet identifies Horace with the nose and even levels that accusation against himself. Finally, 
Persius’ redistribution of body parts among satirists programmatically determines the poem’s 
difficult opening.  
 As we have seen, Persius uses auriculae to “tag” objects of ridicule, in particular persons 
unaware of their own ridiculousness who could not bear to face their weaknesses; the auris 
belonging to his lector is an object of reform. Other body parts are attributed to satirists themselves. 
The nose is a topos taken from the satires of Horace in particular, but also exists more generally in 
Roman writings describing those who scorn others.91  
 Within Horace’s satires, the nose is a marker of a commonly held pose of disdain and of 
satirist-characters. In spite of Maecenas’ high birth (generosus), he does not disdain Horace the 
way others disdain their inferiors, for whom to exhibit this type of scorn is to hang them from a 
curled nose (nec… naso suspendis adunco, Serm. I, 6, lines 3-6).  One of the limited good qualities 
of Lucilius, in his role as a character in Horace’s history of humor writing, is his satirically sharp 
nose: although a poet of clumsy “foot,” he was a man emunctae naris (Serm. I, 4, line 8); a cleared 
nose presumably enables the satirist to sniff out what’s off in others. But the turning up of a nose 
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against others is not a uniformly positive quality: disdain is unwelcome to the satirist even though 
(or when) it is an obvious response to a difference in status. Maecenas refrains from disdain 
towards friends whose real worth is measured in the company they provide. 
 In Sermo II, 8, Balatro, one of Maecenas’ set, is omnia suspendens naso (Serm. II, 8, line 
64). Balatro stands in for a satirist: in addition to possessing Lucilius’ characteristic expression, in 
response to the disaster of the canopy falling on top of the feast, he re-narrates the dinner scene as 
the labors of the host Nasidienus in epic diction, an impromptu satire of his own. The positioning 
of Balatro as a type of satirist within the scene is clear:92 Horace himself is absent from this scene, 
which is reported to him by Fundanius. Horace’s play with names is evident in Nasidienus, who, 
ironically, has a misguided nasus: he is interested in food rather than discernment. His stand-in 
satirist is also etymologically compromised—Balatro is a “clown” and Seruilius (21).  
 Horace is at pains to separate himself from the pose of his literary forerunner and his own 
less judicious contemporaries. While he marks Lucilius’ face with a satirical nose, on his own face 
Horace places the more restrained compressis… labris (Serm. I, 4, line 138). The interlocutor 
accuses Horace of satirizing for his own amusement, amusement which surfaces only in that play 
of a smile about his own mouth (…risum/ excutiat sibi, lines 34-35). That sort of self-reception is 
distinct from the reception of a satirist like Lucilius by his auditor. That type of satirist manages 
to risu diducere rictum (Serm. I, 10, lines 7-8), but along with a mouth agape, the auditor’s ears 
may be exhausted by burdensome verse (sententia… se impediat uerbis lassas onerantibus… auris, 
9-10). The effect on both body parts is laxity and loss of control. 
 The Horatian formulation naso suspendere appears in Persius’ own brief literary history, 
where he marks Horace himself as a nose in spite of that satirist’s association of that body part 
                                                          




with (he thinks) less refined comics (muddy Lucilius, servile Balatro). Persius marks Horace with 
the feature that Horace marked his own competitor-predecessor and marks Lucilius instead with 
the jaw of aggression (Pers. Sat. I, line 115), rather than the nose and clumsy foot. Persius as 
aemulus subjects Horace to his own measure and the smiling satirist shows up poorly. Persius’ 
own more aggressive poetics cohere with the biographical tradition that he was inspired by the 
firebrand Lucilius (lecto Lucili libro decimo uehementer saturas componere instituit, Vita, 51-52).  
Persius’ replacement of Horace’s smile with a nose and Lucilius’ nose with a jaw raises 
the question of Persius’ place within satirical physiognomy—a set of correspondences between 
body parts (nose, lips, jaw, ear) and literary roles (satirists, predecessors, objects, audiences). Just 
as Horace’s interlocutor accused him of laughing to himself, Persius’ interlocutor in the first Satire 
accuses him of hypocrisy and laughing with nasal disdain: rides… et nimis uncis/ naribus 
indulges… (Sat. I, lines 40-41). And so the accusation of the nose is made also against this poet. 
But the nares are not where he locates the seat of his humor. Rather Persius identifies his own 
laughter with his spleen: sum petulanti splene (Sat. I, line 12).  
The spleen is associated with ill-temper and shamelessness.93 The spleen will return in 
Satire 3, cleaving the poet in half as he recovers from a hangover: turgescit uitrea bilis (Sat. III, 
line 8). Petulantia is associated with a range of other character defects, such as libido, prodigitas, 
and other types of wanton behavior. The adjective is applied directly to body parts only rarely, 
notably by Ovid and Petronius; the latter gave a woman petulant eyes. To be petulans is to have 
no regard for propriety and public virtues (Cicero hurls the accusation against Catiline, for 
example; the quality also appears several times in the Pro Caelio). Persius’ own nonaria at the end 
of this satire is petulans (Sat. I, line 33).  
                                                          




But what does it mean to have a shameless spleen? The somatic identification of your humor 
says something about the type of humor (Lucilius’ political attack, Horace’s social amusement) 
and its communicability. Lucilius attacks with his teeth, Horace’s smile is legible, even if multi-
interpetable. The nose and nostrils are also legible sites for the expression of humor. The humor of 
the spleen, by contrast, is illegible; it is buried deep within. And here we are able to come back to 
the beginning of Satire I: Quis leget haec?  
Although Horace also claimed that … cum mea nemo/ scripta legat uolgo recitare timentis—
a sentiment similar to what Persius asks himself in the opening to his first Satire, and surely a site 
of imitation—it becomes clear, in Horace’s case, that nemo is really a small group of people, 
identifiable people, of friends and of a band (imaginary?) of poets (for instance Sermones I, 4, I, 
9, and I, 10). Persius really has no audience (the ideal lector is hypothetical)—and his humor 
ultimately must be buried in the ground (121-122). The libellus-interlocutor introduced here makes 
his mark. The material of the book becomes the reeds that communicate the secret of Persius qua 
barber. 
The first satire advertises two types of speech—the performative and the suppressed. The one 
is deviant and heard; the other is truth-speaking and unheard. The ethical coding of proclaiming 
and whispering will be flipped in the second satire, in which silent whispering is how true prayer 
gets transmitted and display is how false prayer is released. This attention to the difference between 
public and private will be variously developed throughout the satires: later, it will become 
knowledge of the inner self (e.g. in cute, Sat. III, line 30 and in sese temptat descendere, Sat. IV, 
line 23); speaking with someone else apart from others (secrete loquimur, Sat. IV, line 21); 





CHAPTER THREE: Currency exchange (Satire II) 
While the first satire addresses a fictive “whoever you are,” Satire II is the first of three addressed 
to an identifiable, “real life” Roman along with Satire V (to the philosopher Cornutus) and Satire 
VI (to Caesius Bassus). The salutation of Satire II to a Plotius Macrinus, a “father figure” to the 
poet according to the Commentum, marks it as a birthday poem. It seems that even in a friendly 
genethliakon, the poet cannot long keep himself away from the business of ridiculing others. In 
the diatribe which follows upon the opening hail, Persius targets hypocrisy in prayer and then 
wrong-headed religious practices more generally, choosing his theme apparently by contrast with 
the propriety of Macrinus’ birthday celebration. As in the first satire, the chasm between the 
truthfulness of what is said privately and what publicly hangs wide: a whisper reveals the true 
opinion of the speaker. But while the poet was the whisperer in Satire I, in Satire II he condemns 
the whisperer as venal and hypocritical. More ingenuous belief in the gods’ susceptibility to 
persuasion through offering and superstitious behavior is deemed just as bad and equally worthy 
of disdain. Persius explains what an ethically better offering might be, departing for the temple to 
make it.  
 The satirist’s solitary voice, the speaking apart, looks forward to Satire II thus: What we 
have learnt from Ovid’s barber is that whispering is ultimately always heard. Persius constructs 
for himself a pose of whispering into reeds; the reed-pen (Sat. III.11) will work the transmission 
of his secret for him. In the present poem, it is the target of the satire, the praying person 
(henceforth “pray-er,” for lack of a better word) who does the whispering. But the pray-er’s secret, 
too, is out: here Persius exposes the food-stuffing and transactionalism that underlie religious 




 As this chapter shows, the second satire is a poem in dialogue with the rest of the libellus. 
Persius analogizes the production and anticipated reception of prayer in this satire, to the 
production and anticipated reception of poetry in Satire I. The Prologue’s bird and its stomach 
supply a framework for this second satire, whose targets’ conception of divine motivation relies 
on the idea that the gods are purchasable by feeding, feasting, and paying up. As a corollary to 
this, the second satire also develops the Prologue’s coin, an object of fascination for both poets 
and pray-ers, propelling the emergence of the nummus as a “character” through the remaining 
satires. Wherever the coin appears we should see fraudulence: susceptibility to being fooled—
either by the value of money or by bad poetry. The idea of fraudulence with which Persius invests 
the nummus underpins the critique of poetics that emerges through the Prologue and Satire I. It is 
a critique of Horace that is also an exploration of Persius’ own relation to Horace.  
Finally, the “virtuous” offering that the poet makes at the end of Satire II shows that he, too, is 
embedded in the world of his targets. This convivial self-satirization ultimately reminds us that 
this satire has been a jolly, if disconcerting, genethliakon to a friend, perhaps for his birthday 
banquet.  
Sustained scholarship on this poem is scarce, but important inroads have been made in 
particular with respect to its imagistic techniques and the symbolic value of food.94  Cynthia 
Dessen’s notion that the piece is deficient in the “coherent pattern of images and verbal 
repetitions”95 that unify the other poems was effectively dismantled by Everard Flintoff, who 
argued that the world contained in the poem is one thoroughly constructed around food: gods are 
propitiated by food and humans are food; man is pulpa (63). Humans also interact with the world 
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in a way that turns it into food; for example, luxury mining is articulated in terms common to 
harvesting fruits and the precious pearl is thus construed as edible (bacam… rasisse, 66).96  
 In her wide-ranging study, Emily Gowers gives a succinct history of the Romans’ 
mythology of their national diet. While virtuous Romans of the early republic ate simply, so the 
myth goes, elite Romans of the empire ate extravagantly, with the constitution of meals developing 
in parallel with the constitution of the empire. It is a myth of a decline in morals and of the pitfalls 
of exoticism. In the genre of satire, this decline manifests itself in the hodge-podge of foods that 
reflect the lanx satura. Gowers (with Flintoff) sees the Rome of Satire II as a slaughterhouse: 
“wading through dripping lard, chitterlings, lights and tripe, huge stews, and fatty sausages, Persius 
exposes man’s own scelerata pulpa, spoiled flesh (63), in their midst.”97 Since Gowers, much of 
the scholarship on Satire II has explored the breadth of its “food imagery.” Kirk Freudenburg sees 
the food metaphor as extending even to the poem’s addressee and shrewdly reads Macrinus as 
Maecenas on a diet—Persius’ Maecenas is macer! Food puns even express Persius’ own final vow: 
compositum ius is both “justice composite”’ and “blended juice.”98 Shadi Bartsch interprets the 
food imagery of the second satire as part of a more general poetics of digestion and health food in 
the book as a whole.99 
 As to Persius’ relation to Horace, Niall Rudd’s treatment of Satire II is in the main a 
discussion of Persius’ characteristic poetics of one who is iunctura callidus acri (cf. Satire V.14): 
rapid shifts of syntax and tone, anthropomorphization, and most importantly, pressed slices of 
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Horatian poetry.100 Rudd has shown how Persius could compress multiple and diverse Horatian 
passages into just a few lines. Aside from limited lexical and thematic allusions to, for example, 
Epistle I, 16 and Sermones II, 5, Hooley finds his more sustained and “crucially informing 
counterpoint” in Ode III, 23, in which the poet addresses the ideally modest scope of a country 
woman’s prayers and practices, far from the grander rituals of state.101 Like Horace, Persius prefers 
the small offering of grain made with a pure heart to the trappings of the pontifices. But where 
Horace’s woman inhabits an idyllic simplicity of both mind and space, Persius’ woman is 
delusional and her practices repulsive. The rustic innocence that Horace idealizes Persius ridicules 
as mindlessness, a quality that for him characterizes Roman religion on every scale—exposing 
how very close idealization is to caricature (a notion that will seriously problematize the encomium 
of Cornutus in the fifth satire).  
Largely outside of the foregoing conversations, Dietmar Korzeniewski calls our attention to 
the poet as gift giver and the second satire itself as an offering. The poem is not only the pious 
grain (or upright heart) offered to the gods, as Korzeniewski points out, but also a birthday gift to 
Macrinus. It therefore takes on features shared with other genethliaka and other poems that touch 
upon the birthday theme.102 This is a useful notion that reminds us to treat the poem as an entity 
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Persius opens his second poem in a Horatian manner, congratulating his friend, the birthday boy 
Macrinus, on the moderate propriety of his prayers.103 His friend’s piety calls to this ever 
unsatisfied mind the state of prayer and ritual in the world, of which there are two categories: the 
hypocritical and the misguided. In its first attack (5-30), aimed at hypocrites, the satire samples 
persons whose private prayers for wealth, especially for inheritance, betray their roles and duties: 
an oath to give a magnificent funeral in exchange for the death of an uncle, a dowered wife, or a 
ward (9-14). In spite of their unvirtuous nature, prayers of this type are performed in a manner 
overtly consistent with public piety: ritual washings morning and night in the Tiber (15-16).  
 The diatribist addresses his interlocutor: “Hey, come on, tell me this—it’s the tiniest thing 
I’m trying to work out—what’s your opinion on Jupiter?” Does he think his impieties have escaped 
the god’s notice because he’s not suffered the proverbial signs of wrath (24-29)? Does he take the 
god for a fool, as the first satire’s bad lectores of humor would the philosopher (28-29; cf. Sat. 
I.133)? The beard has resurfaced—now on the god and next on the statues (Sat. II.60). Like the 
undiscerning petulans nonaria, who yanked the beard of the philosopher, and like the yet more 
undiscerning reader of human affairs, who would find that funny (Sat. I.133-4), the pray-er 
imagines that, by appearing to be pious, he could pull the beard of Jupiter. Later, in a traditionally 
pious, but theologically unsound gesture, a Roman will believe that by coating the beards of their 
figurines in gold he could please the gods (58).  
 With his second line of attack (31-70), the diatribist’s gaze alights on customs and domestic 
superstitions, which he portrays as generally silly and misconceived rather than hypocritical. But 
frank nature of this misconception does not adjust the satirist’s method, not now that he’s off to 
                                                          





such a good start with his body-focused rant. In this rare moment of attention to a woman in the 
Satires,104 he looks hard upon the aged grandmother or the auntie hovering over her precious 
charge and making prayers that are informed by fairy tales and delusions of future grandeur: the 
boy will be distinguished as a general, a man of wealth—no, a prince. The wetness and shaking of 
the public recitatio are mobilized here in the domestic activity of the old woman, the pray-er, 
fussing over the infant (31-38), whom she shakes (quatit) and whose wet little lip (uda labella) 
she marks with her sacralizing spit (lustralibus saliuis). The problem of deluded prayer does not 
belong to the woman alone. To the contrary, the wayward direction of prayers and the implicit 
misattribution of material desires to the gods are shared by those who practice rituals everywhere, 
regardless of the ancient pedigree of their component parts—the entrails of slaughtered cattle, fires, 
melting fats, and cakes.  
 By using the language of lustral expiation to describe the scene, Persius links his ridicule 
of domestic superstitions to his exposure of the misconceptions that underlie haruspicy (44-51). 
Like the aunt’s prayers for the baby boy, a man’s rather unremarkable prayers for strength and 
success are characterized by vain repetition (da…/ da…, 45-46, and iam…iam…/ iam…iam iam…, 
49-50; cf. hunc…/ hunc…hic…, 37-38). The gilded trappings of traditional religion are formulated 
by extrapolation from human wishes for wealth. A man projects his desire for gold onto his 
divinities and, paradoxically, gilds his divinities in the hope for some quid pro quo (55-60). A 
“moral” closes the diatribe: the only appropriate offering to the gods is that which is unrelated to 
what we think to be good because our flesh desires it, i.e. the upright heart.  
 
 
                                                          





Prayer as Poiesis 
The second satire puts the contemporary practice of prayer and devotion into terms akin to those 
that described the first satire’s recitatio and those that depicted the poetry industry in the prologue. 
Pray-er and poet are motivated to perform by greed, and both imagine an audience of eaters. While 
the second satire’s critique is obviously aimed at the hypocrite, who prays aloud for virtue but 
under his breath yearns for material gain to the detriment of others, it is also aimed at the general 
principles underlying traditional practices of prayer and offerings to gods. The pray-er has made 
the mistake of interpreting the gods’ reception of words as analogous to that of human audiences: 
not all auriculae are easily deceived by a well-sounding performance as are those of the Roman 
auditores in Satire I.  
 Put another way: a pray-er’s appeal to the gods is the (external) formalization of a somatic 
response—a gut reaction. By analogy with his own pleasure in gold, the pray-er comes to the 
conclusion that the gods would be responsive to vows of new golden faces for their statues in 
exchange for dispersing his ill-omened dreams. Gods are thus seen as all too human in their greedy 
ambition. Such beliefs have resulted in the now standard practice of overlaying gold on the 
traditional ritual belongings of the old Italic gods.  
 
Aurality 
The poet writes an aural response in this poem to the preceding satire: the diatribe’s climactic 
exclamation, O curuae in terris animae et caelestium inanis (Sat. II.61), clearly recalls the first 
line of the first satire, O curas hominum! o quantum est in rebus inane! (Sat. I.1).105 That aural 
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(and metrical) continuity (initial O curuae… and O curas…; final inanis and inane) is sustained 
by the correspondence of quid iuuat hoc…? (Sat. II.62) with quis leget haec? (Sat. I.2). The point 
of this connection is not immediately clear, though it does remind the reader of the pointlessness 
of speech, whether directed at humans or at gods: for neither the diatribist nor the pray-er is able 
to “reach” his audience. The line does not, of course, exhibit “Christian overtones” as Dessen 
suggests, regardless of its later appreciation by Christian moralists.106 The line is Lucretian. This 
is no minor quibble. The line’s correspondence with the opening of the first satire further supports 
the plausibility of the LVC assignation of Satire I to Lucretius, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Both lines remind vanity of didactic in the world as construed by a satirist. 
 The aures ubiquitous in the first satire are replaced by aurum in the second: five sightings 
of ears (Sat. I.22, 59, 108, 121, and 126) are replaced by five glimmers of gold (Sat. II. 53, 55, 58, 
59, and 69). In Satire I, gold is implicit in the allusion to Midas’ ears; in Satire II, ears are implicit 
in gold. The connection seems to exist solely on the level of sound—the ears are objects of feeding 
in the first poem; the gold is an offering in the second. The intra-corpus word play, lexical 
substitution, must also indicate something about the fungibility of objects to a satirist; diatribe 
sounds the same, regardless of what the target of the hour may be.   
 
Venter 
In his prologue, the poet declared that the uenter would be the master of invention; a glittering 
coin threw in further motivation—complicatedly for both poet and audience to participate in the 
bad art industry. In the second satire, poiesis includes the production of prayers for an economy 
that runs substantially on food and also on coin. The pray-er merely theologizes the method of 
                                                          





repetitive, mimetic speech that appeals to audiences in the recitatio of Satire I and the prologue. 
The parrots of the prologue were motivated by food, the poets themselves by coin; and the pray-
er expects the gods to be so motivated as well: offerings in the second satire are dough or dough, 
edible or metal. The composition of offerings for the auriculae, rather than aures, of gods is 
significant, as these mini-ears are imagined to be purchasable (qua tu mercede deorum/ emeris 
auriculas, Sat. II.29-30). The pray-er imagines his (divine) audience to have ears as receptive and 
unwitting as those of the audience at a recitatio: (auriculis alienis colligis escas?  Sat. I.22). Like 
the poet, the pray-er offers edibles—here a dish of lung and oiled entrails107—to his “audience.” 
 Dishes and puddings mixed for the gods have further significance for understanding the 
involvement of the satirist in constructing the world that he will seek to deface. The satirist takes 
ritual meat of epic and religious pedigree and mashes it into a sausage (42). Also an Apuleian 
word, tuccetum for sausage operates in a low register—pork bellies mashed up in the kitchen of 
the slave girl Photis, ritual food for the temple (Ap. Met. II, 7; V, 15; VII, 11; and IX, 22). The 
representation of a sausage offering precedes the representation of the more proper offering of a 
victim (45) and that order of presentation renders the reverent ridiculous: 
 sed grandes patinae tuccetaque crassa 
 adnuere his superos uetuere Iouemque morantur. 
 rem struere exoptas caeso boue Mercuriumque 
 accersis fibra: ‘da fortunare Penatis, 
 da pecus et gregibus fetum.’ quo, pessime, pacto, 
 tot tibi cum in flamma iunicum omenta liquescant? 
 et tamen hic extis et opimo uincere ferto  
 intendit… (Sat. II.42-49) 
  
 But grand platters and thick sausages prohibit the gods’ nod 
of approval of these words and delay Jupiter. You hope beyond hope 
to arrange your affairs with a slaughtered bull and you summon 
Mercury with the lobe of an organ: ‘Grant to my Penates that they 
flourish, grant cattle and offspring to my flocks.’ Worst of all people, 
                                                          





on what grounds should that happen for you when the membranes 
of so many heifers are melting in the fire? Yet still he makes his 
efforts with entrails and a fat offering.  
 
 At the end of the day, it turns out, a sacrificial bull is just meat, guts, and fat, packaged in 
a bigger and better looking sausage. So, just as with the moniker “pony” for Bellerophon’s mighty 
steed in the choliambics (caballinus, Prol. 1), it is not only the participants in an activity who 
cheapen traditional forms, but also Persius himself who degrades these activities by applying his 
cheap labels onto hallowed objects, loading platters with fatty foods. The metaphors of food and 
ingestion, which have been elucidated by Flintoff, Freudenburg, and Bartsch, are augmented by 
those of listening: the pray-er imagines that the gods’ ears may be bought with food (pulmone et 
lactibus unctis, Sat. II.30), and so offers it in order to support his hope for bodily strength and a 
good old age (41). But gods are not that type of audience. Filling up a dish for Jupiter in the way 
that you might greedily heap extra servings of thick sausages on your own plate actually slows 
down your access to the gods. It is behavior of which they cannot approve. It is not only mediocre, 
everyday foods that clog the approval process. Even grander offerings do the same.108 Sacrifices 
in the style of epic are the same as sacrifices in the style of satire. 
 
Nummus (a novella) 
Attempting to buy off the gods (his audience) with edible offerings, the efforts of the pray-er qua 
cook recall the theory of uenter as divine inspiration that we saw in the prologue. The pray-er 
understands divine intervention to be a purchased result of divinized (and worshipper-subsidized) 
feeding; fortune is for hire. Now, at the moment when the pray-er’s efforts are shown to be in vain, 
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eating cooked beets. The salutary quality of beets in Persius is its use for oral scraping in its raw form and 





the language closely follows that of the Prologue. There, as we have seen, the hope (spes) of a 
deceitful coin glimmered. Here, in the second satire, the nummus has the final word, or at least the 
final gasp.  
 The nummus is characterized as dolosus (Prol. 12) or deceptus (Sat. II.50). Deceptus in the 
second satire is used in two ways: it both retains the sense from the Prologue of being deceitful—
it is counterfeit—and acquires the new sense of being frustrated from its purpose of bearing 
interest. Why should it be important in the Prologue that the coin is counterfeit? The counterfeit 
coin is payment for counterfeit poetry; the posing poetridae cannot tell that even their profit from 
faked poems would be fake. In the second satire, as in the third, the nummus is counterfeit in a 
different sense: it is a counterfeit Good.  
The glimmering nummus of the Prologue thus becomes more fully a character in the second 
satire. It will also continue to appear five times further. Whereas this coin was formerly the object 
of another’s hope, spes (Prol. 12), in the second satire it has itself lost hope, exspes. Personified, 
this coin sighs (suspiret, Sat. II.51).109 When it sighs from the bottom of the coffers (fundo… in 
imo, 51), it sighs equally in the ground, sharing the pray-er’s concerns about his—their—estate. 
In the third satire, the “sick” man must learn the true use of the nummus, which is asper (Sat. 
III.69-70). The Commentum explains that the coin is asper because ill gotten (male partus aut 
criminosus). The asper nummus is also metonymic for the adverse, “rough” circumstances that 
result in lost profit. But this “newly minted” coin is also out of hope, it is a-spe; and, further, it 
huskily echoes the aspirate sound it made in the second satire—suspiret.  
                                                          
109 Rudd (1986: 101) includes this detail along with the prex emax (Sat. II.3) in his observation that it is 
characteristic for Persius to give human qualities to non-human objects and non-human qualities to humans. 
Jahn (1843) argues that the pray-er is deceptus and exspes and, moreover, that he laments his expenditures 
in direct speech (nequiquam fundo… nummus in imo). Conington-Nettleship (1893) reject the re-





Further to developing the symbolic value of the coin in particular, Persius additionally thematizes 
somatic responses to money in general. After the expiration of the nummus, he proposes dangling 
gold and silver in full view of his target:  
  … sudes et pectore laeuo  
excutiat guttas laetari praetrepidum cor (Sat. II.53-4) 
 
You’d sweat and from the left side of your chest your heart would 
shed drops, all a-tremble at the thought of rejoicing.  
 
These symptoms—perspiration and palpitation—are also symptoms of erotic desire. In the next 
poem, the interlocutor will suffer the same at the sight of a girl, a reaction interchangeable with 
that elicited by the sight of money:  
 … uisa est si forte pecunia siue 
 candida uicini subrisit molle puella,  
 cor tibi rite salit? (Sat. III.109-11)  
 
 If you’ve spotted either money spotted or a gorgeous girl 
from the neighborhood smiles, does your heart duly skip a beat?   
 
 Indeed, we have already seen such trembling in the overtly sexualized recitatio (ingentis 
trepidare Titos, cum carmina lumbum/ intrant, Sat. I.20-21). Symptoms may also be appetitive: 
the sight of the nummus in the dirt will be mouthwatering as the interlocutor will gulp back 
capitalist drool (saliuam Mercurialem, Sat. V.112). The salivation itself becomes his prayer for 
salvation to the money god, who had before at least received a sacrifice (Sat. II.45-6). Notionally 
separate vices—greed and lust—are extensions of the ur-vice: bad poetry.  
 The attention paid by the poet across the corpus to this small token should alert us to its 
symbolic value. We may consider the value of the nummus, then, as Neronian artefact and as 
philosophical topos. The appearance of the nummus is a marker of human misapprehension in both 




reception of money and poetry are not only conceived of in the same terms, but also received in 
similar ways—with striking physiological responses.  
Finally, the satirizings of both poetry and prayer are made to cohere through aural resonance 
and soundplay. At the poem’s close, the satirist reappears in the ritual attire with which he toyed 
in the prologue. There is a variety of ways in which Persius’ discussion of money might seem to 
follow Horace’s. For example, the idea of Sermo I.73, nescis quo ualeat nummus, quem praebeat 
usum? (Do you not know what good a coin is, what utility it presents?), may plausibly inform 
Persius’ quid asper utile nummus habet? (What’s useful about a rough coin? Sat. III.69).  
Additionally, the fantasy of stumbling upon a fortune is shared by the poets’ targets. Horace’s  
O si urnam argenti fors quae mihi monstret, ut illi,  
thesauro inuento qui mercenarius agrum  
illum ipsum mercatus arauit, diues amico  
Hercule!… (Serm. II, 6.10-13)  
   
Oh, if only Luck would show me her urn of silver, as to she did that 
man, the hireling who found the treasure and bought and tilled that 
selfsame field. oh, godly Hercules, my friend!  
 
is reformulated in Persius’ breathless and punchier   
         … o si  
 sub rastro crepet argenti mihi seria dextro  
 Hercule!…    (Sat. II.10-12) 
 
 Oh, if only a pot of silver would clang back at me under a 
handy plough, Hercules!   
 
This “decoction,” this condensation, of several Horatian lines into a shorter and at the same time 
more visceral space is typical of Persius’ style and is the major distinguishing feature of his practice 
of imitatio. But a closer look at Persius’ treatment of money in the satires reveals significant points 
of departure from his predecessor. Money and the mercantile for Horace are in general 




32). The solutions for Horace are, of course, moderate spending and keeping company with men 
of good taste—a sensibility that will be satirized in Persius’ fifth satire. Persius views the lives of 
merchants chasing profit as lives of dissatisfaction and compulsion (e.g. Sat. V.132ff.). But within 
his satires, the coin takes on a life of its own, appearing seven times in his single short book, 
compared to twelve times across Horace’s nearly four-fold satirical output. The nummus becomes 
a minor character in the libellus, taking on human qualities and gestures. At the same time, it serves 
as a token reminder of human misunderstanding.  
The asper nummus has further levels of significance, both historical and philosophical. 
Coinage has specific symbolic value among those philosophers most given to a joke as means of 
unmasking the foolishness of society, the Cynics. Diogenes, we are told, was sent into exile 
because he had defaced the coinage of Sinope: the Cynic expression defacing the currency 
(παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα) “makes joking, parody, and satire not merely a useful rhetorical tool, 
but an indispensable one, constitutive of Cynic ideology as such.”110 Tempting though it may be 
to see the afterlife of Diogenes’ defaced coin in Persius’ nummus—perhaps not an implausible 
proposal, given the occasional cameo by a Cynic elsewhere (e.g. Sat. I.133)—the reading cannot 
be secure. Nevertheless, Diogenes’ story is instructive in that it reminds us that a coin is a symbol 
of the state and social convention more broadly, the common targets of both the Cynic and the 
satirist. We might also recall the Cynic’s excoriation of hypocrites in general, and his inveighing 
in particular against those who praise justice in speech but are unjust in practice, as well as those 
who censure wealth even as they prize it (Diog. Laert. VI, 2.28). The satirist’s unremitting 
ostentation of bodies and their parts might find its philosophic analogue in the principled 
shamelessness of the Cynics. 
                                                          





An engine of the state, the coin moreover bore the face of the princeps. In the years preceding 
Persius’ untimely demise, the hairstyle of Nero’s numismatic portraits became increasingly 
elaborate, departing from the plainer styles of the principes before him exhibiting some artful 
curls.111 We might think of the lector of the recitatio in the first satire, who is pexus (Sat. I.15). A 
golden symbol of the princeps, the coin recapitulates the nod to Nero that may be fleetingly 
glimpsed in the allusion to the Midas story in the first Satire. The culmination of this interest in 
both coiffure and stamped prettiness was the coming out of Nero as Apollo on coinage in the year 
62, the year of our poet’s death. In the years prior, Nero had already begun to make clear his 
aspiration to identify with that god, especially in his role as a patron of the arts.112 At the Juvenalia 
of 59, Nero was hailed as Pythian Apollo and in the same year he began to associate (and to be 
associated with) with poets.113 Edward Champlin has argued for the broadly enthusiastic reception 
he received among intellectuals. As early as the year 60, the Apolline identification is registered 
(alongside a Dionysian identification) in the proem of Lucan’s Bellum Civile.  
 
 sed mihi iam numen, nec, si te pectore uates  
 accipio, Cirrhaea uelim secreta mouentem 
 sollicitare deum Bacchumque auertere Nysa.  
 tu satis ad uires Romana in carmina dandas. (B.C. I.63-66) 
But already you are my divinity; and, if I, your prophet, accept you 
into my breast, I would not wish to appeal to the god who inspires 
things Delphic or turn Bacchus’ attention away from Nysa.   
 
                                                          
111 Champlin (2003b: 278); Hiesinger (1975: 8). 
 
112 Champlin (2003b: 278). The asper nummus also appears in Suetonius: Nero demanded support for his 
campaign to put down the rebellion of Galba, and a staff of “Amazons,” to be paid in newly minted coin; 
because new coin was far more rare than general currency, the population balked at this stipulation (Nero 
44). The event occurred several years after Persius’ death in (we suppose) 62, but the passage nevertheless 
provides some insight into another way in which the asper nummus might be interpreted: it is rough to the 
touch, not yet worn down by its passage from hand to hand, and (the point to be stressed for now) hard to 
come by. The revision of your understanding of hard-won coin is part of the philosopher’s task.  
 




Nero as numen provides Lucan as uates with inspiration for his epic song.114 In the prologue, 
Persius figured himself as a semipaganus, adding his song to the rites of such absurd bards: ad 
sacra uatum carmen adfero nostrum, (Prol. 7). The question of the sincerity of Lucan’s proem is 
a familiar one;115 Persius’ “contribution” is more obviously ironized in the Prologue. The fantasies 
of old bards were a phenomenon bad enough. The problem with their miming successors is that 
they replace numen with nummus, a poor substitute.116  
 The nummus’ more poetic twin, numerus, appears seven times in the satires. In the first 
satire, Persius’ uses the term standardly to discuss genre, whether poetry or prose (numeros ille, 
hic pede liber, Sat. I.13); the supposed literati discuss the poetry of the day with the same term 
(carmina molli/… numero and sed numeris decor est, Sat. I.63-64 and 92). The later appearance 
of numerus near the end of Satire I offers a change in meaning, however, to the straightforward 
“number” (abaco numeros, Sat. I.131). The sense is maintained in the first verb of the following 
poem when the satirist instructs Macrinus to mark the number of his day (diem numera, Sat. 2.1). 
Partially overlapping with its poetic meaning, numerus shifts to a more straightforwardly musical 
force in a seemingly tangential accusation in Satire V (tris tantum ad numeros Satyrum moueare 
Bathylli, V.123). In Satire VI, it overlaps with the satirist’s praise of his addressee’s musical talent 
(mire opifex numeris, VI.3).  
 The straightforward numerus of poetry is lost in the transition between Satire I and Satire 
II, where, as if re-summoning the Prologue, it is replaced by the coin, which did not appear in 
                                                          
114 See Leigh (1997: 22-26), Brisset (1964: 221), and Masters (1992: 230-233) for various interpretations 
of the proem, an issue which I do not wish to engage here. However ironically or sincerely one may choose 
to read Lucan, it is a far cry from the ire Persius turns on any such pretension in the Prologue and Satire V.  
 
115 Champlin (2003a: 113-114).  
 




Satire I. In other words, the sequence prologue - first satire - second satire is paralleled by the 
sequence coin - verse - count/coin.  Through the fungibility of numerus and nummus, Persius 
charges that the idea of counting, which ought to be pinned on the numerus as poetic foot, is 
predicated on the nummus. Pay-oriented poetics have replaced aesthetic and ethical poetics. The 
nummus is a figure for transactionalism, tying prayer production to poetry production. Its 
characterization as dolosus and deceptus, moreover, ties that transactionalism of speech-for-goods 
to counterfeisance.  
 The Prologue has been called “the most devastating critique of the patronage system.”117 
These terms might equally be applied by extension and implication to the second satire’s critique 
of pray-er and religious practices. How far is Horace implicated in the Prologue’s send-up of the 
patronage system? Persius does, after all, work to decoquere Horace’s corpus. If Horace accuses 
Lucilius of writing too much, examples such as the compression of Serm. II, 6.10-13 into Sat. 
II.10-12 might signal Persius’ accusation that Horace himself writes too much—perhaps for a 
patron? Play for pay: An extra numerus, one more nummus. The further problem that the nummus 
creates for Persius is that it is also our reminder of the counterfeit and the mimicry of poets we 
saw in the Prologue: it makes Persius’ satires vulnerable to the same critique. Persius, famous for 
his virtuosic imitatio, arguably counts as a counterfeit Horace, famous for his advertisement of his 
patron. Here, Freudenberg’s observation that Macrinus, the dedicatee of the present satire, is a 
Maecenas might elucidate Persius’ compressive but ubiquitous imitatio.   
 The expectation of the pray-er in Satire II is the same as the expectation of the poetridae 
of the Prologue: nummus. Nummus has also displaced the archaic Numa (Sat. II. 59) of (a fantasy 
of) authentic Roman religion. The problem with the poetry and piety industries is that their 
                                                          





participants cannot spot a fake. Accordingly, the problem in the Prologue is that the faking “poet” 
cannot tell that the coin is fake: si dolosi spes refulserit nummi… cantare credas Pegaseium nectar 
(Prol. 12-14). The language is echoed in the fifth satire: Marco spondente recusas/ credere tu 
nummos? (Sat. V.79-80), where even freedom itself is exposed to be socially (and philosophically) 
counterfeit. 
 It is significant that neither the nummus nor his friends—gold, silver, bronze, or as—turn 
up in Satire VI, the poem ostensibly devoted to the problem of expenditure and the transfer of 
wealth through inheritance. We must pay attention, then, to the shifts in, and limits of, the coin’s 
symbolic significance. In that satire, the prices are gouged exponentially, beyond the reach of 
currency: “Sell your soul for profit” (uende animam lucro, VI.75). In his last cameo in the book, 
the coin resumes his story: like a dog, nummus takes on the characteristics of his human: the hope 
that [eludes] the coin is the hope that the pray-er had, too (exoptas, 44; exspes, 50). Where 
stomachs and ears feed and humans sweat (sudes, Sat. II.53), so too does the nummus:  
quid petis? ut nummi, quos hic quincunce modesto  
nutrieras, pergant auidos sudare deunces? (Sat. V.149-50). 
 
What are you looking for? For the coins, whom you’ve reared on a 
conservative five percent investment, to go sweat out greedy eleven 




farre litabo  
In the first two satires of the libellus, the actions that may be attributed to the satirist are few: 
looking, laughing, writing. The close of the second satire recalls his single action in the prologue: 
haec cedo ut admoueam templis et farre litabo (75), an action which complements his ironic vatic 




offers. But the nature of his offering is at first negatively defined—in keeping with a pattern that 
emerges across the satires. He offers to the gods what is not available from the platter of some 
corrupt person of the consular class. He offers the grits of a pauper.118 The pedestrian nature of 
this particular type of grain offering is twice reiterated in the Satire V (73-5), where far stands in 
for the basic livelihood of a Publius and farrago for the trifling quantity over which a newly minted 
freedman might quibble.   
 There is a contradiction in Persius’ claim to find something that cannot be found on the 
lanx, for the genre in which he writes is itself the lanx satura. Although attribution of the phrase 
lanx satura to Varro is not claimed before the 4th century report of Diomedes, Freudenburg has 
argued that we should positively associate the phrase with the Republican polymath and satirist 
via his depiction in the Academica. There, the Varro of Cicero’s composition uses the vocabulary 
of cooking and feasting in his description of his composition: conspergere, admiscere, inuitare (1, 
2.8).119  
 Persius’ assertion that he makes a simple sacrifice presents a paradox from the generic 
perspective, too. This satire is—as it ought to be—replete with images of fatty foods. Persius 
disdains mashes and mash-ups in general—such is his distaste for the speech stew (sartago 
loquendi) of the world around him, and the fat sausages (tucceta crassa) of ritual. He has certainly 
not stopped contributing to the sartago of speech that he despises (cf. Sat. 1.80). The satirist 
himself, like his targets, has turned the world into food. His own revision of the hypocrite’s prayer 
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119 Regardless of the modern “scientific” etymology of satura, Diomedes’ Varro, Persius, and Juvenal 
certainly made literary hay from the available possible etymologies of satura from (and among) sarcire, 
sartago, farcire, farcimen, and farrago. Diomedes also has Varro as the propagator of the etymology of 






for mens bona, fama, fides (8) contains a culinary pun: compositum ius is both a proper sense of 
justice and a blended sauce, either an uplifting value or a mere comestible. Indeed, following 
immediately upon the description of Messala’s magna lanx, the pun might reasonably be heard 
first as sauce and only thereafter, when fas is joined to it, as justice. More straightforward than the 
pun is the offering of Persius’ incoctum pectus—whether this is metaphorical or literal can only be 
judged by the relative weights of the two interpretations of ius.  
 The rawness of the poet’s pectus may be compared with the vigorous treatment of his 
praecordia, which are to be given a good investigative smacking in the fifth satire (Sat. V.22). 
Whether Persius’ prayer is ultimately deadly serious or yet another joke depends on how the reader 
assesses the distance between the hypocrite and the satirist. Morford observes that the terms ius, 
fas, and pectus form a philosophically and theologically sounder instantiation of the type of mens 
bona for which the hypocrite prayed aloud at the beginning of the satire.120 The placement of 
Persius’ virtues in close relation to the inner sanctum of his mind (73-4) suggests such a reading. 
Likewise, Rudd, while shrewdly identifying the double usage of ius, deems Persius’ “spiritual 
food-offerings [to be] acceptable to the gods.”121 Alternatively, the embeddedness of Persius’ own 
prayer in a food-shaped world—that is, his inability to articulate the world of prayer and virtue in 
a way distinct from his targets’ misguided vision of the world—self-consciously situates the satirist 




                                                          
120 Morford (1984: 43). 
 





Happy Birthday. You’re not as bad as the rest of them.  
The second satire is not just a diatribe on hypocrisy. It is dedicated as a birthday poem. We must 
ask, therefore: What type of gift does Persius intend this to be? Why should this diatribe follow 
upon the observance of Macrinus’ birthday pour (funde merum genio, 3)? It is a vehicle for piled 
platters at the birthday feast that naturally follows upon the birthday toast and birthday wish. 
Persius’ diatribe on the fattening of prayers is itself an elaborate dish of sermones, carmina, 
philosophy, sausages, and gold—with a sprinkling of grain. Moreover, these final culinary jokes 
are precisely appropriate to a convivium, perhaps a birthday party.122 The envoie of hilarity returns 
us to his friend Macrinus and the status of Satire II as birthday card. 
 If we consider Macrinus’ birthday not as pretext for an opportunity to write another in a 
series of diatribes, but instead as an essential quality of the poem, the satirist’s worldview comes 
more clearly into focus. Propertius’ over-the-top birthday verses for Cynthia (III, 10) are a confetti 
of best-dresses, wishes, and (of course) night games by comparison. But there is darkness on the 
edges. The poet hopes his song will banish the possibility of mourning (El. III, 10.7).123 Similarly, 
Horace’s Ode IV, 11 on the occasion of Maecenas’ birthday recounts the readying of the household 
(and the good wine) for the great man’s celebration. But in his final words, the poet hopes that the 
day’s activities will lighten dark cares (minuentur atrae/ carmine curae, Carm. IV, 11.35-36). What 
Persius does, then, is to invert the genethliakon’s priorities: he takes the wistful sides to any 
remark—even a celebratory one—on the passing of life and makes bleakness the main course: 
“there is a sad descent to Persius.”124 All he can offer is his uncooked heart and some grain, and it 
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123 On this, see Cairns (1971: 150).  
 




is not even the birthday boy to whom he offers these—they go to the gods, as evidence of Persius’ 
separation from the world. This is becoming an awkward pattern, this matter of Persius’ gifts. In 
the prologue, carmen adfero was a sarcastic “Oh, I’ll give it to ya;” in the first satire, the final 
Callirhoen do was a similarly derisive presentation; here, in Satire II, the final farre litabo is 
offered in earnest, but to someone else. 
 Across the Prologue and Satires I and II, poetry and prayer are analogized via the 
leitmotif of the nummus as related productions and transactions through their shared adaptation of 
the theme of food and eating. Broadly, the theme of payment and consumption began with the 
Prologue’s allegation that the uenter is master of poiesis and that poiesis is motivated by coin (a 
take-down of the institution of patronage). The activities of poetry and the activities of prayer and 
ritual are both therefore built upon a projection of the prologue’s avian motivation onto human 
motivation in Satire I and, in Satire II, by the pray-er (mistakenly) onto the gods. 
 There are structural parallels between Persius’ provision of the stomach and of the coin as 
dual models of human motivation. Motivation by food and money are projected by poets and pray-
ers upon their respective audiences. In the Prologue, bird-poets were motivated by their stomach 
and thus, in Satire 1, the poet cooks to please others. Birds love shiny objects; the human desire 
for coin, also presaged in the Prologue, is projected by humans onto gods. Later, the two 
understandings of motivation are so conflated that the foolish will even attempt to feed their coins 
(Sat. V.149) on a diet of accumulated interest. This is not the only “mistake” humans make when 
it comes to gold: they are themselves unable to discern the real from the counterfeit. Fakes abound 
in the libellus.  
 The Prologue’s send-up of counterfeit poetry to be paid in kind with counterfeit coin sets 




manifests itself through the extreme conventionality that characterizes the production of 
contemporary poetry by which sound masks quality. In the second satire, this is paralleled by the 
production of ritual piety, which masks theological misconception and hypocritical prayers. In 
Satire 3, it is the hiding satirist himself who shall come under inspection. As the second satire sees 
prayer as poiesis, the three subsequent satires will treat philosophy as poiesis, proposing a narrative 
of the emergence of philosophy as an activity and as a literary genre. We shall see how the student 
of philosophy emerges from a disreputable sleep and the Ur-teacher of philosophy is recast as the 
gadfly.  
 compositum ius fasque animo sanctosque recessus 
 mentis et incoctum generoso pectus honesto. 
 haec cedo ut admoueam templis et farre litabo.  
  
 Justice and rightness balanced in the soul and the sacred 
recesses of the mind a raw heart with noble respectability: grant that 
I bring these to the temples and I’ll make my devotional with grain.   
 
Persius decides that his best offertory will be the insides of his mind and his raw heart; he retreats 
from us to make his [pious] propitiations. This moment of bizarre quiet and piety hints that we 
might hear the carmen that he promised to offer the uates in the Prologue, naïvely understood--
perhaps he will offer us a carmen compositum for a place apart from the bodily fluids and improper 
organs of the first and second satires. The sounds that the third satire emits, however, are a snore, 





CHAPTER FOUR: Split down the middle (Satire III) 
Nempe haec adsidue. Yes, unrelentingly like this—things prior, things present, things to come. 
The third satire begins with perpetuity, morning, a hangover, a question, and a complaint. The poet 
exchanges elusivity and absence for radical subjectivity: it is highly focalized through the waking 
writer in the first person—at first a nascent, oceanic plural (“We snore,” Sat. III.3). We meet, at 
last, the imagined “author” of the book we have been reading, only to discover that he is as 
malformed a youth as ever was, incapable, it seems, of rising, speaking, writing. In the middle of 
the libellus, we meet the author in the middle of writing (or is he behind on his writing?). This new 
subject contextualizes the object-directed diatribes in Satires I and II, resolving (on my reading) 
the question of authorship while at the same time opening the new question of authority.  
 The satire’s first moment—which is also every moment—is focalized through the perception 
of cracks (rimas, 2) the interruption of sleep by a friend is followed by the attention suddenly 
drawn to the subject’s body, which is split (findor, 9); the subject receives pen and parchment that 
are figured as split, too—the nib is cracked, the parchment two-colored. The fissure of body, pen, 
and paper precipitates the splitting of discursive registers within the poem. Attempts at a dialogue 
scene will be aborted in favor of diatribe as the subject qua author proves incapable of completing 
the satire himself, in his real, newly revealed propria persona. We’re snoring off what’s enough 
to despume a heady Falernian (stertimus, indomitum quod despumare Falernum/ sufficiat, III.3-
4): When the poet admits mid-book that he is sleeping off a hangover, Persius supplies an alarming 
revision to the implicit frame of the first three poems: If it has always been this way, have Satires 
I and II been as sloshed as Attius’ indicted Iliad (I.50-51)? Have the preceding rants been his own 
drunken contributions to the symposium of Romans in their cups (I.30-31), or to Macrinus’ party—




 This chapter begins with the poem’s opening through and alongside the history of its 
interpretation. To consider the components of this scene (How many voices? Whose are they? 
How are we to imagine these questions and answers unfolding?) is a de rigeur site of any serious 
treatment of this poem and so here also are offered some ways in which to synthesize a reading of 
this scene with the turns of the diatribe that follows it. Through a digest of the poem’s broad 
outlines, this chapter argues that Persius’ narratological experiment identifies the author-subject 
with his book, drawing in particular upon Horatian and Ovidian comparanda: in a change from the 
disembodied, obscure authorship of the first two satires, the book-subject acquires a physical body. 
This new embodiment of the poet provides evidence against the often repeated but not fully 
substantiable view that Persius’ third satire, once its poetic devices have been explicated, is itself 
an ethical protreptic.  
 This chapter gestures towards studies of the Roman book as aesthetic project in order to 
reassess the opening of the third satire and thus to capitalize upon the tensions between imagined 
and actual reception in ancient reading contexts—the lectio upon which I focused my analysis of 
the earlier poems. This chapter argues that the prominence of the book as a material object early 
on in the poem offers a midway reprogramming of the libellus as a whole. The poem sets up new 
programs for Persius’ satirical project. This reassessment opens a new avenue for interpreting the 
long diatribe that dominates the remainder of the poem. The absent poet becomes a present poet 
as object-driven critique is exchanged for subject-driven self-criticism. Vituperation of others’ 
song and speech is exchanged for a self-portrait of the poet’s own alleged failure to write and to 
speak. And questions of style—even as proxies for character—are exchanged for questions of 
moral substance, as poetics become supplanted by ethics as the satirist’s principal interest, 




the shift to an inconsistent, and unpredictable subjectivity is thematized in the splintering of voice, 
body, and book, which are described in the same terms and thus mutually identified.  
  
Voices (from the past) and Dialogue 
The desire for clarity on what is happening in Satire III.1-34 could hardly be longer standing, nor 
the approaches more disparate. It is in recognition of this that I here draw together voices from 
across the long history of critical consideration of this poem. How should we identify the “voices” 
of the third satire’s opening scene? How should we understand the imagined context of their 
encounter? Who is the subject of stertimus? What exactly is a comes? For how long does he speak? 
The production of manuscripts, editions, and translations necessarily predicates how the poem is 
read; modern presentations of the text range from minimalist editorial interferences to the highly 
interventionist. The difficulties of punctuating the dialogue in this satire become still more striking 
when one observes that the number of meaningful lexical variants and conjectures is small by 
comparison.  
 The controversy raised by these lines is seen most plainly on the modern printed page, in 
both editions and translations, the first seven lines alone exhibit several divergences. Casaubon’s 
approach in his 1605 edition was entirely different even from the area of relative agreement among 
both prior and subsequent scholars:  
… quinta dum linea tangitur umbra. 
En quid agis? siccas insana canicula messes  5 
Iamdudum coquit, & patula pecus omne sub ulmo est. 
Vnus ait comitum: uerúmne? itáne? ocyus adsit 
 
Casaubon believed Persius to maintain the role of the Stoic philosopher from the start: the 
beginning is not a scene-setting as much as it is the beginning of a speech without introduction, as 




was mistaken because Roman aristocrats did not keep philosophers in their retinues; rather, he 
argued, the comes is a disciple, one from among those who gather about a philosopher (230-233).125  
 Jahn (1843) extended the speech of the comes to cover all of the opening lines (1-6), up to 
unus ait comitum (7), marking an alternate voice at Verumne? itane? ; Conington (1893) followed 
suit, as we shall see shortly. Clausen, in his (still) standard 1956 edition of this text, used a light 
hand and applies the quotation mark sparingly—only around the interjection marked by en:  
… quinta dum linea tangitur umbra. 
‘en quid agis? siccas insana canicula messes  5 
iam dudum coquit et patula pecus omne sub ulmo est’  
unus ait comitum. uerumne? Itan? ocius adsit  
 
A fuller understanding of the impact of these critical divergences upon interpretation may be 
gained from even the briefest survey of translation. Two types of interpretation—the dramatic and 




I suppose this is now routine. Already the bright 
morning is coming through the shutters, 
enlarging the narrow cracks with light. We’re 
snoring enough to make the untamed Falernian 
stop fizzing, while the shadow reaches the fifth 
line.  
F 
“Hey, what are you doing? The mad Dog star 
has been baking the crops dry for hours now and 
all the herd’s beneath the spreading elm,” says 
one of my mates.  
P 
‘Is this always the order of the day, then? Here 
is full morning coming through the window-
shutters, and making the narrow crevices look 
larger with the light; yet we go on snoring, 
enough to carry off the fumes of that 
unmanageable Falernian, while the shadow is 
crossing the fifth line on the dial. What do you 
mean to do? The mad dog’s star is already 
baking the crops dry, and the cattle have all got 
under cover of the elm.’ The speaker is one of 
my lord’s companions. ‘Really? You don’t 
mean it? Hallo there, somebody, quick? 
Nobody there?’ The glass of his bile is 
expanding. ‘I’m splitting’ – till you would 
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Are you sure? Really? Quick, someone come 
here. No one around? My bottle-green bile is 
swelling: my head is splitting – you’d think all 
the herds of Arcadia were braying. Now my 
book come to hand, and the two-tone parchment 
smoothed of hair, some paper and a jointed reed 
pen. Then we start whining: the liquid hangs 
from the nib too thickly, but when water’s 
added, the black cuttle ink thins and we whine 
that the reed keeps globbing together the diluted 
drops.  
F 
“You idiot, more idiotic by the day, is this the 
state we’ve got to? Oh, why don’t you act like a 
pigeon chick or a little prince instead, and 
demand your baby food cut up into tiny pieces, 
and throw a tantrum and refuse to let your 
mommy sing you to sleep?” 
P 
But how can I work with a pen like this? … 
F 
“Who are you fooling? Why do you keep 
reciting these evasions? It’s your move. You’re 
mindlessly draining away—you’ll be a 
laughingstock… 
think all the herds in Arcadia were setting up a 
bray.  
     Now he takes the book into his hand, and 
the parchment, which has had the hair taken off 
and shows two colours, and the paper, and the 
jointed reed. Next we begin to complain that 
the ink is thick and clots on the pen; and then, 
when the water is poured in, that the blackness 
of the liquor is ruined, and that the implement 
makes two washy drops instead of one. Poor 
creature! poorer and poorer every day! is it 
come to this? Had you not better at once go on 
like pet pigeons and babies of quality, asking 
to have your food chewed for you, and pettishly 
refusing to let mammy sing you to sleep? 
     ‘Can I work with a pen like this?’ Whom are 
you trying to take in? What do you mean by 
these whimpering evasions? It is your game 
that's playing, you are dribbling away like a 
simpleton, as you are. You will be held cheap... 
 
Both translations are highly interventionist and mutually incompatible. Conington made sense of 
the text for his reader by introducing a third voice, a “narrator.” “The speaker is one of my lord’s 
companions” is as much argument as translation. This narrator presumably makes the observation 
“Now he takes the book into his hand…,” awkwardly separating the related iam liber… uenit… 
(10-11) from tum querimur… (12-13), where the temporal-adverbial iam and tum must conjoin 
one moment that precipitates the next: the receipt of writing materials and the discovery of their 
dysfunction. Conington frames the perplexing interplay of sensations and voices with his narrator 
who enables the presentation of a coherent “scene.” Braund, on the other hand, presents the lines 




switching roles and personae among the satires. The translation, however, awkwardly transforms 
the subjective sense-impressions of the room and the state of the body into statements seemingly 
addressed to another while at the same time hedging on how much is vocalized by placing 
quotation marks only around the words she attributes to the “friend” (F).   
 My point here is not to detract from the efforts of Conington and Braund at making 
intelligible for the reader-in-translation a poem often deemed unintelligible. Rather, the range of 
possible (and incompatible) readings generated by the text, and the impossibility of definitively 
“fixing” these lines, indicate that it is the text itself that is divisive, and, as we shall see, it is the 
text itself that thematizes the difficulties of its own division. Early readers—presenters of the 
text—also tried their hand at explanations of the scene: as in the case of the first satire, manuscript 
evidence indicates that both medieval and modern readers share concerns about how to begin a 
reading of a satire of Persius. The reader of O provides a re-narration of the scene in between the 
lines of the Latin.127 The reader of K attributes the first four lines to a paedagogus, apparently, on 
this view, rousing the sleeper, who is marked dormiens repeatedly in the margins.128 That reader 
seems to agree with the traditional scholiast, who reads the satire as belonging to a scene in which 
a teacher (pedagogus) attacks a student (scolasticus) in front of him for laziness, using his ill 
behavior as a proxy (and point of departure) for the vices of others in the world. But the scholiast 
doubles this interpretation: et cum inducit pedagogum obiurgantem scolasticum… et inducit unum 
ex comitibus alium castigantem.  The companion (unus comitum) according to the Commentum 
rouses the sleeper who rises, calls for his servants, and expresses his irritation at their slowness to 
appear. The scholiast understands the poet’s voice to be the voice of the companion to some extent: 
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the question an tali studeam calamo? belongs to the student while cui uerba? and Quid istas 
succinis ambages? belong to the poet, presumably with the voice of the companion or teacher.  
 Now, some time later, “Housman’s ghost has lingered over Satire 3 for decades,” as Hooley 
has put it.129 Indeed, the 1913 piece precipitated a tiny but lively industry of scholarship working 
out how to understand the controversial lines. Housman proposed something like an erasure of 
characters and scene by offering the idea that the satire gives us not two, not three “speakers,” but 
just one; the apparent diversity of voices represents an internal psychological tug-of-war between 
a higher and a lower self, not a dialogue staged between individuals.130 This suggestion was 
challenged on the grounds that such a poem would be an unprecedented, unlikely production.131 
The longevity, persistence, and manifest insolubility of the question, however, suggest that 
expectation may not be especially informative.132 And in fact scenes of self-contemplation are 
represented in Roman literature, not only by Seneca (for example in De Ira III.36), but also by 
Persius himself, in this very satire: a man pales at night at his own thoughts, which are incapable 
of being shared even with his nearest and dearest (Sat. III.42-43). D’Alessandro-Behr has used the 
methods of Bakhtinian dialogic analysis to propose that, on the one hand, the boundaries between 
the voices are dissolved by the poet (since they share vocabulary from differing registers and since 
the grammatical persons change) and, on the other, that the third satire presents a dialogue among 
strongly embodied characters.133  
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 Some difficulties of the text seem to me to be overstated, some instances of grammatical 
person not so mystifying. For example, when addressing the sick patient, the phrase temptemus 
fauces (113) should not make us speculate on the presence of some further character.134 Doctors 
and dentists often say, “Let’s see now…” or “Let’s open wide…” without patients jumping out of 
their skins wondering whether there be additional persons in the examination room. Similarly, if I 
told you that one of my friends woke me up this morning (unus ait comitum, 7), you would 
probably not leap to the thought that a throng of friends crowded my bedroom and only of one of 
them came forward to speak. At the same time, while some—even much—of the appeal of this 
poem lies in the elusive and meandering quality of its voices, as Reckford has advised, the 
performative demand of Roman lectio requires that the lines be readable, that is, readable aloud. 
Certain aspects of the opening scene are clarified as it proceeds: the interruption en… (5) is 
certainly an intrusion upon the sleeper.  
 The better question, rather, is: What is the pay-off from Persius’ composing the scene in this 
way, in which we are given very little information about the interruptor, the voice which becomes, 
as the poet continues to snore away, the diatribist? Here it is instructive to adduce Horace’s Serm. 
II, 3, the confrontation with and diatribe of Damasippus, a poem that has much lexical and 
thematic, and some formal, influence on Persius’ third satire. In Horace, the players in this sermo 
are provided in the first line, by the scribis of Damasippus (Serm. II, 3.1), who is identified by 
“Horace” at the first opportunity (16). In Persius, the opening scene focuses on emergence from 
the (drunken) darkness: The light, the time, and the liminal state precede the entrance of the voice 
that sets things in motion. Persius likes to play with false starts—indeed we have already seen this 
phenomenon in Satire I, where the didactic trajectory of the first line is immediately thwarted by 
                                                          




the objection of the second, and in Satire 2, where the genial address to Macrinus gives way to a 
diatribe on hypocrisy after just five lines. 
 Persius’ rewriting of the Damasippus scene has the following important effect:  his first 
person overture (stertimus) disallows the ironizing of the critic’s accusations. By introducing the 
subject’s vice (and voice) before the words of censure from an alternate voice break into the scene, 
Persius removes the waking writer’s capacity to undermine the accusations themselves. Horace’s 
accuser is simultaneously identified and undermined: Damasippus himself has already proven a 
failure; his foray into philosophy is a second, recuperative career. We are prepared to question his 
lecturing at the writer. Horace’s responses to the man are subtle (and not-so-subtle) critiques of his 
own that Damasippus seems not fully to process but that call for the ironizing complicity of the 
reader: May the gods give you… a barber! (di te, Damasippe, deaeque/ uerum ob consilium donent 
tonsore, Serm. II, 3.16-17) and Yes, I, too, am shocked you’ve been cured of your previous 
madness for cash (noui,/ et miror morbi purgatum te illius, Serm. II, 3.26-27). In Horace’s closing 
scene, when Damasippus starts to cast barbs that are a little too close to home (You live beyond 
your means, Serm. II, 3.24), Horace pulls the plug: he has the final word, reminding Damasippus, 
and us, that—whatever the truth of his accusations may be—Damasippus is ever the worse man 
(o maior tandem parcas, insane, minori! Serm. II, 3.326). Persius’ scene, by contrast, attests to the 
subject’s dissolution in advance of the criticism, making evasion of the barbs impossible; the 
subject is indeed an uncivilized drunk; he has told us so in his own person (stertimus, 3 and findor, 
Sat. III.9). 
 The divergence from the Damasippus satire, important though Horace’s poem is to Persius, 
could scarcely be greater with respect to staging. Importantly, only the subject of Persius’ satire is 




subject his supplies, is disembodied, outside the interest of the subject. Of course, this alternate 
voice is a product of the student’s imagination: Persius told us as much in the first satire when he 
revealed his method for creating the patently fictive interlocutor (quisquis es, o modo quem ex 
aduerso dicere feci, Sat. I.44). The solipsism of the subject in Satire III is reflected in his own 
radical embodiment: we get much information about his existence as a body and none about the 
existence of the other—not even the name. We have seen the disembodied voice before, and not 
only in quisquis es. The absent poet and diatribist of the prologue and Satires I and II similarly 
resisted identification. The Subject is unable to speak or to respond coherently: aborted attempts 
at dialogue result in its abdication in favor of diatribe. In this new poem, the subject has passed the 
responsibility for diatribe on to the fictive interlocutor this time, radically shifting the direction of 
critique from other to self, or self-as-other, i.e. the subject is the object.  
 
Digest 
Here, in fairness, I submit my translation of the same lines:  
 
Nempe haec adsidue, iam clarum mane fenestras 
intrat et angustas extendit lumine rimas. 
stertimus, indomitum quod despumare Falernum 
sufficiat, quinta dum linea tangitur umbra.  
‘en quid agis? siccas insana canicula messes 
iam dudum coquit et patula pecus omne sub ulmo est,’  
unus ait comitum. verumne? itan? ocius adsit 
huc aliquis. nemon? turgescit uitrea bilis:  
findor, ut Arcadiae pecuaria rudere credas.  
iam liber et positis bicolor membrana capillis 
inque manus chartae nodosaque uenit harundo.  
tum querimur crassus calamo quod pendeat umor.  
nigra sed infusa uanescit sepia lympha,  
dilutas querimur geminet quod fistula guttas.  
o miser inque dies ultra miser, hucine rerum 
uenimus? a, cur non potius teneroque columbo 
et similis regum pueris pappare minutum  




an tali studeam calamo? cui uerba? quid istas 
succinis ambages? tibi luditur. ecfluis amens, 
contemnere.    (Sat. III.1-21) 
 
 
Of course, this constantly is what it is: now bright A.M. is getting 
into the windows and widening the narrow cracks with its light. 
We’re snoring, enough to despume a stiff Falernian, while the line 
is touched by shade no. 5. ‘Hey, what’re you doing? The raging Dog 
Star’s been cooking the dried crops for some time already and the 
whole herd’s beneath the spreading elm,’ says a friend. Really? Is 
that so? Someone better get here, fast! No one? Glassy bile is 
swelling: I’m being split open, so you’d think that the cattle of 
Arcadia were mooing. Now a book and its two-colored—hairs 
removed—skin and the pages and knotty pen come into my hands. 
Then we complain because a thick glob hangs from the reed. But 
black fluid keeps vanishing once the ink is poured in. Then we 
complain that the nib doubles the diluted drops. Oh, you wreck, a 
wreck every day hereafter, have we come to this point in life? ah, 
why no better than either a tender dove or the sons of kings are you 
refusing to nurse a little, and should you reject your nurse’s lullaby? 
Well, could I work with such a pen? For whom are these words? 
Why are you droning on with these evasions? The joke’s on you.135 
You’re flowing out of your mind. You’re a nothing… 
 
 With this operating account of how the opening lines are passed from the sleeping subject to 
the diatribist in view, the poem’s more general trajectory may be outlined. The first several lines 
are marked by a density of time markers. The immutability of the human condition that the satire 
is about to describe (adsidue) is made particular and specific by the subsequent time markers. 
Persius opens his third satire with remarkable certainty: everything is constantly this way. His 
adsidue looks backwards upon the human condition (Sat. I, 1 and 9-10) that he has observed for 
us and forwards to the personal incapacities about to be revealed. The poet then applies the 
condition of perpetuity to the specific moments. The scene first introduces the sleeper as he wakes, 
snoringly late, documenting each moment of his undignified levée. The scene is focalized through 
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the opening of an eye, mediated through the body and senses of the sleeper: the moment (iam) is 
defined by the impression in dark space of morning (mane) light broadening the gaps around a 
shutter (Sat. III.1-2). This movement of light and shadow causes the sleeper to surmise that the 
fifth shadow is arriving at the hour-line (Sat. III.4). 
 After the moment of morning has been related impressionistically, an importantly alternate 
voice (a “friend”) draws the subject’s attention to the time outside the room. The hour is reiterated 
by the phrase canicula messes/ iam dudum coquit (Sat. III.5-6): the noonday is baking the crops, 
further afield. The disruptive en quid agis? (Sat. III.5) that has goaded the sleeper to concern 
(uerumne? 7) ends in inaction. The adoption of his friend’s concern for the late hour is immediately 
upended. The sleeper catches on to the state of the fields; he proves it by appropriating the trope 
of the countryside and reformulating that language as the rustic state of the body, emitting its own 
lowing (Arcadiae pecuaria rudere credas, Sat. III.9). So the origins of pastoral. The petulant 
innards of the first satire burst with liquid (turgescit uitrea bilis:/ findor, Sat. III.8-9): the poet’s 
body comes into being and makes itself known at once with its rupture, his somatic reaction to the 
unfortunate news that time passes. Finally, iam (Sat. III.10) and tum (Sat. III.12) revert to the 
subject’s experience, his reception of writing materials (inque manus…uenit, 11).  
 Interest in the mechanics of his own body is succeeded by a solipsism that persists as the 
sleeper attempts to engage and act in the world. Preparing to write what we are about to read—
and have read thus far—he huffily demands assistance (ocius adsit/ huc aliquis, Sat. III.7-8). 
Whereas Horace recognized the presence of his slave where pertinent to action (for example, Serm. 
I, 9.9-10), Persius’ assistant is recognized only when, infuriatingly, he is not there (nemon? Sat. 
III.8). When the “help” finally has arrived, with the required items in hand, the poet does not 




as something along the lines of “paper and pen are handed to me”136 might achieve. Instead, paper 
and pen uenit into his hands (10-11), an experiential description that emphasizes his passivity. The 
pen is faulty, leaky, impossible to work with (Sat. III.12-14 and 19). As difficulties with his tools 
proliferate, writing turns out to be harder than whispering into a ditch—the satirist’s vain activity 
in the first satire. Reiterating the Midas allusion in that earlier poem’s communication failure, in 
the third satire the pen is Persius’ harundo (Sat. III.11), reedy conductor of the unspeakable. Persius 
will attempt to transmit his secret via reed after all, but his is a split transmitter.  
 The declaration of the subject’s everlasting wretchedness (o miser inque dies ultra miser, 15) 
reverts to the notion of perpetuity that opened the piece (adsidue, 1). Between lines 16 and 34, the 
subject’s moral failures are analogized by the alternate voice from infancy to death: the accusations 
leveled against him range from baby-talk (16-18) to an ethical death by drowning, an allusion to 
the Stoic lesson that he who drowns in only three feet of water drowns all the same—and so ends 
the life of him who tries but fails to be virtuous (Sat. III.33-34). We have seen metaphors of cooking 
and consumption already in the first satire’s morsels and the second satire’s sausages and unmixed 
juices. Here, the fatal adverse effects of consumption appear in the object’s belt-loosening and 
visceral fatness (Sat. III.31-34). Intervening between these two moments—the baby talk and the 
death—are an accusation of malformation (udum et molle lutum es, Sat. III.23): the sleeper is wet 
clay that will not survive the tap-test. This last is an allusion to the metaphor employed by 
philosophers (e.g. Socrates in Phileb. 55c and Diogenes the Cynic in Diog. L. VI, 30) for the 
testing of propositions and ideas, but here the poet applies the test to the whole self: This pot’s got 
to go back to the wheel. 
                                                          




 Jupiter, please punish tyrants who are moved by desire (35): This is Persius’ new prayer—
the last one we heard was at the end of Satire II, in which he declared that his prayers were better 
than those of the public and promised a compositum ius fasque animo sanctosque recessus (Sat. 
II.73)—the abstract prayer of an absent satirist. The tyrants here are those who are shackled by the 
psychic tyranny of misplaced desire (e.g. Epict. Disc. I, 19). So the analogy through which the 
man who cannot bear the terror of his inner life is compared to torture by the tyrant Dionysius (Sat. 
III.39-43).  
 We then proceed to reminiscence of the speaker’s boyhood and his calculated failure to 
perform at school, to read or speak. The scene significantly revises the scenes of Horace’s father 
attending that poet’s lessons (Serm. I, 6.71-88; memini…, Sat. III.44), the diatribist says. What 
does he remember? The story cannot emerge from the life of this fatherless poet.137 Persius’ 
assertion of memory marks allusion to the earlier satirist’s scene but also something more: Is he 
the reincarnated Horace, by dint of that metempsychosis which Ennius claimed and which our poet 
will appropriate in Satire VI?138 Persius’ own boyhood scene charms: the disappointed father 
sweating with anxiety, the son’s preference for games rather than Stoic recitations, the gamble a 
greater concern than mortality (44-51). The subversion of lessons and the survival of boyhood are 
related without remorse; it is not until we read haut tibi (52), that that story is presented as a 
negative example for the subject, and we realize that it is not a variation on one of Horace’s stories 
about lippitudo, bleariness as a stock site of humor. The diatribist fixes his attention on the 
incongruity of the writer’s philosophical-educational pedigree and his evident (in)capacity to 
function: still, even now he is snoring (Sat. III.58); yesterday’s bender wafts from his gaping jaws; 
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not only is he not a straight shooter (Sat. III.60), but he attempts to pursue birds by slinging 
potsherds and mud (Sat. III.61)—bits of his own malformed substance (Sat. III.21-24).  
 Lines 63-76 adopt the deixis and multiple interlocutory mode characteristic of diatribe: see 
them asking for medicine—they (you) don’t even know what true ailment is sneaking up on them 
that cannot be negotiated away (Sat. III.63-65). You, plural, (they) must learn the nature of the 
universe, the point of human existence, the best uses of material goods, and god’s intention for 
you, singular (Sat. III.66-72). Also: don’t be envious of the wealthy with their full larders (Sat. 
III.73-76). The diatribist has taken us outdoors, to the streets.  
 Here, some young musclebound jock takes his turn lampooning philosophers, who, he says, 
mumble useless nonsense at the ground, mindlessly chewing on their lips while contemplating the 
type of lesson just recommended by the diatribist: nothing comes from from nothing (Sat. III.77-
84). He and his buddies are doubled over, usurping the roles of the satirist with their sneering noses 
and laughter (ingeminat tremulos naso crispante cachinnos, Sat. III.87; cf. Sat. I.12 and 118). The 
centurions tell us something new about the lessons to which the subject has been exhorted: Don’t 
skip your lunch over it (Sat. III.85).  
 The diatribist returns from his excursus into philosophical life lessons and the rebuttal from 
the street satirist. He returns to and watches closely one of the sick men asking for a doctor (Sat. 
III.88-89). After a brief convalescence he goes back to the bottle (90-93) to whose ill effects we 
were introduced in line 3 with the trenchant Falernian hangover. He is interrupted: “Hey, buddy, 
you’re getting pale” (Sat. III.94). The consumption of fatty feasts in Persius’ world leads to 
sickness and death of the sort that form the negative exempla of Satire III. The man is so riddled 
with gout—disease of the rich—that the standardly prescribed hellebore is useless to this drunken, 




This scene recalls the opening scene of the poem in the following ways: first, the person’s 
symptoms of dissolution are his gaping exhalation and his fondness for drink (aegris/ faucibus 
exsuperat gravis halitus, Sat. III.88-89; gutture sulpureas lente exhalante mefites, Sat. III.99; lenia 
loturo sibi Surrentina139 rogabit, 93); second, the interrupting voice of correction is unidentified, 
but on familiar terms (heus bone, Sat. III.94). The sick man is beyond correction by the alternate 
voice; the remainder of his body falls apart and he’s carried out feet first (Sat. III.100-106).  
 The satire’s closing scene shows no sign that the diatribist’s interlocutor has changed or that 
he has switched locations in the city (e.g. poscentis uideas, Sat. III.64; hic aliquis, 77; qui dicit, 
90). Since it is context-less, I suggest that it is the subject who plausibly returns and is the 
diatribist’s final interlocutor. He has endured his “friend’s” repeated flogging and has sat through 
that extended fable of the sick body (Sat. III.63-106). It does not apply: I’m not your guy; I’m not 
sick (tange, miser… nil calet hic, Sat. III.107-108). The diatribist has already censured the subject 
for living like Natta, whose self-indulgence required undoing his belt (Sat. III.31). He makes a 
final pitch at the sleeper: Does his fundamental disease not make itself known through his bodily 
responses to the temptations in the world before him (Sat. III.109-111)? That this final interlocutor 
is an embodiment of or variation upon the subject is evident in his identification with oral and 
guttural problems: An ulcer is latent in his mouth, his throat must be scraped with curative modest 
foods: the plain beets and cabbages recommended to avert the fate of that putrefying glutton (Sat. 
III.111-114) turn out not only to be handy scrapers for an oral ulcer but also to be laxatives for the 
whole entire tract.140 The “friend” holds a final torch to the subject’s eyes: they are all madness 
(Sat. III.115-118).  
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“Ainsi, lecteur, je suis moi-même la matière de mon livre.”  
As we have seen, references to the poet in the Prologue and in the first two satires have been 
oblique; the first person in those earlier poems asserts what he is not, what he does not—perhaps 
cannot—do.  The self-named semipaganus (an epithet highly subject to interpretation and therefore 
but a half-identification) recuses himself from the poetic tradition in the Prologue. The first person 
of Satire I appears in his recognition of his interlocutor’s fictionality (o modo quem… feci, Sat. 
I.44), his rejection of audience praise (Sat. I.45-46), his frustration over where he might find an 
audience (nec cum scrobe? Sat. I.119), and his related concern for the character of his lector (Sat. 
I.123-126). Nowhere is he an embodied character walking down the Via Sacra or rubbing elbows 
with the intelligentsia of a new empire. The “programmatic” poems, Prologue and Satire I, position 
that disembodied diatribist's voice against poets who are very much tied to their bodies—the 
stomach of the birds (Prol. 11) and the throat, nose, and mouth of the performers (Sat. I.17 and 33-
35). The disembodied “I” thoroughly in-corporates his performer (with his “little eye”) and 
audience (with their privates) and his non-existent reader (ear and pallor over his books, perhaps 
a stand-in for the absent poet’s somatic response to reading) in Satire I, hypocrites (with tongue, 
saliva, fingers, eyes) in Satire II. Earlier satirists have visible body parts (nose and jaw) while 
Persius’ single somatic mark is unseeable, the inscrutable spleen of Satire I, which finally erupts 
into our view with the cleaving of his body only in Satire III. In the second satire, he is even more 
effaced: his ego addresses a prayer to Jupiter—an attack against his target; his final offertory is 
similarly a rejection of the vows and votives of others. In those poems, the poet is the voice of 
diatribe. This voice—a laugh permitted not even to whisper—is the extent to which the poet is 




 In Satire III, we are introduced to a highly embodied satirist, a helpless body without 
integrity: exhaling liquid (Sat.III.3), swelling and side-splitting with bile, involuntary lowing 
(Sat.III.8-9), mind dribbling (Sat.III.20), head hanging, jaws gaping (Sat.III.58-59). The penetrable 
audience (Sat. I.21-22) is replaced by a subject whose orifices are examined and insides are in full 
view (findor, Sat.III.9; ego te intus in cute noui, Sat.III.30; temptemus fauces, Sat.III.113), just 
where the medical discourse that Bartsch has examined gains its full currency. Finally to know that 
elusive poet is to know him too intimately, in his skin, his body open. What we find there is all 
bile and methane. 
 Painfully aware, at last, of his body, the poet transfers somatic qualities onto the objects 
before him. The split-open writer is re-embodied in his writing materials. Membrana (parchment, 
Sat. III.10) is not merely variatio for charta (paper, i.e. papyrus) or for liber, which appear in the 
next lines.141 No, the corporeality of the parchment is emphasized by reminders of its production: 
a once hairy site (positis…capillis, Sat.III.10), it is bicolor because it was the interface between a 
body’s innards and an outer condition. The writing surface is animal, rather than vegetable. A book 
is a body. The herd animals to which the friend alluded are present not only in the body of the 
writer but also in his book. Membrana is the material of a slow writer, too.142 Scriptitauit et raro et 
tarde (Vita 41). The text is its material: its split body is Persius’ split body, its running ink Persius 
spilling out of his mind (uanescit sepia, Sat.III.13; ecfluis amens, Sat.III.20). The rustic origin of 
the pen is emphasized by nodosa (Sat.III.11), just as the term bicolor acts upon the parchment: the 
knots of the reed reflect Persius’ interest in the roots of his book’s materials, their organic 
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142 Quintilian tells us that wax tablets allow greater facility and flexibility in writing; parchment slows the 
writer down and the ink it requires is also a retarding distraction, as seen amply here in Persius (Inst. Orat.  




substance. Each iteration of the pen—harundo (Sat.III.11), calamo (Sat.III.12), fistula 
(Sat.III.14)—is imperfect; the knotty reed also turns out to be both too thick (crassus, Sat.III.12) 
and its ink too watery (uanescit, Sat.III.13). But the attribution of “knotty” to the pen is also an 
epithet transferred to the difficulty of the present poem; from the moment pen touches the paper, 
the writing splinters (geminet quod fistula, Sat.III.14). The bad poet blames his tools (querimur, 
Sat.III.14). The writing materials are a figure for Persius’ ambivalent poetics in this satire; pen is 
a metonym for the mind. The emanations from this dysfunctional mind, like the doubled book and 
doubling pen, are doublesong (succinis ambages, Sat.III.20).  
Persius’ references to his text, from the address to his book in the first satire (uidi, uidi ipse, 
libelle, Sat. I.120) to the multi-stage appearance of the book in the third, recall another disheveled 
little book, addressed in the first poem of Ovid’s Tristia: Parue—nec inuideo—sine me, liber, ibis 
in urbem (Trist. I, 1.1). Theirs are blotted texts (liturarum, Trist. I, 1.13; dilutas guttas, Sat. III.14). 
Both poets stage these texts as diminutive and decrepit objects in search of a reader of a rare, 
perhaps even eluding, temperament, one that enables the imagined lector’s empathy with the 
author. As we have seen, Persius’ imagined reader (Sat. I.123-130) has an ear tuned for Persius 
and reads Attic Comedy in a way that is very rare and particularly Persian; he knows not to laugh 
at the low-hanging fruit but rather at some unarticulated quality of Comedy (politics? human 
vices?). To fulfill this set of prerequisites is quite possibly impossible for a non-fictive reader, 
perhaps for anyone who is non-identical to the poet himself. Ovid’s imagined reader will be one 
who sighs with Ovid and cries with Ovid (qui me suspiret and nec siccis…genis; cf. lacrimis… 
meis, Trist. I, 1.27-28 and 14). Unlike the tradition of poetry that asserts privacy and a small, elite 




their readership may not exist and that their physical manifestation in the world does little to attract 
a readership.  
The Tristia are missives meant to represent their author where he himself may not go (ei mihi, 
quo domino non licet ire tuo!, Trist. I, 1.2). Ovid’s conceit is epistolary—and answers Horace’s 
less desperate letter. In the final poem of Epistulae I, Horace presents himself at odds with his 
liber: in spite of having been reared for a private audience, the book wishes to go out in the world. 
The poem is an envoi to itself and its book: fuge quo descendere gestis (Ep. I, 20.5). In spite of the 
poet’s assertion that these Epistulae were written for private circulation, the book is ready for the 
world and will live its own life, as from a desirable youth to a reminiscing old age, when it is to 
represent its poet favorably (Ep. I, 20.19-28). The book is polished (pumice mundus, Ep. I, 20.1) 
and calculated to be dear to the public upon release (carus eris Romae, Ep. I, 20.10),  as the poet 
himself has been pleasing (placuisse, Ep. I, 20.23). In these two cases, the text’s fictive body 
conforms to the character of its author. In the case of Horace, the body is mundus in keeping with 
the Horatian expressions of refinement; of Ovid, it is incultus is in keeping with the disarranged 
appearance of a lamenter. Unlike the finish of Horace’s book, the Tristia will be rough (hirsutus, 
Trist. I, 1.12), unadorned (nec te purpureo velent vaccinia fuco, Trist. I, 1.5), and unpolished 
(incultus, Trist. I, 1.3).  
Tristia I is a particularly good foil for Satire III because it presents poems that assert their own 
unreadiness and isolation even as they are consumed through publication. Persius and Ovid assert 
a fictive condition of and for their books, either text being impossible to copy and distribute in the 
malformed state pretended. The poet asks his lector or auditor to imagine that the words being 
read arise from some object other than that before him, to replace the copy and see the disordered 




Horace’s missive. But Persius also rejects the completeness—whether nice or unadorned—of the 
books of both earlier poets. In spite of its unkempt appearance, Ovid’s book is ready to go (uade, 
Trist. I, 1.3). Ovid’s and Horace’s texts are persons—representatives, reliable (Ovid) or not 
(Horace) of the poet. The inchoate state of Persius’ libellus, meanwhile, reflects its infantile and 
waking author. The book in pieces reflects the poet in pieces. It is Persius alone who presents his 
corpus as it comes into being—in the middle of writing, at the middle of his book. 
 
Progress  
The fissures of body and materials result in the poet’s inarticulate sounds (lallare, Sat. III.18; 
succinis, 20; maligne respondet, 21-22) and split writing, the substantiation of a split mind that is 
given to inarticulacy (which proves ultimately unsustainable as it yields to the mode of the 
diatribist). The attention is drawn to the (in)activity of composition rather than of publication. 
Persius provides the splitting voice(s) of the satire’s opening with a graphic equivalent: the 
cracking of the pen. Where at first his ink was an untenable glob, it now disperses and draws two 
lines on the page (Sat. III.14). The image of the written word persists: A philosopher’s upsilon 
(metaphor for the paths of virtue and vice) regains its graphic importance (Sat. III.57-58). The 
letter has been drawn for you, and you are supposed to be grappling with the problem it represents. 
But Persius does not administer this lesson; instead, he composes an elaborate periphrasis for the 
very simplest of statements: Y. The philosopher and this poet have rather different ideas of the uses 
of letters. The philosopher-teacher introduces the letter to symbolize something important, that 
you are to take the matter of ethical choice seriously and that the paths of virtue and vice diverge 




in the drawn out; Y becomes instead a semantic joke: the image of divergence is his mouth, gaping 
open at its hinge (conpage soluta, 58).  
 Here it is necessary to assess Persius’ philosophical commitments—not as a matter of 
citation, rhetorical technique, or expertise, but as a single, if major, component of a virtuosic poem. 
The diatribist’s lectures conform showily to traditional Stoic methods, with exempla drawn from 
a diversity of philosophical and every day sources but all geared towards the purpose of 
motivation; such exempla in Satire III, however, fail in their protreptic purpose. This failure is 
deeply embedded in the structure of the poem—a failure which emerges from the conflict between 
the set of rhetorical techniques that traditionally teach progress on the one hand and entrenched 
thematic cyclicality on the other. Persius gestures extensively to particular Stoic philosophical-
pedagogical practices; but their thematic repetition across the poem as a whole reveals their 
ultimate inefficacy.  
 Both Classical and Hellenistic schools of philosophy are relevant to this discussion because 
Persius’ text gestures at their stock practitioners, and sometimes at specific texts in his corpus. To 
perceive even superficially the breadth of his engagement with representations of philosophy 
beyond Stoic maxims we need only to glance over each satire: e.g. Lucretius (Sat. I.1), Plato (Sat. 
IV, passim), Diogenes (Sat. III.22-23), the Cynics (Sat. I.133), Chrysippus (Sat. VI.80), Epicurean 
terminology (Sat. II.63), and, of course, Cornutus (Sat. V, passim). The Platonist seeks to reform 
the rational part of the soul in order to place it in a position of mastery over the non-rational parts; 
the Peripatetic, the philosopher least engaged by Persius, theorizes the source of moral feelings 
without proselytizing; the Cynic acts (or postures) as a living exemplum to the ostensible 
abdication of abstraction; the Epicurean guides his follower towards a (rigorously) pleasurable 




strivers’ mind in company with his own—through the development of a logic that will underpin 
action. The paradigm set by Zeno and Chrysippus is meant to engage the minds of progressors by 
training them in the proper use of logic and syllogism.143 Noticing that early-stage students may 
lack the motivation to embark on these labors in the first place, the later (imperial) Stoic may use 
rhetoric that goes out of its way initially to rouse his addressees’ emotions and interest in self-
improvement. Such stirring rhetoric, however, ought only to be deployed in the service of turning 
others in the direction of a rational understanding that will ultimately disavow, and teach its 
students to disavow, emotion. Ideally, rousing rhetoric is used for protreptic purposes only; in fact, 
any continued reliance on raised emotions would indicate that the proficiens has not made progress 
in logic or ethical philosophy more generally. The ultimate goal of a Stoic is “precisely to improve 
his own and others’ minds—their grasp of philosophical truths on the basis of the reasons that in 
fact make them true….”144 Even Epictetus’ vigorous diatribes alternate between violent and 
civilized exempla of ethical behavior. Cornutus’ Epidrome for the beginner student of philosophy 
is tranquil, lucid; it both exemplifies and recommends application of reason in order to reduce the 
possibility of disturbance.  
 The rhetoric pertaining to the mind’s fundamental ability to be molded appears in Persius’ 
reference to the mind as clay and the urgency of getting the subject-as-pot to the wheel (Sat. III.23). 
Likewise, Persius’ techniques roughly conform to contemporary extant models of protreptic 
rhetoric. The hortatory praecepta are meant for Stoic beginners and progressors; exempla of 
behavior are adjoined to those praecepta in order to illustrate the consequences of virtuous and 
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vicious motivation and behavior. Persius gives shorter shrift to decreta (statements of universal 
principles) and places a relatively greater emphasis on praecepta (hortatory and protreptic 
statements). He relies most heavily on exemplarity, albeit with some shades of difference from 
other “Stoic” practitioners: exemplarity in Seneca and Epictetus is often historical, legendary, or 
political (e.g. Agrippinus in Epict. Diss. I, 1; Alexander in Sen., Epist. Mor. 94.62-63); Seneca’s 
historical exempla often present vicious behavior as models of what to avoid; Epictetus’ very often 
present virtuous behavior (in any case negative figures are frequently paired with equal and 
opposite positive figures, e.g. Heracles and Odysseus in Diss. III, 24.) Persius’ exempla are often 
contemporary or literary and feature mundane characters rather than men of distinction; the 
exempla of Satire III are uniformly illustrative of vice (the insanity of the final addressee, the greed 
and lust of the coin-spotter, the shortsightedness of the “patient,” the avarice of the merchant, 
willfull moral ignorance of the centurion). The counter-argument that satire demands depictions 
of the debased, of the disgusting, only raises the point that Persius’ choice of genre is itself a 
perverse one. 
 The models of Seneca and Epictetus show us that exempla are best conjoined to praecepta 
in order for the precepts to be pedagogically effective: the praecepta with which a Stoic teacher 
frames his didactic anecdotes predict the vice or virtue of the exemplar and encourage the student 
to act in the future in a way that is informed by his new knowledge. Persius’ diatribist is similar to 
the “impassioned”145 improver of self and others like Seneca and Epictetus; this is very much a 
departure from the un(der)heated, unemotional didacticism of Cornutus, whose Compendium 
demonstrates the unremitting application of logic to empower his student to engage in the world 
precisely without the emotions raised by conflict and confusion (Epilogue). Praecepta under 
                                                          





Roller’s model of Stoic teaching are characterized by “deontic language and syntax: imperatives, 
futures with imperative force, the passive periphrastic conjugation, verbs like debeo.”146 We see 
these across Persius’ little corpus, but the frequency of such praecepta increases significantly in 
Satire III; this in contrast to Satires I and II, where Persius observes vices in others in order to 
distinguish the character of his own speech, rather than to instruct his targets. But in Satire III 
Persius’ diatribist warns: “Face your encroaching disease” (uenienti occurrite morbo, Sat. III.64); 
“Learn, you wrecks, and get to know the rules of the universe” (discite et, o miseri, causas 
cognoscite rerum, Sat. III.66), a praeceptum immediately followed by a series of unexplicated 
decreta; “learn and don’t be envious…” (disce nec inuideas…, Sat. III.73).  
 Persius’ manifest engagement with Stoic pedagogical techniques necessarily causes us to 
ask: to what end? Are deontic language, exemplarity, and lessons rendered here as verse 
equivalents to the speech of an active teacher or are they subordinate to some other, not entirely 
coextensive, program of the poem? Moreover, the extreme specificity of the passage of time 
discussed above (“Digest”) throws into relief the confusion of the ages of life that unfolds within 
the satire.147 By setting up the expectation of forward movement, time markers (iam, etc.) throw 
into relief the failure of human progress as projected within the poem. Persius draws our attention 
to the immutability of life through time, and he even rapidly supplies an entire life cycle within 
the first 34 lines. Childhood is invoked when the subject of the current moment is likened to a 
child (regum pueris, Sat. III.17); an adolescence of sorts comes into view when he is likened to 
clay in need of shaping, shaping at that very moment (nunc, nunc properandus, Sat. III.23); and 
then comes emergence from a great family into adulthood (stemmate quod Tusco ramum millesime 
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ducis... vel quod trabeate salutas? Sat. III.28-29). This trajectory recurs through more extended 
scenes: childhood (Sat. III.44-51) and adolescence (Sat. III.52-57); sickness (Sat. III.63-65); and, 
again, sickness and death close out the poem (Sat. III.88-106). The “development” from youth to 
old age is observed not in one addressee but over a range of the characters we encounter; this is 
the fulfillment of what was promised early in the first satire: tum cum ad canitiem et nostrum istud 
uiuere triste/ aspexi ac nucibus facimus quaecumque relictis (“…then, when I’ve looked upon 
white hairs and this our sad living and whatever it is we do once toys have been left behind,” 
Sat.I.9-10). But at no point in the life of man, from four legs to three, is virtue attained.  
 The education in philosophy featured in this satire is defined by its incompleteness; lessons 
are given but not apprehended. The dying words of Rome’s most exemplary Stoic, Cato (himself 
reading Athens’ most exemplary Plato), are never spoken (Sat. III.45). The centurion’s lampoon 
of the philosopher (Sat. III.85) goes uncorrected and unchallenged. The sick man follows his 
doctor’s instructions for just three days before going back to the bottle (Sat. III.90-93). The 
recollection of Diogenes’ maxim that the education of a youth is like the molding of clay (lutum, 
Sat. III.23) into a pot provides a metaphor that the poet merely converts into all the messiness of 
mud. Persius’ youth flings his mud (luto, Sat. III.61), and he is sure to exit life muddied (lutatus, 
Sat. III.104), just like the negative exemplum before him, whom he stubbornly refuses to see as a 
version of himself. The metaphorical muddiness of his mind prefigures the corporeal muddiness 
of his death. The motif’s continuity over the course of the poem homologizes the apparently 
disparate persons, and the vices of the speaking subject of the frame-scenes become assimilated 
with those of the targeted objects of the embedded diatribe. As patent as Stoic rhetoric is in this 
poem, so manifest is the failure of its pedagogy. While Persius’ diatribist makes use of pedagogical 




his diatribic mode and manner, perhaps after seeing that his other techniques—direct criticism 
(Sat. III.15-34), prayer (Sat. III.35-43), and a personal exemplum (Sat. III.44)—have done nothing 
to deter the writer from falling back to snoring (stertis adhuc, Sat. III.58) half-way through the 
satire.  
 Like Persius’ amens, effluens, non sanus subject, the protagonists of Seneca’s and Epictetus’ 
negative exempla are also characterized by madness: Epicurus is disturbed (Diss. II, 20.15-18); 
Alexander has furor (Epist. Mor. 94.62); Pompey has an insanus amor magnitudinis falsae (Epist. 
Mor. 94.64-65). Seneca follows these exempla with further praecepta: these explain the difficulties 
that the common views of these men pose for the individual making an effort to progress towards 
virtue; they employ deontic language to exhort the student, now that he may fully recognize the 
problems entailed in philosophical progress, to pursue a true understanding of behavior (Epist. 
Mor. 94.68).148 The target’s response to the moral of the fatally disobedient patient’s story (Sat. 
III.88-106) is “But I’m not sick!” (tange, miser… nil calet hic, Sat. III.107-108). Persius’ use of 
rhetorical techniques upon which Stoic teachers rely is in conflict with his representation of their 
inefficacy: in his address to the subject, Persius’ diatribist moves from exemplum to exemplum, 
from praeceptum to praeceptum to no avail. Persius offers no concluding resolution and protreptic 
envoi. The subject is unswayed by the injunctions to stir and motivate knowledge of the self and 
of the universe: he says and does what even the classic madman would deem madness (dicisque 
facisque quod ipse/ non sani esse hominis non sanus iuret Orestes, Sat. III.117-119).  
 Persius is evidently well versed in philosophy; his choice of writing Roman satire—in the 
tradition of satire—means that nothing is off-limits—including philosophers, who are patently 
risible in their lip-biting puzzlement, even if we also laugh at those who wrongly see that 
                                                          




eccentricity as their defining quality, like the centurions of lines 77-85. This is not to argue too far 
that he thinks Stoic theory is misguided. Rather, he presents the idea that the Stoic pedagogical 
methods in Imperial currency are demonstrably ineffective. Stoic practitioners use rousing 
rhetoric—but this implicitly appeals to non-rational emotions in order to lead one eventually to 
rationality, in tension with their belief that the human mind is wholly rational. This is the trap into 
which, as Cooper has argued, Seneca falls in his Epistulae Morales. Persius shows that mind and 
the body are incorrigible. His will to study, to get to the rigorous work of Stoic progress is subject 
to his body’s instinct to sleep and his irrational refusal to understand exempla as having anything 
to do with himself. The sleeper does not register the exemplum of the sick, self-indulgent man, 
who has been carried out feet first: he fails to respond to Stoic exemplarity. But why should we be 
surprised?  
 Nempe haec adsidue, indeed: mid-diatribe, the intrusive stertis adhuc reminds us that the 
state of affairs of the opening scene (stertimus, Sat. III.3) is unchanged: you are still snoring (Sat. 
III.58-59); and in the final line, in spite of the rigorously didactic turn of the poem, the amens 
subject remains non sanus ( Sat. III.20 and 118), just as he was out of his mind when we first met 
him. The progress that ought to be made through philosophical education and the adoption of a 
philosopher’s way of speaking (diatribe) is confounded by the circularity of insanity. As it was in 
the beginning, is now, and ever shall be: amens. Everything has always been mad—even the sign 









The third satire’s opening experiment in subjectivity develops the book’s poetic program and 
thematic range and at the same time catalyzes the book’s incipient interest in interiority and ethical 
coherence that comes to dominate Satires III, IV, and V. The first two satires attack the language, 
performances, and hypocrisies of others, with the second satire in particular laying this 
groundwork for our new direction through its exposure of whispered versus open prayer, and the 
first through its complaints about whispered versus public critique.  The third satire has begun an 
investigation into the subjective experience of such a satirist; the subsequent two satires then offer 
more probing investigations of the philosophical development of the self. The theme of perpetual 
adolescence and frustrated progress will persist in Satires IV and V.  This accompanies the shift 
across the libellus from poetics to ethics, from object to subject. Persius’ interest in the identity of 
book and body, meanwhile, will come to its ultimate fruition in the final satire.  
 While the poem has resolved the question of authorship, the poet’s authority has emerged 
severely damaged. It turns out that critique can only be delivered flatly by someone who is not 
fully there. The disembodied, embedded diatribist takes over this role from the poet, who gains a 
body in the third satire. This is to say that in the Prologue and first two satires, ego is an outsider, 
identified as part of traditions of satirists and comedians. In the third satire ego becomes an object 
of interest himself; a high degree of subjectivity and self-consciousness is assumed and paraded 
by the Persian poetic ego and the possibility is raised that the critic we’ve been listening to may 
not be quite all there himself. The subsequent satires will take up this interest in ethics and self-
study through philosophy. The fourth satire will further probe the student; in that poem the 
character of the young Alcibiades will provide an analogue for Persius. Persius’ own Socrates will 




 The generic shift to Socratic dialogue in the fourth satire is an important step away from the 
demolition of the third satire. Persius has proven that he cannot write or speak, much less engage 
in dialogue (cui uerba? Sat. III.19). Still, as we shall see, the choice of Socratic dialogue as an 
object of imitation is loaded: in Satire IV, Persius will carefully stack the deck against the 
pedagogue’s favor by exposing dialogue’s narratological framework and presuppositions. The 





CHAPTER FIVE: pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades (Satire IV) 
 
The fourth is the briefest of the satires in this slim libellus. From the notebooks of the young sleeper 
in the previous poem, the satirist now alights upon Plato’s Alcibiades, a primer for beginners in 
philosophy and, presumably, right living. Persius, I argue, philosophically formalizes the question 
of self-knowledge broached in Satire III by affiliating Satire IV with this standard philosophical 
text, in which turning a young man towards the pursuit of self-knowledge is the philosopher’s 
central aim. Satire IV re-imagines the seminal confrontation between Socrates and Alcibiades. 
This reimagining proceeds (or descends) into the form by now characteristic of our satirist, a 
diatribe—this time against vanity, with particular over-attention to the arcana lumbi. Through his 
imitation of Platonic dialogue (which, as we shall see, has nothing dialogical about it), Persius 
questions the entire notion of an authoritative teacher, a virtuous philosopher, and slyly exposes 
the potential hypocrisy at the heart of the canonizing project around Socrates. The innuendo and 
unconsummated erotic tension that makes much of Plato an enjoyable read are heightened to a 
pitch of sexual hysteria; confrontation with sexual organs replaces the philosophically and 
literarily productive subtlety of desire. It would require the straightest of faces to achieve 
equanimity while reading this satire, and, indeed, it would improbably deny Persius his place as a 
humorist. To reveal the philosopher as a performer, even a hypocrite, is to laugh at the philosopher, 
an activity sometimes not conceded to Persius and his reader, but one that must be allowed from a 
critical understanding of his reworking of philosophical tradition.  
Persius frames Satire IV as a Romanization—and satirification, so to speak—of that 
dialogue which addressed the folly of the young Alcibiades’ perilous aspiration to guide a people, 
a task for which his upbringing has ill prepared him. Though less often read today, in part because 




philosophy in the period. Alcibiades I held canonical status among the ancients, especially as a 
protreptic to philosophy; doubts about its “authenticity” date only to the nineteenth century. 
Romans not only considered it to be Platonic but prized it as essential to an education in 
philosophy.149 Persius, our philosophical proficiens, starts at the beginning, redeveloping in 
hexametric miniature the exchange between the legendary teacher and his notorious pupil. Persius’ 
choice to render this particular philosophical-pedagogical relationship in satire has important 
implications for our understanding of the place of philosophy and pedagogy in his satirical project. 
To start at the beginning of philosophy is to start with Socrates; but to revisit Socrates as a satirist 
is to resurrect that figure’s complexities and compromises, which had been put to rest through his 
beatification by the Stoics and other Hellenistic schools. That resurrection throws back into 
question the ultimate utility—and indeed viability—of philosophical ethical education.  
In his restaging of Plato’s Alcibiades, Persius pulls the disastrously erotic thread that runs 
across representations of their relationship across the Platonic corpus and imputes them to the 
prequel presented by the Platonic dialogue at hand. The satirist makes explicit and central what is 
implicit in Plato. But Persius more than restores the de-fanged Socrates to his thornier—and 
livelier—Platonic roots; in fact, he goes too far. His unsanitized Socrates turns out to echo sounds 
from comedy in addition to those from Platonic dialogue. The cleverly problematized erotics 
between erastes and eromenos that underpin the Platonic corpus become bare sexual jokes. 
Socrates’ characteristic erotic and intellectual engagement with younger men becomes a fixation 
on genitals and pubic hair; his characteristic interrogation becomes the meanest self-indulgent 
diatribe.  
                                                          




The fourth satire’s treatment of its philosophical pre-text opens the way to enriching our 
understanding of the afterlife of Plato’s dialogues. By rewriting this early encounter between 
Alcibiades and Socrates in Satire IV, the satirist puts contemporary Stoic philosophy in a 
discomforting dialogue with Platonic texts. The prevailing Stoic view of Socrates is subverted by 
the exposure of essential conflicts between the instability and polysemy of the dialogue form, on 
the one hand, and the Stoic pursuit of progress according to stable virtue models, on the other. By 
reassessing the ways in which Satire IV is a provocative revision of contemporary philosophical 
convention, we see that Persius satirically disrupts the Socratic tradition of the Stoics by presenting 
the Socrates whom the Stoics would be least happy to see: the comedic, endlessly talkative, 
insulting, erotically-obsessed philosopher of Aristophanes and, indeed, of much of Plato for those 
who see Plato himself as a humorist.  
 
The Socratic context  
Persius’ literary transformation of Alcibiades is predicated upon the multivalence of Socrates, 
which leads to a complex narratological structure and a slippery characterization of the 
philosopher. The divergent paths that Socrates presented to writers and thinkers had persisted from 
his own time, as is readily visible to us in the varying characters purveyed by Xenophon, 
Aristophanes, and Plato.150 Even before his death and within twenty years of that event, portraits, 
visual and literary, of his physical peculiarities as markers of his character varied from the derelict 
in Aristophanes’ Clouds to the portly Silenus-like character familiar from Plato (Symp. 215a-c, 
passim), and the man whose every apparent ugliness is actually a mark of beauty from Xenophon 
                                                          





(Symp. 4-7).151 All depictions and descriptions of Socrates and his successors are, as Paul Zanker 
has argued, equally topoi: the magical physiognomy of Plato’s wise man is as much a fiction as 
the meager body of Aristophanes’ sophist.152  The whimsical Silenus comparison that we know 
from Plato and Xenophon is perhaps a reappropriation of the representation of the Satyr as a 
paidagogos. The robed Silenus represented on a wine cup from ca. 450 BCE chastises a 
schoolboy.153 The importance of this image for understanding the origin of the tradition of 
Socrates-as-Satyr has been observed by Zanker and others;154 moreover, the rod of punishment 
that the satyr wields is a patent substitute for the phallus in his traditional representations. Even 
though this is a clothed, pedagogic Silenus, the tradition of, and anxiety about, sexual aggression 
nevertheless surfaces. 
The antagonistic, irksome, even “uncivilized” Socrates of the Athenian period yielded to a 
figure of great civic virtue in the Hellenistic period. The further softening of the figure in the 
Roman period built upon the Hellenistic impulse to civilize philosophers into model members of 
the state. Much of this remodeling of Socrates is apparent in the treatment of his hair and beard, 
configuring him as one venerably fit to preside—as a statue, an image—over spaces of learning 
and the civic cultivation of youth.155 Philosophers, especially Stoics, were fashioned in visual 
media as conservative judges without feeling, retaining their beards as signs of their living in 
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152 Zanker (1995: 32-33). Aristophanes’ thin Socrates is paralleled by visual caricatures of sophists in 
contemporary pottery. 
 
153  Appendix, fig. 2; Beck (1975: 46 and pl. 53, 276a). 
 
154 Zanker, p. 38. 
 





accordance with nature, but cropping them closely—in other words, natural, but not too natural. 
Zanker has characterized this classicizing trend in visual media from the late Hellenistic and 
Roman periods as an “impoverishment of the iconography of the intellectual” by comparison with 
earlier Greek representations. The classical philosopher was now constructed to appeal to Roman 
patrons.156 
Three of the four major “schools” of philosophy in the Hellenistic period tried to answer 
the fundamental question of the relation of virtue to happiness posed by Socrates, but they diverged 
in their answers. Each still claimed Socrates as the founder of their philosophical practice. The 
positions of Stoicism, Skepticism, and Cynicism never differed on the extraordinary value of 
Socrates; they differed in their perception of the nature and content of that value. Each school 
placed differing emphases upon the putative “substance” of the philosopher’s teaching, the 
methodology of that teaching, and his manner of living. Stoics adopted from Socrates foundational 
“precepts” regarding virtue, and they attended less to his reputation for awkwardness and 
provocation. Their argumentation proceeded from their interpretation of ethical lessons, 
particularly from the Memorabilia of Xenophon and from the Platonic Phaedo, Meno, and 
Protagoras.157 Skeptics took the characteristically Socratic elenchos to imply that no enduring 
philosophical conclusions could be reached, and that the practice of philosophy and access to virtue 
therefore existed solely in disputation. Cynics found in Socrates a model of virtue in mundane life, 
and in his repudiation of socially conventional goods; they practiced philosophy by living 
according to models that were logical ends to the more rigorous aspects of Socrates’ lifestyle. Even 
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Epicureans, as A. A. Long has pointed out, who wholly omitted Socrates from their philosophical 
pedigree, arguably adapted their Epicurus to a model of Socrates. 158 
That these divergent Hellenistic schools all laid claim to Socrates as their progenitor points 
to the multivalence of the Athenian philosopher. What is sometimes perceived as the Stoics’ 
incomprehensible neglect of an interrogatory method (essential to Plato’s representation of 
Socrates) was in fact a difference of emphasis, stemming from the broad spectrum of traditions 
that variously emphasized aspects of Socrates’ person, whether as a figure of fun, respect, or 
puzzlement. While Plato’s image of Socrates the questioner has prevailed in today’s history of 
philosophy, the representations of writers such as Xenophon, Aristoxenus, and even of 
Aristophanes—and the traditions of interpretation that proceeded therefrom—persisted throughout 
the Hellenistic period. For their part, Cynics actually developed a hostile stance towards Plato’s 
Socrates. Plato’s Socrates also met with a viable rival in Xenophon’s (perhaps comparatively 
anemic) Socrates, who was fundamental to the Stoa. Even within the Stoic tradition, the 
interpretation of Socrates could be a point of contestation, from its earliest moments: while Zeno 
was apocryphally inspired by Socrates, Aristo took issue with his teacher’s departure from what 
should allegedly have been a Socratic practice restricted to ethics.159 The apparent absence of 
dissension among Stoics of the Imperial period, however, does not exclude the widespread 
availability of divergent representation of the figure in other philosophical and literary texts.   
The authority of this Stoic Socrates persists throughout the philosophical work of the early 
Empire. If we are to understand Persius’ treatment of Socrates in Satire IV, it is crucial to 
understand how Socrates appears in this context. In the writings of Seneca, the teachings of 
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Musonius Rufus,160 and, shortly thereafter, the teachings of Epictetus, whose lives all at one point 
revolved around the court of Nero and frame for us the all-too-brief period during which Persius 
wrote, Socrates was a figure whose ubiquity was at once banal and dynamic.161  Far less of 
Musonius Rufus survives than of Seneca and Epictetus. His (apparently oral) teachings were 
distilled into analects and transmitted by a student, Lucius. The breadth and intensity of his impact 
on Stoicism, however, are better understood through the positive testimonia of the ancients. As 
dry as the analects of Rufus may seem today, they provide crucial evidence for the moderation and 
establishmentarianism of authoritative (Roman) Stoic teachings and they are therefore important 
for any evaluation of Persius that would position the latter as a Stoic hardliner. The analects 
provide comparanda that throw into relief just how far from the contemporary Stoic confines 
Persius has dug his infamous hole (hic tamen infodiam, Sat. I.120). The diversity of themes and 
allusions to earlier figures exhibited in the analects provides a window into authoritative 
contemporary discourse. Rufus cites Socrates for his indifference to anger and pleasure; less 
conventionally he also mentions Socrates in his wholly rational case for the philosophical 
education of women and in his defense of marriage for the philosopher.162  
Socrates appears throughout the Senecan corpus as an exemplum of any and every kind of 
good behavior, from the maintenance of calm in the face of everyday mishaps to a philosophical 
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attitude to death. The integration of Socrates—often named in the same breath as Rutilius, Regulus, 
or Cato—into Seneca’s exempla points to the extent of the pervasiveness of the figure in Roman 
consciousness. From these instances, we can see that Seneca frequently uses Socrates (and Cato) 
ad libitum, whenever he needs a “stock” sapiens.163 But Socrates is not invoked by Seneca solely 
in this anecdotal, even indiscriminate, manner. At his most critical philosophical moment—in what 
amounts to his own apology in De Vita Beata—Seneca articulates the meaning of a philosophical 
life through the voice of Socrates at the culmination of his argument. There, the writer puts in the 
mouth of Socrates an extended defense against the charge of hypocrisy that might, Seneca argues, 
be leveled against any and all philosophers. As his speech gains impetus, his voice blends with 
Seneca’s own. Socrates is showcased as ille Socrates and ecce Socrates ex illo carcere (DVB 25 
and 27). Crudely speaking, Socrates makes his argument from the Stoic perspective of preferred 
indifferents, and he engages in the Stoic practice of praemeditatio.164 That Seneca should summon 
Socrates at his own moment of philosophical peril tells us that to stage the person and to embody 
the persona of Socrates is a maximally significant—even life saving—gesture, reserved for a 
moment of crisis.  
Socrates was likewise essential for Epictetus, who was very probably a student of Rufus; 
his “diatribes,” written by his own student Arrian, are replete with allusions to claims made in the 
works of Plato and Xenophon.165 We should understand Epictetus as a Stoic who is consciously 
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divergent from Seneca; after all, the latter is pointedly never named in the diatribes which are 
otherwise replete with Romans from the courts of Nero and other Caesars. In the diatribes, Socrates 
serves to demonstrate the best manner of living and, more importantly, of dying (Encheiridion 5). 
Epictetus frequently alludes to Platonic dialogues and to Socrates’ biography as a model166 of (self-
examination) and education upon which to build an ethics for the imperial psyche. Socrates, then, 
is very much alive in the Stoicism of this period.  
Socrates continued to be a vital figure in philosophical argument and practice. We might 
usefully think of the figure as a tradition, a product of textual, cultural, and moral accretion, a 
figure with unique flexibility and utility in the teachings and writings of the satirist’s prominent 
philosophical contemporaries—and, moreover, a figure with the weight of moral authority behind 
him. There was one version of Socrates, however, that seems largely to have dropped out of the 
contemporary Stoic scene: the electrifying character whom we know from some of Plato’s 
dialogues. For Epictetus, as for Seneca, too, Socrates was, in A. A. Long’s formulation, “no gadfly 
or sting-ray, no lover or symposiast…”167—not the man who attacked authority but rather the saint 
who embodied it. It is in this context of multiple iterations of Socrates that the peculiarity of 
character and form in Persius’ fourth satire must be assessed. In the fourth satire, Persius revivifies 
a Socrates who has been absent from Stoicism. But in so doing, the poet exposes the instability 
and limitations of philosophical education and de-authorizes the certainty and assuredness of his 
colleagues’ pursuits. The encounter between the youthful Alcibiades and the sage in the Platonic 
original thus closes on an ominous note: the implication is that this relationship risks failure and 
loss in the face of the attractions of politics. The encounter’s satirical instantiation presents a 
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downward trajectory from Plato through the erotic to demo(li)tion without positive didactic 
correction.  
 
The First First Alcibiades 
Alcibiades I presents Socrates’ first foray into the education of Alcibiades at the crossroads. Even 
as a protreptic text it leaves open the possibility of divergent evaluations of the philosopher’s 
teaching (and perhaps even of its own protreptic status). While it captures the dramatic moment in 
which the younger man supposedly attaches himself to Socrates, it is also encoded with the ways 
in which that relationship will collapse: the philosopher doubts whether he will successfully seduce 
the younger man away from the appeal of the polis and flattering connections. The dramatic-
historical irony of the dialogue is one reason why its authorship has been questioned, and that 
questioning itself arguably indicates that the contest over the “real” Socrates is not over; certainly 
the contest over the “real” Plato is not. The canonical status of the text was not a matter of debate 
in the ancient period; it was, essentially, the textbook for Philosophy 101.  
Plato’s dialogue is protreptic in the sense that it dramatizes Socrates’ effort to turn 
Alcibiades, who is about to embark on his (in)famous political career, toward philosophy. Socrates 
gives Alcibiades a survey of the questions that the latter is not yet able to answer: what is good, 
what is bad, what admirable, what contemptible, and, most importantly for the pedagogue, what 
constitutes real education and real knowledge. Socrates approaches Alcibiades explicitly as a lover 
(ἐραστής σου, Alc. 103a) and the only one of his lovers who has not given up. Up until this 
moment, however, he has not tried to engage Alcibiades in conversation; this, therefore, marks 
their first “dialogue,” as a conversation and as a form. But Socrates has been watching 




that he is the most arrogant of all men (πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγαλαφρόνων, Alc. 103b),168 
a vice that proceeds from the fineness of his physique and mind and the excellence of his family 
(Alc. 104a); his connections are aristocratic, including even Pericles (Alc. 104b). Alcibiades has 
rejected all of his lovers thus far, secure in the knowledge that they were beneath him (Alc. 104c). 
He wonders, in fact, why the strange and silent Socrates should be addressing him, bothering him 
(ἐνοχλεῖς), in fact, by following him around (Alc. 104d).  
 The role of erastes is not a mere pretext: Socrates continues to use erotic language in his 
address (104e) and when the dialogue has gained full momentum. His frustration with his 
prospective student is all the greater because of his own desire for him (ἀγανακτῶ ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ 
τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος, 119c). Socrates imagines a hypothetical situation in which he approaches 
Alcibiades, about to embark on a public speech, to ask upon what basis he is about to advise the 
Athenians (Alc. 106c). Alcibiades imagines his own reply (Alc. 106d). Socrates gets Alcibiades to 
agree to his conception of question and answer: if Alcibiades assents, then he has in effect 
articulated what has been said—and so Socrates’ judgment of Alcibiades becomes Alcibiades’ 
judgment of himself. “And what was said was that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, 
doesn’t understand justice and injustice….” (Alc. 113b, Hutchinson, trans. in Cooper, ed.). 
Socrates argues that Pericles cannot teach Alcibiades because he has shown himself to be inexpert: 
if he were a true expert he would be able to impart his understanding, but no one can be shown to 
have become wiser from time spent with Pericles (Alc. 118c-119a). 
No one, in fact, has bothered to give young Alcibiades an education that genuinely prepares 
to be a political leader; that has mattered to Socrates alone, as his lover (122b). Socrates claims 
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that he is uninterested in Alcibiades’ body, beautiful though it is. After Alcibiades has agreed that 
someone who loves him will love his soul, not his body, he is convinced that he must try to keep 
his soul as attractive (κάλλιστος) as possible in order not to lose Socrates’ interest (Alc. 131c-d). 
Alcibiades, it turns out, has never had any real lover except Socrates (Alc. 131e). Socrates’ only 
fear is that Alcibiades will lose his spiritual bloom through corruption by the Athenians (132a). In 
order to avoid the terrible fate of being taken in by the demos’ pretty face (εὐπρόσωπος) himself, 
Alcibiades must view them naked, stripped down (ἀποδύντα, Alc. 132a). Alcibiades ultimately 
swears his allegiance to his lover as a safeguard against such dangers. It is Socrates himself who 
expresses his uncertainty, well sensing the ways in which his student may be lost (and implicitly 
the ways in which he might fail), even before their lessons have begun (135e). 
 
Digest 
That, then, is the dialogue against which Persius presents his fourth satire for measurement. 
“Taking on the Republic?” Satire IV starts with the query posed by Socrates, whom the satirist 
identifies obliquely as the bearded teacher dispatched by hemlock poisoning (Sat. IV.1-2).  
Socrates in turn obliquely identifies his addressee, Alcibiades, as the ward of Pericles the Great 
(Sat. IV.3). Clearly, he says, the youth’s ability to deliver orations on affairs of state appeared 
precociously (Sat. IV.4-5). When the rabble rages, his genius silences the crowd with a gesture of 
grandeur. But then what will Alcibiades say? Socrates anticipates the slick tones of the young 
man’s trite political speech (Sat. IV.8-9), for he knows how to balance (suspendere) the word 
“justice,” he knows how to get the right rhythm (pede, Sat. IV.12), how to pinpoint vice. But it’s 
all nonsense, Socrates continues: Shouldn’t he stop thrusting at the obliging people? Isn’t he the 




he’ll respond that his credentials are his family name, his shining good looks—no better than an 
average peddler (Sat. IV.20-22).  
 But really no one—no one!—tries to dig into himself, but instead everyone keenly 
scrutinizes the other guy (Sat. IV.23-24). Then he’ll ask whether wealth and property should count 
for nothing (Sat. VI. 26-27). Does he mean the wealth of a man who celebrates the Compitalia 
stingily with roughage and vinegar? If he were to idle around slathered in oil to get some sun on 
his skin, some stranger would spit out a bitter “Such habits! Spreading out to dry your wrinkling 
penis and the recesses of your loins, withering vulvas.”169 Alcibiades’ slick body is the graphic 
fixation of these lines, which harp on depilation and the confusion of sexual characteristics 
(penemque and uuluas). The agricultural metaphor of raisin-making (pandere and marcentis) is 
expanded in plantaria and filix.  
 We know we’re not supposed to like full or greasy plates from one of the second satire’s 
pray-ers, who misguidedly offers his sausages170 and rich cakes to the gods (Sat. II.42-49). 
Similarly, we know we’re not supposed to like rich dishes from the fate of the target in Satire III, 
where the delusional sick man goes on feasting until his last breath (Sat. III.98-102). The hypocrite 
of Satire III transforms the despised food and platters of the targets of Satires II and III into the 
body of his own target. The greasy platters of the second satire and the uncta pulmentaria of the 
third—and indeed, Alcibiades’ own predilection for an uncta patella (Sat. IV.17)—become his 
own greased-up body (Sat. IV.33), and thus becomes part of the book’s food imagery. Though he 
coifs his beard, he shaves his inguinal windpipe (“throat” here as a stand-in emphasizes Alcibiades’ 
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penetrability)—but in vain: even if pro-wrestlers were to steam and pluck these shrubs, that bush 
could not be tamed (Sat. IV.39-41). Beard plus bikini wax equals hypocrisy.  
But we are all susceptible to these arrows of critique. This strange critic himself has a 
wound growing in his groin.171 The arrows of critique here in line 42 covertly work an elegiac 
motif into diatribe: the sagittae are a conversion of the arrows of love with which Alcibiades struck 
Socrates in the Symposium.172 In satire, these arrows go straight into the groin rather than the soul. 
This is the rule: a belt covers the target’s fundamental wound. He puts stock in whatever comes to 
his one-track mind (in penem quidquid tibi uenit, Sat. IV.48). He shouldn’t trust external praise 
but assess the totality of his own deficiencies.  
 
Dialogue  
We come to the now familiar consideration of speakers and “characters” in Satire IV. As with the 
other satires, these two issues are disputed. Here in particular there are two questions: (When) does 
Socrates finish speaking? Who is the diatribist? There is a feature unique to this diatribe that 
requires that we give it special attention: it is the sole example of diatribe in the book that never 
shifts to the second person plural characteristic of diatribe (contrast, e.g., occurrite, Sat. I.62, dicite, 
Sat. II.69, occurrite, Sat. III.64, petite, Sat. V.64, and cognoscite, Sat. VI.9).173 Moreover, it lacks 
the shifting scenes characteristic of diatribe (e.g. multiple lectiones in Satire I, multiple pray-ers 
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in Satire II, multiple sick and dying men in Satire III, multiple slaves in Satire V, and multiple 
misers in Satire VI) and therefore uniquely envisions itself as an ad hominem attack.  
In the standard text of Wendell Clausen (1959), the speech of Socrates ends at line 22; by 
implicitly treating lines 1-22 as a prefatory scene to the remainder of the text, Clausen’s text 
obscures what must be the continuation of Socrates’ speech. In a recent treatment of this issue, 
Cedric Littlewood argues against the interpretations of John Henderson and Dan Hooley, who have 
reasoned that the critical attribution of lines to either an Alcibiades or a Socrates demolishes the 
obvious ambiguity of this text. Littlewood proposes that the fact that the fourth satire is “modeled 
on a dialogue… [implies] an exchange of criticism.”174 He also argues, however, against the 
standard dialogic interpretation that follows this logic of exchange—that the entire satire therefore 
must be divided between these two characters—and seeks to resolve the ambiguity by inserting a 
third speaker, a “Persius,” to account for any lines that may clearly not be attributed either to 
Socrates or Alcibiades. Littlewood’s argument sidelines the discomforting ambiguity treated by 
Henderson and Hooley, which I suggest is critically important to understanding Satire IV, 
especially in relation to contemporary philosophical discourse.  
But the question of speakers—characters—is nevertheless an important one for a text that 
would seem so ostentatiously to present its Platonic pedigree: it is a question of who speaks the 
language of philosophy and with what generic affiliations. The camp of critics to which Littlewood 
must ultimately belong assumes the premiss that because the satire invokes a Platonic dialogue, it 
must formally present the two voices in the “source” text, with speakers who are relatable to 
Platonic counterparts. What we are reading, however, is satire, verse satire, Roman verse satire, 
and so the question of genre is necessarily multi-sided. Persius invokes the dialogue in a form that 
                                                          




plays with the idea of dialogue but is not a dialogue—in my view—ironically and even 
tendentiously not a dialogue.  
The voice of Alcibiades is only apparent in this satire (and it is given more structural 
prominence than it commands from the modern editorial convention of quotation marks). We do 
not hear the “real” Alcibiades: Persius has told us to believe (crede, 1) that the philosopher is 
speaking; the philosopher, in turn, asks us (and Alcibiades, if he is indeed there) to imagine the 
young man’s responses by reciting them himself. Alcibiades never performs his own response; 
rather, his voice is ventriloquized by the (imagined) teacher in misguided words that the 
philosopher puts into Alcibiades’ mouth by using the imperative (“Dinomaches ego sum” suffla, 
“sum candidus,” 20). In this manner, Socrates even tells the younger man what he (i.e. the younger 
man) thinks when articulating that conventional and inane public speech:  
… quid deinde loquere? ‘Quirites,  
hoc, puta, non iustum est, illud male, rectius illud.’  
 
Then what are you going to say? Think: “Roman countrymen: the 
former’s not just, the latter’s worse, the third option better.” (Sat. 
IV.8-9) 
 
To read the diatribe as a continuation of Socrates’ speech makes sense of the second person 
quaesieris (25), which follows expecta (19), i (19), suffla (20) and even puta (9).175 (This reading 
will have the further advantage of making sense of the situation proposed in line 33, si unctus 
cesses et figas in cute solem in, picking up Socrates’ earlier charge that Alcibiades thinks the good 
life is uncta uixisse patella/ semper et adsiduo curata cuticula sole, 18).  “Dialogue” is only 
apparently bi-vocal; Persius’ revision of Alcibiades shows up Socratic elenchos for what it really 
                                                          





is: the teacher’s exertion of control over discourse. The teacher creates his own fiction, the fiction 
of pedagogy, that ethics may be taught, staging his own classroom scene and playing all the parts.   
Persius identifies the magister barbatus whom we are to imagine before us as sorbitio tollit 
quem dira cicutae (“…the one whom a stiff drink of hemlock exalts,” 2)176 and the magister in 
turn identifies his addressee as magni pupille Pericli (3).  The significance of the first two lines 
extends beyond establishing characters: Persius makes explicit the foreshadowing of the disaster 
to come expressed in the Platonic Socrates’ hesitation (135e)—a reflection of Plato’s own anxiety 
about the utility of elenchus. The frame also makes central the historical irony of the text. The 
hazards at the ethical crossroads are an implicit concern in the protreptic dialogue; the satire seizes 
upon that implicit concern and eliminates the possibility that this fraught relationship ever could 
have succeeded—the satirist obstructs the path of Virtue. Here, Persius capitalizes not only upon 
the historical irony but also chronologically later discussions in Plato’s Symposium and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia I, 2; in the former, the relationship is coming apart at the seams; in the 
latter it has utterly failed and that failure is Alcibiades’.  
In his first two lines, Persius takes as his premiss the demise of both Platonic characters by 
identifying them not by name, but by their eventual ends—the death of the former and the latter’s 
career as a politician. The satirist’s initial projection to Socrates’ suicide indicates that we are not 
meant to focus solely on the present, precious moment, but rather to have in view the end of the 
story. The satirist’s initial identification of Alcibiades with the ultimate politician Pericles rather 
than with his father (which takes pride of place in Plato, Alc. 103a) keeps in view his ultimate 
forsaking of philosophy in favor of politics. In the final analysis, apud Persium, Alcibiades is not 
                                                          





the son of Kleinias or even a student of Socrates, but a product of the Pericles described as a failed 
teacher in Alcibiades (118e).177  
That Alcibiades’ ultimate demise should reflect poorly upon the philosopher-teacher’s 
great reputation is precisely the charge of which the Stoics’ Xenophon labored to clear Socrates. 
Persius’ terse formulations provide a frame of dramatic irony at which his model hints and which 
is embedded in Plato’s treatment of the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades more 
generally. From the first moment, the Socrates of Persius is manifestly too late: too late to avert 
Alcibiades’ seduction by the world. Thus the unimpeachable authority of Xenophon’s Socrates, 
and by extension the Stoics’ Socrates, is demolished by Persius’ poem. That protreptic was always 
going to fail. With this reading of Satire IV, we now have two instances of failed education: we 
have just seen the infinite regress of diatribe in Satire III. Satire V will offer another. That makes 
three—a pattern of failed pedagogy—in the corpus of this supposedly ardent follower of the Stoics, 
those peddlers of moral progress.  
 
The Question of the Beard  
Our final consideration in the Socrates-Alcibiades discourse outlined above is the matter of the 
beard. Bartsch has excluded the identification of the sun-tanner as Alcibiades, the identification 
advocated here. This exclusion is based upon two claims. The first claim is that the expression 
ante pilos uenit in line 5 means that Alcibiades’ beard has not yet appeared. That argument rests 
only if we take the perfect uenit as a present completed (“your cleverness has shown up before 
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your hair”); but it may equally well have simple aspect (“your cleverness arrived before your 
hair”). The second claim is that since Alcibiades is an unbearded figure, he cannot be the bearded 
man in Satire IV.178 In the Athenian evidence, however, Alcibiades’ hair growth is meaningfully 
ambiguous: in the two extant positively identifiable visual representations of the politician we have 
from the Classical period, he is beardless.179 In Plato’s Protagoras, on the other hand, his cheeks 
are described as blooming in the scene that sets the stage for the dialogue on sophistry and bad 
pedagogy; Alcibiades’ beard growth is mentioned as a way of teasing Socrates for his enduring 
interest in a post-pubescent young men, like Agathon in Symposium. As a marker of sexual 
maturity, the maturation into manhood is hazardous for the young Athenian: it disqualifies him 
from being an eromenos to Socrates’ erastes and thus jeopardizes the erotic pretext of their 
relationship. Persius therefore capitalizes upon what is latent in Plato's representations of 
Alcibiades and other men who are too old to be eromenoi. He characteristically makes the 
delighting tension that arises from the ambiguity of Alcibiades’ hair-status in Plato into a full-
blown, discomforting incongruity between a well-cared for beard and well-cared for groin.  
The preoccupation of Persius’ Socrates with Alcibiades’ body exposes to sunlight the 
questions lurking in Plato’s sustained interest in their relationship. Is he primarily a teacher or an 
erastes? Was his ostentatious lack of interest in Alcibiades’ body a sham? That body itself is also 
a site of ambivalence, situated somewhere on the border between boy and man, erastes and 
eromenos, student and teacher. The beard and pubic hair are central points of fixation for Persius’ 
Socrates. Hair is an important marker of both philosophical and sexual maturity. Hair and 
hairlessness are deceptive as forms of physiognomic pretense to either knowledge or youth. The 
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philosopher is classically bearded: the beard is part of the positive identification of Socrates in line 
1, where it occupies the central position and precedes even the canonical hemlock (IV.1-2). 
Alcibiades’ precociousness is measured against his hair growth: his personal talents appeared even 
before his hair (IV.5). Later, in the philosopher’s fixation on the displayed body, a special critique 
is reserved for the younger man’s hair, top and bottom: the perfumed beard (balanatum gausape) 
stands in contrast to his shaven penis (detonsus gurgulio), from which sprouts (plantaria and filix) 
are weeded in vain (IV.37-41). Persius’ treatment of the status of Alcibiades’ hair adds the negative 
Roman view of the pathic: Amy Richlin offers a close reading of Satire 4 that is focused on the 
sexual status of Alcibiades, whom Persius figures as both puer and prostitute, male and female, 
bearded and shaven.180 The disparity between the bearded face and plucked-smooth genitals is, as 
has often been noticed, a condemnation of hypocrisy more generally and in particular, as Shadi 
Bartsch has observed, a charge leveled at philosophers in invective and epigrammatic literature.181 
The beard is a central maker and marker of philosophical maturity and a meaningful site in 
Persius’ period, too.182 Cornutus offers us a critical comparandum for illuminating the idiosyncrasy 
of Persius qua “Stoic.” The philosopher’s Epidrome casts the beard along with penetrative power 
as an index of reason. Cornutus presents the god Hermes as divinely-sent λόγος, which makes man 
the λογικόν animal (Epidrome 16). In this allegorizing scheme, the traditional phallic marker of 
boundaries and crossroads becomes a figure of contemplation and inquiry: 
 “The ancients made the genitals of the older, bearded Herms erect, 
but those of the younger, smooth ones hang down: this shows that 
reason is productive and mature in those advanced in age… but in  
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the immature it is unproductive and imperfect.”  
(Epidrome 16, Boys-Stones, trans.) 
 
This passage of Persius’ own teacher shows us what a good philosopher does when confronted 
with the unfortunate reality of beards and penis. Cornutus’ interpretation relentlessly moves 
outwards and upwards from the bodily to the philosophical. Body parts are not markers of 
physicality in the present but rather remnants of an ancient wisdom that may be reconstructed 
through careful exegesis.183 Human phenomena—what the people commonly say, the irrational 
idiosyncrasies of mythology—may be deployed for a Stoic cosmological inquiry that is closely 
engaged with the Platonic inquiry.184 Beard and erection are concomitant, while the smoothness 
of youth is consistent with flaccidity in the scheme of Cornutus. Persius’ young-looking sun-tanner 
thus rests in an ambivalent position when placed alongside the philosopher-proficiens herms of his 
master: he exhibits both activity and passivity. The gurgulio of Persius’ Alcibiades is erect, but 
the young man himself is supine (4.33-38). And it is not merely that Persius’ young man is growing 
a beard and is therefore too old to fulfill the role of puer, but also that he exhibits the mark of the 
philosopher, the beard, without possessing philosophical knowledge. By placing the student 
“Alcibiades” at the intersection of these categories, Persius foregrounds the risky ambiguities of 
adolescence and maturation.  
 The fuzziness of these categories—bearded vs. unbearded, blooming vs. shaven, depilated 
vs. pre-pubescent, as well as active vs. pathic, male vs. female—is precisely what Persius is playing 
with, and importantly playing up, in his imaginary Alcibiades. As Richlin has noted, the wound 
exposed or even created by depilation makes the sun-tanner pathic and female: pandere vulvas 
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(IV.36).185 This notion aligns well with the words of old Chrysippus, as reported in Athenaeus on 
shaving: Chrysippus tells us that to shave is to challenge the prudence of nature in making you a 
man.186  
 For Bartsch, the sun-tanner is Socrates, a conclusion to which she arrives after rejecting the 
more obvious candidate, Alcibiades, by comparison with Martial. The learned philosopher, whose 
beard belies his desire to be penetrated (percidi) is familiar to us from the writer of epigrams who 
was a younger contemporary of Persius (Ep. IX, 47; VII, 58). In the epigrammatic genre, 
philosophers tend to be subject to charges of sexual hypocrisy: their profession of virtus is at odds 
with their desire to play cinaedi. Accusations of effeminacy and pathic behavior as outward 
manifestations of hypocrisy are part of a wider Roman system of invective and aggression.187 
Through their own professions and pedagogical aspirations, philosophers open themselves to 
critique, as we saw earlier in the defense of Seneca’s Socrates against charges of hypocrisy in De 
Vita Beata. 
 But not all beards have the same symbolic significance: the outward appearance of the beard 
matters—and this is crucial to our judgment here. The beards of good Stoic philosophers are 
generally supposed to be short and unkempt. The cropped, patchy, unattended beard on the statue 
of Chrysippus is a reflection of his conservatism and his lack of concern for his body.188 The beard 
of Persius’ sun-tanner is marked as perfumed and combed (balanatum gausape pectas, IV.37), 
which places it not in the category of the beard of Martial’s philosopher Pannychus, which squalet 
                                                          
185 Richlin (1992: 187-190).  
 
186 Zanker (1995: 108-109); Athenaeus, Deipn. XIII.565. 
 
187 Richlin (1992: 221ff.).  
 





(Ep. IX, 47.2), but rather in the category of the pexa barba worn by the pathic youths whom another 
of Martial’s philosophers, a “Galla,” has tried unsuccessfully to “marry” (Ep. VII, 58.1-2, 10). 
Thus Alcibiades struggles in Persius, as in Plato before him, between his status as the penetrable 
eromenos and his behavior which comes increasingly to look like that of an erastes by the time of 
his melodramatic speech in Symposium.   
 
Socrates innocentissimus  
The erastes-pose of Socrates in Alcibiades coheres with the mention of Socrates’ erotic pursuit of 
Alcibiades, who is filling out with a beard, as a matter of course in Protagoras (309a1-2).189 In the 
opening of Satire IV, by contrast, the erotic aspect of their relationship is left unstated. This 
conspicuous suppression results in the diatribe’s explicit fixation on the naked body on display. 
Again we are forced away from the Stoics’ idealized image of Socrates into something 
considerably more down-to-earth. Plato’s Socrates claims in Alcibiades and elsewhere that he is 
unmoved by the youth’s body—in fact this is a sore spot for Alcibiades in Symposium. In Satire 
IV, Socrates both fixates on the naked, primped, and plucked body and ventriloquizes an extended, 
hysterical critique of it, even as he maintains that such criticism is misguided and blind. He fails 
on all counts to be “philosophical,” developing instead a sort of pornographic puritanism. Indeed, 
like the Kreitton Logos of Aristophanes Clouds, he revealingly protesteth far too much.  
We were put on notice in Satire I to hear the Aristophanic—and perhaps the comedian 
sends back his echoes here. Clouds, that caustic parody of Socrates and the project of philosophical 
education, provides two important comparanda, the first of which we glimpsed above. If we 
understand that the diatribe’s target is Alcibiades, who spends his time on the tanning bed to the 
                                                          




detriment of self-knowledge, then we may see him sharing the vice of Pheidippus, whose concern 
for his tan delays him from going indoors to study (Clouds, 119-120). (Pheidippus himself has 
been read as an analogue for Alcibiades.190) Socrates’ split-brained diatribe, which starts with 
justice but devolves into holes of all sorts, significantly resembles the “Stronger Argument.”   
Persius’ Socrates is a character split between the pedagogical and the erotic. Alcibiades’ 
body is the graphic fixation of this Socrates, who is ventriloquizing the words of some stranger 
spitting at the scene before him (li. 34). This too-late Socrates is not merely the deliverer of a 
prefatory “homily” to the satiric diatribe,191 but the voice and figure through which the diatribe is 
mediated. But is Persius’ deployment of Socrates in this satire just another example of a 
convention pervasive in contemporary moralizing discourse, a convention in which a healthy 
admixture of Socrates might support any ethical protreptic? The diatribe of Persius’ hemlock-
drinking philosopher is remarkably un-Socratic, both according to the Platonic model by which he 
guides through exchange and according to the Stoic model seen in Epictetus and Musonius Rufus, 
by which he moves through the world unruffled.  
It is useful to consider how far from the Socrates of the Roman Stoics this ranter has turned 
out to be. Persius’ Socrates engages in an activity from which a Stoic Socrates ought to refrain: he 
ought never to say a word that is λοίδορον (Epictetus, Diss. II, 12.14). Persius’ diatribist forgets 
that he, too, is subject to the law that he applies to the ignotus. It is he, Socrates, who by self-
indulgently imagining what someone might sputter about Alcibiades’ body and proclivities, brings 
that body and those vices vividly and hilariously into view. By contrast, the Socrates of Seneca’s 
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philosophical texts explicitly condemns fixation on the faults of others on the grounds that it is to 
the detriment of self-knowledge.192 Seneca also imagines that Socrates, when assaulted by a punch 
or otherwise driven to ira, lowered his voice and said less, not more (De Ira III. 5. 11-13).  
Socrates is greater than the sum of his textual parts, asserts Cicero in the preface to Book 
III of De Oratore (III, 5), despite the fact that the Platonic dialogues are themselves written 
divinitus (De Oratore, I, 5). This textual portrayal of a man of prudentia, acumen, venustas, 
subtilitas, eloquentia, varietas, and copia inspired generations of philosophers. Interlocutors at 
varying levels of adherence to the program of Cicero’s Crassus—the synthesis of philosophy and 
oratory—are consistent on what type of man Socrates was: the omnium sapientissimus who lived 
sanctissime, says Antonius, and (very importantly for my immediate purpose) innocentissimus of 
the charges for which he was put to death (De Orat. I, 231-233). The most irreverent the Roman 
interlocutors become on the subject of Socrates is that the philosopher sprinkled some salsum into 
his gravitas, just enough for urbanis sermonibus (De Orat. III. 270).  
But what this composite image does not include—here or anywhere else in the Roman 
philosophical writers—is Socrates the erastes. These nice, politely polishing writers take their cue 
from Xenophon, upon whose construction of Socrates the Stoics in particular relied. Memorabilia 
I, 2 systematically rebuts an imagined accuser who charges the Socrates with having led young 
men—especially Alcibiades and Critias—astray. The violence and hubris of those characters were 
not at all consequences of their association with Socrates. Xenophon defends Socrates from the 
charge that the philosopher was a lover of youths and of vice; and down the line, Socratic traditions 
of the Roman period duly separate Socrates from homoerotic practice. In spite of any 
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generalized “homophobia,” when attention is drawn to homoerotic behavior, it is not Socrates who 
is taken to task for it – a glaring omission, one might suspect, but a question that the textual 
evidence indicates has been put to bed, at least in philosophical discourse.193  
Condemnations of pederasty, homosexual behavior, and other deviations from the hetero-
norm do not intersect with discussions of Socrates in the writings of Persius’ philosophical 
contemporaries—Seneca, Musonius, Epictetus—or in those of his Latin predecessors. When 
Cicero excoriates deviance in the Tusculan Disputations, it is, strangely, Epicurus whom he 
invokes, and the spaces of deviance are the gymnasia of the Greeks, not the symposia, or other 
spaces traditionally associated with Socrates (Tusc. 33.7-71). For his part, Seneca talks about other 
Stoics, or, rather, about others operating sub specie Stoica who promote vitia and identify the 
sapiens with the amator, and who themselves pursue iuvenes. Again, this is a Greek custom 
(consuetudo Graeca), but not a Socratic practice. There therefore seems to have been a systematic 
tendency in philosophical discourse to expurgate the association between Socrates and 
homoeroticism in the relevant bodies of philosophical literature: a concerted effort, that is, to 
“clean up” Socrates’ act as part of his beatification at Rome. The degrading fixation on the sexual 
that characterizes the discourse of this philosopher limits and qualifies his sainthood.   
Again Cornutus throws into relief Persius’ deviation from Stoic best practices. Cornutus’ 
treatment of the erotic in philosophy is a continuation of this expurgatory tradition. His seemingly 
bizarre conversion of the phallus into philosophy in the case of the herms, discussed above, 
conforms to his treatment of the muse Erato (Epidrome 17), whose name classically and 
(obviously) is associated with love (teneri nomen amoris habet, Ov. Fast. IV.196). Cornutus’ is a 
systematic suppression of the erotic in Erato. Rather than dealing with desire as manifested in and 
                                                          




cultivated through the arts, Cornutus turns to philosophical practice through a convenient 
etymological likeness between ἐράω and ἐρέω. The two exegeses he offers for her name are 1) 
that it comes from ἔρως because she cares about every type of philosophy; and 2) that it comes 
from ἐρέσθαι because she is the guardian of questioning and answering – of dialectic, in other 
words. These are, obviously, not alternative explanations: each has to do with philosophy; each 
equally turns away from the erotic. Cornutus strips Erato of her function as the muse of the 
ἐρωτικόι (e.g. Plato, Phaedrus 259d); instead, he makes her the guardian of the σπουδαῖοι and the 
Muses in general the representatives of the φιλομαθόντες. When Cornutus later comes to Eros, a 
development unavoidable in his allegorizing treatment of Aphrodite, the wingèd boy becomes the 
impulse for thoughtlessness (Epidrome 25): Cornutus labors to convert the erotic into the abstract 
wherever he can in his introduction to Stoic allegoresis. Persius does the opposite of this, bringing 
us back to the nitty gritty of the physical, and this disruption of philosophical high-mindedness 
goes to the heart of his satirical project.  
Just as Horace once showed us the wet-dream under the covers of a political embassy 
(Serm. I, 5.82-85), so Persius shows us the awkward, collar-tugging side of contemporary 
Stoicism. He awakens questions that have been all too smoothly put to bed, and he does so in a 
manner that plays with the orthodox repudiations of pederasty; as if putting balls in play, Persius 
puts the genitals back on display, a reminder of the origins and the continuing problems of 
philosophical discourse. Rather than barring us from laughter, Persius brings the type of ridicule 
of philosophers typical of the epigrammatic tradition to the fore in a text that is itself so patently 





The satirist’s opening command crede calls attention to the satire’s status as a 
representation of a representation and also to the artfulness of the Platonic genre itself. Any 
Socrates is a fiction. Persius’ Socrates is Aristophanic and moreover Hipponactean—a sex-joke 
making hater who possesses none of the enkrateia prized by Xenophon.194 Looking forward to 
Satire V, we will see how Persius builds on this exploration of Socratic posturing. Persius’ 
treatment of hypocrisy in Satires IV and V operates on two levels, thematic and generic, that are 
mutually reinforcing. On the thematic level, the diatribes of both satires are about hypocrisy: the 
diatribe of Satire IV is concerned with blind critique in general and with the masquerade of hair in 
particular; the diatribe of Satire V is concerned with the legal pretense to freedom and the 
unmerited claim that haec mea sunt (V.13). On the generic level, Satire IV theorizes the pretenses 
of philosophical dialogue, while Satire V sends up the pretense of Stoic diatribe. Both forms of 
discourse are framed by failure: the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates only gets worse 
in its Roman instantiation; the relationship between Persius and Cornutus that will preface the 
diatribe in the fifth satire will be predicated upon that model.  
The status of philosophy’s figures and texts are subject to the same hazard of audience 
belief to which the exalted status of poetic literature was subject in the prologue. Then again, in 
line 20, we discover that even within this system that recognizes the fiction of the dialogue, the 
crucial component of elenchus—the philosophical interlocutor—is itself invented by the 
philosopher: with the imperative suffla we see that Alcibiades does not in fact speak in this satire 
at all; he is ventriloquized by Socrates. Persius presents the veneer of a dialogue—it appears on a 
cursory glance that there are multiple speakers and that the Alcibiades has a voice—but in fact he 
gives us solely the voice of the teacher upon whom the further fiction of the student voice is 
                                                          




predicated.195 Thus the whole exercise of education as dialogue—the central tenet of post-Socratic 
philosophy, is called into question.
                                                          




CHAPTER SIX: pseudo-Socratic Cornutus (Satire V) 
The fifth satire may be read as a reasonably (for Persius) straightforward set of variations on moral 
libertas, a standard philosophical theme, conspicuous from Republic VIII and IX on the passions 
of the tyrant continuously through to Epictetus’ diatribe IV, 1 on freedom. This chapter argues, 
however, that the satire’s poetic and discursive features show that the deeper interest of the piece 
is its entanglement with Platonic questions that endure from the previous satire. The continued 
relevance of Platonic themes are marked by Persius’ dubbing his teacher Socratic (Sat.  V.37). The 
Platonic corpus is here treated as a resource for laughter and humor in ethical treatments. From the 
Stoic perspective, the irreverence and comedy of this reading of Plato would be a misuse and abuse 
of the legacy of Socrates as constructed and defended by Xenophon. But from the satirical 
perspective, generic interplay—sex, comedy, symposium— are already available in Plato. And it 
is all fair game when reading and re-working Socrates. 
 Persius puts non-philosophical literary genres in competition with the Stoic frame. This 
practice is somewhat is out of step with Stoics’ prevailing interpretations of the Platonic corpus 
and Socratic tradition, as it admits contrarian and ambivalent literary elements into what might 
otherwise be strictly a “declaration of love from one tough Stoic to another.”196   
 The fifth satire is closely linked to the fourth, which in its compactness at 52 lines functions 
to some extent as a preface to this very long poem at 191 lines: Satire IV’s foregrounding of the 
paradigmatic, historic, and problematic philosopher-youth relationship offers a tempting analogy 
for the philosopher-youth relationship as configured in Satire V. Moreover, Satire IV suppressed 
an important metaphor articulated and manipulated at length at the close of Alcibiades I: Socrates 
appropriates political terms of “freedom” and “slavery” for the ethical lexicon, a project to which 
                                                          




the Stoics would subscribe too. Vice, he says, is appropriate for slaves (δουλοπρεπής, Alc. 135c) 
while virtue is characteristic of the free (ἐλευθεροπρεπής, Alc. 135c). Finally agreeing that he is 
not free because he does not yet know virtue, Alcibiades declares a role reversal: in order to avoid 
being a slave, he will attend Socrates as a slave—not quite, in the end, what Socrates had had in 
mind. In his declaration of this new servitude, Alcibiades has shown that he already fails to 
understand the Socratic lesson. Socrates fears that their pedagogical master-slave relationship will 
lose to the irresistible power of politics, which, of course, it will. Not a trace of this turn of events 
is to be found in Persius’ Alcibiades, but the diatribe of its sequel, Satire V, does indeed focus on 
what it is to be a true slave.197  
The fifth satire opens with a lampoon of poetics at Rome, a lampoon that is superficially 
similar to much of the first satire (Sat. V.1-4). On this occasion, however, Persius attacks the noisy 
and pompous conventions of high genres, epic and tragedy, rather than the more delicate poetics 
under attack in the Satire I, whose hexameters suffer from the frothy indulgence in Maenads and 
the Dionysian (e.g. Sat. I.99-102). An interrupting voice tells him to ignore the mouths of bombast 
and follow a style whose sharpness reflects moral judgment (Sat. V.5-18). Then turning to 
Cornutus, the satirist changes his tune to an epicizing tribute to his friend (Sat. V.19-29), which 
honors his mentorship (Sat. V.30-51) and good qualities by contrast to the habits of the dissolute 
(Sat. V.52-64). A diatribe takes over midline, signaled by its characteristic exhortation to the 
                                                          
197 Niall Rudd (1986: 144) has noted as an oddity that Persius never uses the word seruus in these lines, in 
order to make the point that Persius’ relation to freedom and slavery is necessarily affected by his class 
status. Persius may not, in fact, be terribly interested in the lives of contemporary slaves. But Persius does 
indeed use seruitium and it is bitter (Sat. V.127), and he stages a scene with a puer ordered to attend to his 
master’s bathing needs (Sat. V. 126). Masters also appear in the satire (domini, Sat. V.130; cf. Sat. V.78 
and 156); they are unkind and relentless. Persius is showing how you are already a slave, through the 
experience of being roused in the morning. It seems likely that in the context of slave holding societies in 





crowd, a protreptic expressing the urgency of ethical reform (Sat. V.64-72). The diatribe takes on 
the task of teaching the difference between legal and moral freedom (Sat. V.73ff.); 
misunderstanding what constitutes the free exercise of volition causes the masses to submit to 
quotidian pressures and changeable emotions (Sat. V.132-188).  
While the modes of the poets under fire in the first satire are there parodied and wholly 
rejected, in Satire V Persius takes the risk of appropriating the modes of the high genres for his 
own purpose in the encomium. In the diatribe, Persius will cycle through a catalogue of genres, 
discourses, and stock moments: Horatian satire and Stoic syllogism, of course, but also law, 
comedy, Horatian lyric, 198 and even his own anti-superstition diatribe and morning lévee. None of 
it works, however. Every mode of persuasion and protreptic fails at the end of this satire, in a final 
confirmation of the circularity hypothesis that he offered implicitly in Satire III—you’re as sick at 
the end as you were at the beginning.199  
 Epictetus’ diatribe on freedom (Diss. IV, 1) is a product of much the same milieu and 
education—Roman Stoicism in the imperial court. In that diatribe, the philosopher addresses the 
illusion of freedom that is held by Romans of widely differing social status.  The slave and the 
consular type are equally enslaved according to the rigorous application of what it is to be truly 
free, which is to be free from the compulsion of one’s own fears and desires. In content, the texts 
exhibit similar exempla, and in structure, a similarly shifting interlocutor. But Epictetus does not 
                                                          
198 The density of allusion in this poem is impenetrable, even for Persius: e.g. Horace, Serm. I, 6.38 for 
Dama, Sat. V.76; Epictetus, Diss. IV, 1 for libertate opus est, Sat. V.73 and sed intus et in iecore aegro/ 
nascuntur domini, Sat. V.129-30; for Masurius Sabinus, see Kissel (1990) on Sat. V.89-90; for Sat. V.151-
153 alone, cf. Horace, Carm. I, 11.7-8, Carm. IV, 7.16, and Serm. II, 6.97, and Kissel ad loc.  
 
199 In his elucidation of Satire V by comparison with Horace’s Serm. II, 7, Hooley (1997: 117) arrives at a 
partially shared conclusion about Persius’ pedagogy, as it were: “he seems not out to convert people; he 
shows little positive exhortation toward virtue of the sort one finds in Seneca, or, later, Epictetus.” But that 
is where we part ways. For Hooley, the avoidance of proselytism, is related to the principles of his Persius, 




play Persius’ games. Whatever generic play he entertains (the appropriation of fable, for example, 
IV, 1.24-31), Epictetus makes sure that every new piece of evidence points firmly in the direction 
of moral reform—to the understanding of genuine, moral freedom. 
 
Digest 
Persius invokes the conventional vatic demand of poets for multiple voices to articulate the 
grandeur of their epic subjects (1-2) and conflates that amplificatory device with a caricature of 
the work of tragedians—a caricature that is full of pores on both sides of the performance: the 
wounds and groin of a tragic figure, on the one hand, and the gaping mouths of the admiring 
theater-goers on the other (3-4). In the fifth line, a voice interrupts with a question, quorsum 
haec?—similar to the en quid agis? that interjects in the fifth line of the third satire—wondering 
what dish the poet seems about to cook up and why he is trying to compete with his own hundredth 
throat. Implicitly, in the accusation of grabbing for his hundredth throat, the poet participates in 
the projection of over-the-top poeticizing through mimicry; his parody participates in the crimes 
of its object. The alternative is to leave well alone; leave it to the epicists – to the poets embarking 
on major works in the province of the Muses (Helicone, 7) or to those whose province is one of 
the cannibalistic culinary disasters of myth. The reference to uates and carmina and the muses 
recalls the poet’s recusatio from epic and other inspired poetry from the Prologue. It is combined 
here with terms of critique from Satire I, with the likening of poetic composition to cooking food; 
those mouths are “body parts as essential for eating as they are for poetic recitation.”200 The lines 
conflate his epic tragedians, or tragic epicists, with the crow poets (Prol. 13) and the cook poets 
(Sat. I.22) 
                                                          





The interruptor explains Persius’ preferable style, first in negative terms, (he does not huff, 
puff, and blow hard, recalling the relentlessly non-indicative identifications of the Prologue) The 
interruptor assigns him no bellows for a poetry factory, no caw of the Prologue’s crows (Prol. 
13),201 and no cheeks full to bursting. The windbag-tendency of the contemporary literary scene is 
rejected in favor of a precise analysis of social ills and a harsh style (Sat. V.10-20). Now diverging 
from Persius’ bodiless and poetically anemic self-presentation in the Prologue and Satire I, this 
presentation of the poet by the interruptor assigns him a moderate mouth (Sat. V.15), just one 
mouth (a reasonable number) in contrast to the hundred mouths and tongues of the blowhards. 
Persius’ style is wholly Roman (uerba togae sequeris); it is sharp, even difficult, and critical; it 
strips down and scrapes away at molding moralities (pallentis… mores); it is studied, modest, 
gentlemanly, and precise. Half of these qualities sound like the Persius we have come to know 
(iunctura callidus acri, 14; doctus, 16); half do not (modico, ingenuo ludo, 16).202  The poet should 
turn from Thyestes’ unfortunate feast of body parts and get to know the sandwiches of the people 
(18).  
 The ambivalence of the interruptor’s description of Persius is only intensified by the reply 
of the poet who answers the interruptor with non equidem (19): “No, no, you’re right: I’m not 
trying to get my page to make fluff weighty. We’re speaking privately…”—still we (readers) are 
not privy to the identity of this bossy interlocutor—“but I’ll talk about you in epic style.” And so 
begins the so-called encomium of Cornutus, who is finally revealed at line 23. The encomium 
breaks away from secrete loquimur and treats its subject in the language of the most public of 
genres. These lines of hexameter satire become inextricable from hexameter epic devices, from its 
                                                          
201 coruus and cornix are largely interchangeable; see Arnott (2007) and Thompson (1895).  
 





hailing the encouragement of the Latin Muse (hortante Camena, 21) to the ending of this “proem” 
in its ostentatiously Vergilian expression (non ennarabile fibra, 29).203 We might even see the 
directive that Persius gives to Cornutus—to thump the heart that he presents to him (pulsa, 24)—
as a metamorphopoiesis of Cornutus into an Ennian Muse, one of the Camenae with thumping 
feet.204 The Camena also, through etymological wordplay attested by Varro,205 prepares Cornutus 
for a long song about to be sung in his honor, one of the carmina of the uates.  
 Cornutus turns out to be so effective a muse that even Persius would dare to join the uates 
in their demands (deposcere, 26; cf. poscere, 1) and draw out his song in a pure style. Cornutus’ 
earlier sanctioning of the singular mouth is overturned by Persius’ epic assumption of a hundred 
throats (fauces, 26), a satirical metonymic dislocation of the ora and linguae (2). While the trope 
is high-register watermark of epic, the same language is perverse in satires in which mouths are 
sites of softness and wetness (eliquat ac tenero subplantat uerba palato, Sat. I.35; tenero latet 
ulcus in ore/ putre, Sat. III.113-114; uda lebella… lustralibus ante saliuis, Sat. II.32-33), the 
tongue belongs to the panting dog (nec linguae quantum sitiat canis Apula tantae, Sat. I.60) and 
to the whisperer (sub lingua murmurat, Sat. II.9), and songs themselves are objects of sexual 
interchange (carmina lumbum/ intrant, Sat. I.20-21). In other words, all these poetic parts in satire 
mark inward ingress into the body, rather than outward production. Apparently the epic convention 
here is used for the tragedian’s prayer; and, moreover, it is transferred from poet to audience, whose 
mouths are also agape (fabula seu maesto ponatur hianda tragoedo, Sat. V.3) at the staged figure 
                                                          
203 non ennarabile textum, Verg. Aen. VIII.625. 
 
204 Musae, quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum (Ann. I.1) and Musas quas memorant nosce (?) nos 
esse Camenas, see Skutsch (1976: 77, n. 11). 
 





who pulls a sword from the lumbic wound that he shares with Alcibiades, about which we have 
just read (uolnera seu Parthi ducentis ab inguine ferrum, Sat. V.4; cf. ilia subter/ caecum uulnus 
habes, Sat. IV.43-44). Tragedian, audience, and actor are all stymied in and through the shared 
satiric body-pores.  
 Persius puts his own body on display in the encomium, too. This time he hands himself 
over to Cornutus for a thorough shake-down, or inspection by slapping; but as in Satires I (spleen), 
II (heart), and III (bile), Persius’ body is all internal parts—here, praecordia (Sat. V.117). More 
body is revealed, but still only innards—sinuoso in pectore (Sat. V.27) and arcana…fibra (29). 
Thump away at this heart of hearts-turned pot, distinguishing between the sound of solidity and 
the sound of embellished language (21-25). 
 Persius characterizes Cornutus as a Socrates to whom he submitted himself at adolescence; 
when he gave up the locket symbolic of childhood (bullaque… pependit, Sat. V.31) Cornutus 
responded by enfolding him in his Socratic lap. The arrangement of Socratico, Cornute, sinu  
firmly embeds Cornutus in the role--even in the body--of Socrates (37). Persius’ assertion that he 
presented himself to Cornutus and was taken up by him (me tibi supposui. teneros tu suscipis 
annos, 36) has standardly been identified as referring to a formal Roman ritual in which a 
paterfamilias recognized an infant and therefore introduced the child into his household; but this 
interpretation must surely be questioned in light of Brent Shaw’s argument that the tradition of this 
ritual is the fiction of historians.206  
 Indeed Persius’ brief narrative of his hesitation at the divergent paths before him indicates 
that this is pointedly not an “infant” moment, but rather an evocation of the type-scene of the 
crucially adolescent threshold of moral choice. The latter day myth of Prodicus’ young Heracles 
                                                          





at the crossroads of the Virtue and Vice—transmitted by Xenophon, 207 that Socratic writer of such 
importance to the Stoics—is the paradigm of this scene; but the moral importance of a youth’s own 
agency in his education that is explicit in me tibi supposui is also prefaced (and ironized) by 
Alcibiades I itself, when the young man declares his own enslavement to Socrates. The metaphor 
is a philosophical citation of Persius, too: the divergence of moral choice at the branching 
crossroads (Sat. V.34-35) recalls the lesson of the branching path symbolized by the Pythagorean 
upsilon that Persius missed when he was snoozing through Satire III.208  
 The relationship is reframed as one of craft: Cornutus applied the ruler; Persius’ soul was 
molded by Cornutus’ thumb. Lines 41-44 express their friendship in the language of Catullan 
sympotic poems (e.g. Carm. 50); intellectual and personal intimacy followed, day and night (Sat. 
V.41-42), the two of them, it seems, to the exclusion of the world, sharing a single purpose while 
they pondered at their respectable dinners for two, obviously by common consent, led by a single 
guiding star (43-44). That star brings to mind yet another connection: this is an astrological pair, 
too, and all the celestial signs are in on it: fastidious Birthday balanced them evenly on Libra, 
Gemini coordinate their fates, and they evade the grim Saturn by Jupiter, together; somehow the 
star astrologically balanced Persius and Cornutus (51).   
 The image of the twinned scales that, in the fourth satire, Socrates used to describe 
Alcibiades’ delusional practice of public criticism (scis etenim iustum gemina suspendere 
lance/ancipitis librae, rectum discernis ubi inter/curua subit…, Sat. IV.10-12) is appropriated by 
Persius in the fifth satire to describe his relationship with his teacher (nostra uel aequali suspendit 
tempora Libra/ Parca tenax ueri, seu nata fidelibus hora/ diuidit in Geminos concordia fata 
                                                          
207 Mem. I, 2. 
 
208 uitae nescius error/ diducit trepidas ramosa in compita mentes, Sat. V.34-35 and et tibi quae Samios 




duorum…, Sat. V.47-49). The quality of their friendship is truly cosmic.209 The close, mutually 
informing relationship between Cornutus and Persius has allowed for the emergence of their shared 
fates (49). The two figures are conjoined with mihi te (27), me tibi (36), and, again, me tibi (51). 
And the arrangement of the phrase nostra animae around pars tua answers the question that quanta 
raises (22-23). 
  With the diversity of mankind, at line 52, the verses begin to take on a Horatian 
sensibility—men have different motivations and live differently; the reasonable voice balances 
their concerns nicely over the lines. In the context of the address to Cornutus as Persius’ sweet 
friend (23), we might recall Horace’s ode to his sweet patron (O et praesidium et dulce decus 
meum, C. I, 1.1) or his epistle to the same, bidden by the muse (Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende 
Camena, Ep. I.1). But the poetic even-handedness of this survey of human lives is destroyed in or 
via the enjambment of venereal disease, gout, and rot (57-58).  
mille hominum species et rerum discolor usus; 
uelle suum cuique est nec uoto uiuitur uno. 
mercibus hic Italis mutat sub sole recenti 
rugosum piper et pallentis grana cumini,             
hic satur inriguo mauult turgescere somno, 
hic campo indulget, hunc alea decoquit, ille 
in uenerem putris; sed cum lapidosa cheragra 
fecerit articulos ueteris ramalia fagi, 
tunc crassos transisse dies lucemque palustrem            
et sibi iam seri uitam ingemuere relictam. (Sat. V.53-61) 
 
There are a thousand types of person and many colored are the ways 
of doing things; each has his own will and life is not lived by a single 
prayer. This man at sun up exchanges wrinkled pepper and seeds of 
pale cumin for Italian merchandise; this man, loaded, prefers to bloat 
away in his sloshed sleep; this man plays on the sportsfield; this man 
is depleted by the dice, that diseased man by sex. But once rocky 
gout has turned their knuckles into the branches of an old beech, 
then how the thick days and marshy light have passed and how life 
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has been lost—that’s what they groan to themselves, already too 
late.  
 
He turns for the last time back to Cornutus with at te, (Sat. V.62): his life is devoted to study and 
teaching. This teacher is as if a sower of seeds--into the ears of youths, the ears that have been 
such an important receptacle and site of contest throughout the satires.  
 Diatribe suddenly—at long last?—interrupts this encomium’s turn to yet another 
metaphor—philosophical agriculture (we were about to learn about sowing adolescent ears with a 
philosopher’s fruit)—with its familiar call: petite hinc, puerique senesque… (Sat. V.64; cf. discite 
et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum, Sat. III.66). Conventionally, the start of this satire’s diatribe 
has been marked at line 73. Sometimes the final twenty or so lines of the “encomium” are identified 
as transitional.210 But a recognition that this diatribe interrupts midline and turns from the single 
and singular, pointedly (atypically) identifiable addressee to the many in and after line 73, better 
accounts for the language of the lines that immediately follow and their literary and philosophical 
content. The diatribe becomes confused with too many devices: other characters get in the way of 
the diatribist and deliver their own sermons, effectively elbowing-aside their creator. Some other 
Stoic, Greed, Sloth, and even reason disrupt him. Persius’ recital of his lesson is diverted by literary 
imagination. 
 The diatribe emphatically declares its subject in libertas: libertate opus est (73).211 People 
fail to comprehend true freedom because they misinterpret the libertas conferred by manumission. 
Hurtling between sloth and careerism, they acquire ever more dominators of the psyche, mistresses 
such as Greed and Luxury. The encomium played with epic, tragedy, and Catullan and Horatian 
                                                          
210 For a review of opinions on the breaks in this text, including those of Casaubon and Gildersleeve, see 
Anderson (1982: 154). 
 
211 The phrase clearly alerts us to Horace, Serm. II, 7, the myriad connections with which Hooley (1997: 




lyric tropes. As the diatribe proceeds, it, too, pulls in scenes and tropes from other genres and 
poems as exempla that might persuade the pueri senesque of the importance of libertas.  
The uiatica (Sat. V. 65) Persius urges all to seek is a contemporary metaphor for 
philosophical study used also by Musonius Rufus (“Τὶ ἄριστον γήρως ἐφόδιον;” XVII). An 
anonymous interlocutor, out of nowhere, complains at the satirist’s lack of urgency; he’ll get to it 
tomorrow (Sat. V.66-68). That interlocutor, of course, is always already condemned to the rat race: 
pinned to the back axle, he’ll never catch up, no matter how fast the wheels turn (68-72).  Persius 
cites his own satire, too, with the invocation of Satire III’s hazy procrastinator:  
‘cras hoc fiet.’ idem cras fiat. ‘quid? quasi magnum 
nempe diem donas!’ sed cum lux altera uenit, 
iam cras hesternum consumpsimus; ecce aliud cras 
egerit hos annos et semper paulum erit ultra. (Sat. V.66-69) 
 
‘It’ll happen tomorrow.’ Tomorrow be the same. ‘What? as if you’re 
granting such a great thing in a day!’ But when another morning 
arrives, already we’ve eaten up yesterday’s tomorrow. Look, another 
tomorrow will live out these years and always there’ll be another 
beyond.  
 
These lines recall the day-after-day failure to rise in the third satire (Sat. III.1 and 15-16). The 
nempe there, the sameness of every morning of indolence has proceeded as predicted.  
The satirist sends up the hypocrisy of the political paradigm: no one conceives of a recently 
freed slave as an equal; you wouldn’t believe that, just because he has acquired Marcus for a name, 
the freedman will have left his cheating mentality, the supposed slavish attribute, behind with his 
bondage (Sat. V.76-81). An interlocutor: But what else is freedom except the ability to live as one 
wills? Now it is an explicitly Stoic character who responds (Stoicus hic, Sat. V.86) and breaks 
down that logic. The Stoic is on Persius’ side—we know this because his ear has been cleaned 
out—like the purgatas aures of Cornutus’ students or the uaporata aure of the ideal lector of the 




of the world we are familiar from the second satire, Sat. II.31-38). But the action of the logical 
Stoic is different from the action of the satirist. Compare his methodical response—accepting one 
premiss, rejecting the others—to the physical response of the satirist, plucking grandmothers from 
the interlocutor’s lungs (dum ueteres auias tibi de pulmone reuello, Sat. V.92, i.e., to rid him of 
entrenched misconceptions): the philosopher and the poet have very different responses to 
ignorance and hypocrisy; for the one, it is to explicate and teach; for the other, it is to pick and 
pluck, in incomprehensible somatic terms. Next, we learn that it is not within the praetor’s power 
to assign to the ignorant those duties that accompany a subtle understanding of the universe (tenuia 
rerum/ officia, 93-94), nor to sanction the squandering of life (94).  
Persius again confusingly cites Persius, staging a scene he’s already put on:  
mane piger stertis. ‘surge’ inquit Auaritia, ‘eia 
surge.’ negas. instat. ‘surge’ inquit. ‘non queo.’ ‘surge.’     
‘en quid agam?’… (Sat. V.132-134)  
 
In the morning you're snoring lazily. ‘Get up,’ says Greed, ‘hey, get 
up.’ you refuse. She's still there. ‘Get up,’ she says. ‘I can’t.’ ‘Get 
up.’ ‘Well, what should I do?’ 
 
The lines recall the snoring poet of Satire III, late to his table, whose “friend” roused him in much 
the same way: 
Nempe haec adsidue. iam clarum mane fenestras 
intrat et angustas extendit lumine rimas. 
stertimus, indomitum quod despumare Falernum 
sufficiat, quinta dum linea tangitur umbra. 
‘en quid agis?…’ (Sat. III.1-5) 
 
Of course, this constantly is what it is: now bright A.M. is getting 
into the windows and widening the narrow cracks with its light. 
We’re snoring, enough to despume a stiff Falernian, while the line 
is touched with by shade no. 5. ‘Hey, what’re you doing?...’ 
 
In the target, the satirist-diatribist sees the sleeper of Satire III; in other words, Persius sees himself. 




deinde, insane, ruis, quo? Sat. V.142), again with similarity to the warnings against 
wrongheadedness in Satire III.212 But the roles of exhortation have been perverted in these re-
stagings. How is the target of a verbal lashing meant to identify and view his commander? 
Similarly, with disce, the diatribist will urge his target to wipe that sneer off his face (Sat. V.91)—
but the expression on the face of the target is one of which Persius himself has been accused (Sat. 
I.40-41).  
 The diatribe of Satire V uses prefabricated principles, such as libertas and natura,213 
affiliating itself to Stoicism on a lexical level. But diction only goes so far. Ratio chatters nonsense, 
making it impossible for her listener to learn. As in Satire III, there is a noticeable lack of positive 
didactic exempla.214  
 The Stoic has a vinegar-cleansed ear, Stoicus hic aurem mordaci lotus aceto (Sat. V.86); he 
is similar to the ignotus in Satire IV. Ratio appears, chattering in the ear (secretam garrit in aurem, 
Sat. V. 96); this is similar to secrete loquimur (21). Her speech is incomprehensible to the listener; 
garrire even recalls the meaningless speech of birds: Ovid’s parrot, as we have seen, is garrulus 
(Amores II, 6.26). The inscrutable law is explicated: someone must not be allowed to do what he 
will undoubtedly screw up (96-97). Universal law, nature herself, says that action from ignorance 
                                                          
212 tibi luditur. effluis amens,/ contemnere, Sat. III.20-12; dicisque facisque quod ipse non sani esse hominis 
non sanus iuret Orestes, Sat. III.117-118. 
 
213 sapiens (114), publica lex (98), ius…sui (176) and The Right (recti, 121). cf. Harvey (1981) ad loc. 
 
214 The expectation-failure scheme is in fact the real pattern in this satire. The diatribe only partially 
performs proper pedagogy in philosophy, failing to represent the progress fundamental for contemporary 
Stoics. The inevitable intractability of procrastination is laid down by the series cras-idem-nempe-lux 
altera-iam cras-cras hesternum- aliud cras-semper (66-69) as soon as the diatribe tries to move forward 
from petite hinc (63). The scenario of failure to be one’s own master (li. 115-121) is three times longer than 
the scenario of success (li. 113-114). The (comedic) young man—even if he should escape his mistress—





is forbidden (98-99). Medicine and navigation215 are lower-stakes, real-world examples of this (99-
104)—so why should expertise in discerning Truth from Falsity be any different (104-106)?  
quaeque sequenda forent quaeque euitanda uicissim, 
illa prius creta, mox haec carbone notasti? 
es modicus uoti, presso lare, dulcis amicis? 
iam nunc adstringas, iam nunc granaria laxes…  
                                                                      (Sat. V.107-110)            
  
Have you marked down both the things that will have to be pursued 
and the things to be avoided by turns, the former first in chalk, next 
the latter in charcoal? Do you make moderate prayers at a 
conservative hearth, sweet towards your friends? Just now do you 
close your pantry, just now open it… 
 
The poetic balance and restraint of these lines once more ring as Horatian as their values. But even 
in Persius’ poetic practice, there is a failure successfully to turn his gaze from the bodily feasts:  
… inque luto fixum possis transcendere nummum 
nec gluttu sorbere saliuam Mercurialem?  (Sat. V.111-112) 
 
…and could you pass by a coin fixed in the mud without slurping 
back mercenary drool? 
 
The satirist spoils the relief of ethical and poetic balance with a return to the mud and drool that 
pooled and stagnated throughout his previous satires.216  
 The target of the diatribe says “Yes,” but the satirist-diatribist cannot believe him, it’s more 
likely that he is holding on to former vices while parading around a new hide (115-118). Reason 
has imparted nothing to the target: no matter what he does, he’ll screw it up, no matter how trivial 
                                                          
215 The mention of “Melicerta” is particularly perverse. Persius uses his pre-metamorphosis name instead 
of his cult name, Palaemon: cf. Met. IV, 542 and Fasti VI, 501, where Ovid makes clear the division 
between the names. The infant unaware, in Ovid’s picture, is laughing at the moment of his murder by his 
frenzied father (ridentem, Met. IV, 516). Juno laughs at the sight (risit, Met. IV, 524), an atrocity of trivial 
divine jealousy. 
 
216 e.g. liquido cum plasmate guttur/ mobile conlueris, Sat. I.17-18; summa delumbe saliua/ hoc natat in 
labris et in udo est Maenas et Attis, Sat. I.104-105; lustralibus ante saliuis, Sat. II.33; udum et molle lutum 




or banal the action (113-123). Again, the target asserts that he is free—but surely he mixes up legal 
and ethical freedom. Persius reiterates the lesson: freedom does not consist in the manumission, 
only in wisdom (113-14 and 125). The target is as much a slave as the most menial garçon who 
runs after his master to the baths.  
No prayer of yours will obtain for you the slightest bit of Right Living (119-121). It is not 
right to mix up a lack of expertise with delicate dances (122-123). “I am free,” but how do you 
arrive at this conclusion, when you’re so lost as to the fact of your spiritual masters? (124-125) 
Another scene: Barking orders for a slave to prepare his master’s bath. You don’t feel anything. 
But if you have inner masters, you are no less a slave. (126-131).  
This is the important lesson: nothing outside yourself compels your body (neruos) to do 
anything; it is the congenital masters that live within, that hide deep in your diseased liver (Sat. 
V.127-130) to which you are ultimately enslaved.  
Straight out of comedy, a young man tells his slave that he’s about to break with his 
mistress, lest he make himself and his family ridiculous (161-166). “Well done.” But will she cry? 
(168) “You’re a tough guy till you prove yourself her slave, saying ‘what should I do?’” In these 
lines it is the slave, for a change, who points out the folly of his superiors (169-174). Davus, too, 
Horace’s slave, makes a cameo from Serm. II, 7.217 This, this is the moment we’ve been talking 
about—the question of non-legal freedom (174-175). Does the man driven by political ambition 
have self-control? (176-177). The characters of Satire II return: the public has strange, superstitious 
beliefs: Jewish rituals (180-184), bizarre cultic practices that smack of Egypt (185-188)—all oily 
and anatomical, in the ways we’ve seen before.  
                                                          




You make these points—in fact all the ethical critiques that have been presented in the 
satires—in front of a crowd of muscled centurions; the big one laughs, buys a hundred Greeks for 
an even hundred. (189-191).  The satire closes on a disconcerting note. You finish your diatribe. 
Centurions laugh at it and buy a hundred-pack of philosophers (189-191), reminding us that 
pedagogical labors fall on deaf ears.  
 The final lines, with the singular dixeris haec (Sat. V.189), reframe the diatribe in the 
context of the address to Cornutus: the diatribe has been recited as an example of the type of 
philosophizing Cornutus (or a Cornutus-aspirant) uses to proselytize (63ff.). As the diatribe 
proceeds, however, Persius confuses the diatribe with other methods of exhortation and persuasion, 
however, other masters get in the way of his lessons and themselves deliver sermons. The Stoicus 
hic becomes one of several dominating speakers, occupying the same plane with Auaritia, Luxuria, 
and a surprisingly ineffective Ratio. Persius’ ventriloquizing of his teacher is thwarted by his 
involvement in literary technique and literary worlds. 
 
Persius : Cornutus :: Alcibiades : Socrates 
The unbalanced relationship of Socrates and Alcibiades staged in Satire IV provides an important 
interpretive frame for Satire 5 that ironizes the Persius-Cornutus relationship and puts Persius’ 
encomium in dialogue with Platonic texts and Platonic questions. If Cornutus is a Socrates in Satire 
V, then Persius is suggestively an Alcibiades, an analogy pre-determined by the satirist’s having 
gestured towards that infamously problematic student-teacher relationship in the previous poem. 
Persius qua Plato (the student who documents) is in conflict with Persius qua Alcibiades (the 




 The implicit analogy “Persius : Cornutus :: Alcibiades : Socrates” is confirmed by various 
correspondences between both students and teachers across the two poems. Clearly, the Socratic 
lap of Cornutus (Socratico, Cornute, sinu, 37) puts him squarely in the role of that philosopher, 
and remind us of Symposium, as Hooley and Villeneuve have observed.218 Lexical parallels 
between the representations of Persius and Alcibiades also precede and prepare for that explicit 
identification. Both youths display cleverness in speech (dicenda tacendaue calles, Sat. IV.5; 
iunctura callidus acri, Sat. V.14), a precocious talent that is morally indifferent; it is only a form 
of potential, and even a hazardous one when misdirected in the matter of public concerns (et potis 
es nigrum uitio praefigere theta, Sat. IV.13; doctus et ingenuo culpam defigere ludo, Sat. V.16). In 
Satire IV’s graphic description of Alcibiades’ body, his groin is “weeded” and yet his “bush” 
cannot be ploughed away (haec plantaria uellant, Sat. IV.39; non tamen ista filix ullo mansuescit 
aratro, Sat. IV.41); the work of the Socratic Cornutus upon the minds of young men is pitched in 
agricultural terms (cultor enim iuuenum purgatas inseris aures, 63).219 The juxtaposition is telling. 
The idea of pruning and plowing, of course, has a long and erotic history in both poetic and 
philosophical literature. Catullus classically uses the trope in his Sapphic (and thus erotic) poem 
to Furius and Aurelius on the sexual transgressions of Lesbia, and additionally in his 
epithalamium.220  
                                                          
218 Villeneuve (1918) ad loc. and Hooley (1997: 81-82).  
 
219 P. A. Miller (1998: 268-269) discusses this metaphor in Satire 5 as an engagement in “grotesque” 
discourse. Cf. Nussbaum (1986: 172) and the failure to reproduce in human love vs. productive sowing in 
Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium. 
 
220 illius culpa cecidit uelut prati/  ultimi flos, praetereunte postquam/ tactus aratro est (Cat. Carm. 11. 22-
24) and ut flos in saeptis secretus nascitur hortis,/ ignotus pecori, nullo conuolsus aratro… (Cat. Carm. 




 Like Satire IV, Satire V is framed by a relationship between youth and philosopher. There is 
an important structural difference between the two poems, however. The principal speaker on stage 
in the fourth satire was the philosopher, whereas the speaker of the fifth is the younger man, in an 
important reversal of dialogical roles. The question remains: will philosophy fare better in this 
satire than it did in the last?  
 
Platonic Praise and Friendship 
The encomium as an expression of friendship is not a philosophically sound sort of poetry. We 
know this from Cornutus’ swift reminder within the satire to keep it simple, but also from Platonic 
dialogues on friendship, praise, and the education of youths. Encomium mythologizes and 
misleads. Therefore, as we shall see, Persius writes the encomium to his philosopher-friend as 
“bad” literature, not only using the poetic tropes that he has repeatedly assailed, but also by 
reigniting certain erotic-Socratic tendencies that, as discussed in the previous chapter, were 
sidelined in the period. Erotic complicity in ethical development runs across the Platonic corpus, 
for example in Alcibiades I, Lysis, and Symposium. In Phaedrus, it is the grounds upon which some 
of Plato’s most beautiful pages were written—the conversation of Socrates and Phaedrus on the 
nature of love set on the banks of a river (231a-242b). Indeed, the erotic is essential to Plato. But 
it is anathema to the tradition that follows Xenophon.  
The relation between praise and love is the motivating factor in Lysis, the dialogue in which 
Socrates interrogates the understanding that a group of boys have of friendship. The set-up of the 
pedagogical moment is this: upon hearing that the besotted Hippothales has been praising Lysis in 
prose and verse, Socrates shows the boys that praise genres are inefficient for obtaining the objects 




exercise in self-aggrandizement by association. Socrates will show them the effective method of 
obtaining the beloved: confuse and reduce him to incapacity through philosophy. Hence the 
dialogue on what constitutes friendship is based on the premiss that philosophy will get you a 
boyfriend. By extension, Persius would seem to share young Hippothales’ error: he is speaking 
philosophically defective literature. 
 As the dialogue takes shape, it turns out that friends value each other because they belong 
to one another: 
“And if you two are friends with each other, then in some way you 
naturally belong (φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοι) to each other..”  
“Absolutely,” they said together. 
“And if one person desires (ἐρᾷ) another, my boys, or loves him 
passionately (ἐπεθύμει), he would not desire him or love him 
passionately or as a friend (ἐφίλει) unless he somehow belonged 
(οἰκεῖος) to his beloved (ἐρωμένῳ) either in soul or in some 
characteristic, habit, or aspect of his soul.”  
(Lysis 221e-222a, Lombardo, trans. in Cooper, ed.) 
 
Persius’ description of his friendship with Cornutus is actually very close to the portrayal of 
friendship in Lysis. Both the theory presented in Lysis and the Stoic theory of friendship use the 
language of belonging, but Persius seems to reject the Stoic development in favor of the Platonic 
variant. The notion of what is οἰκεῖον as a property of friendship—that one loves what is in some 
sense one’s own, what one can appropriate or share—is also a central part of the Stoic theory of 
friendship. But Stoic οἰκείωσις is an expansive idea; it starts with an affinity for kin and expands 
outward to include all humanity.221 The friendship of the satirist, on the other hand, is far from all-
encompassing. The closeness between Persius and Cornutus is concomitant with their separateness 
from the rest of the world: secrete loquimur (21) are the two words that turn the satirist’s attention 
away from the follies of other writers and, in the same gesture, introduce Cornutus to the text. 
                                                          




Their friendship, in other words, is rather “Platonic” in the sense presented in Lysis. It is also 
clearly sympotic.  
 In Symposium, Alcibiades’ speech on eros and Socrates has been insightfully interpreted by 
Andrea Nightingale as a “systematic misreading” in its encomiastic endeavor that ultimately fails 
to represent the philosopher; and by Martha Nussbaum as a poetic complication of philosophy.222 
Persius has forgotten that praise is at odds with the purposes of a philosopher and that praise may 
equally well be a condemnation in that it exhibits the inefficacy of the teacher’s instruction and of 
philosophical rhetoric more generally.223 Like Alcibiades, he reminds us that the teacher is no saint, 
and that philosophy is susceptible to a critique that is beyond its control, outside of its own 
discourse, and vulnerable to poetic reconfiguration.  
Persius explicitly writes his encomium with the tropes of “bad” literature and “suspect” genres 
that foreground the tension between purpose and modes of speaking. Persius deplored the motif of 
the hundred mouths as bad poetry.224 But rather than discussing his teacher in a poetically and, 
more importantly, in a philosophically sound mode, Persius praises Cornutus in precisely those 
“bad” poetic terms, demanding 100 mouths for himself, flagrantly writing both “bad” poetry and 
“bad” philosophy: Rather than backing off from poscere (Sat. V.1), Persius strengthens the request 
with deposcere (26). We have already been informed about the content of good poetic practice is: 
to pin down bad habits with precision (mores defigere, 15-16) and from that position to draw out 
his words (hinc trahe quae dicis,17).225 But in the encomium, with deliberate glibness, Persius has 
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223 The leading dactyl me tibi (36)—me first—enacts Socrates’ observation in the Lysis that the act of 
eulogizing is tantamount to self-praise. 
 
224 … centum sibi poscere uoces/ centum ora et linguas optare in carmina centum (Sat. V.1-2). 
 




pinned down the philosopher, right into his own self (te fixi, 27) and he draws out his words for a 
philosophically unsound project: praise.  
 
Plato and ethical slavery  
The encomium of the teacher in Satire V has been considered a reflection of their “joined 
commitments.”226 On Hooley’s view any ideological problem that might arise from the writing of 
a eulogy in a satire may be written off by analogy to the “benevolent irony” modeled by Horace 
in his ode to Maecenas (Carm. 2.17). The possibility of reading the relationship documented in the 
eulogy as tied up with the master-slave relationships of the diatribe has been taken by Anderson 
as the wrong reading, as the reading of “fools.” 227 For these critics, the function of eulogy is largely 
to allow Persius to emerge as a pedagogical voice equal to that of his tutor’s. But is there any 
interpretive value in having Persius in fact play the fool? Let us examine philosophy and slavery 
in this regard based on the signal of the Socratico sinu. 
 At the close of Alcibiades I, the young man enslaves himself to Socrates—an odd notion 
in general, but all the more so because of the terms he use. Alcibiades declares that he attend 
Socrates specifically as a paidagogos (παιδαγωγεῖν, 135d) proposes an enslavement to the 
philosopher more nuanced than one that might be indicated by δουλεύειν. It is a strange proposition 
that positions Alcibiades as slave (and thus lower status), but one with great personal responsibility 
for (and thus higher status) charge; he is an older person guiding a younger person; he is even a 
wise teacher (as the paidagogos in Republic 390e). Of course, these are inversions of the manifest 
relation between the two men: Socrates is older and wiser; it is Socrates who is meant to guide 
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Alcibiades to virtue. Socrates does not refute this assertion but rather deduces from the success of 
his love for Alcibiades, now parentally conceived:   
“Then my love (ἔρως) for you, my excellent friend, will be just like 
a stork: after hatching a winged love (ἔρως) in you, it will be cared 
for (θεραπεύεσθαι) by it in return.”  
           (Alc. 135e, Hutchinson, trans. in Cooper, ed.) 
 
The difficulty of the relationship has much in common with the complexity of the 
relationship between Persius and his Cornutus—parental affection, submission, teaching, and 
desire. The pretext of the slavery metaphor in Alcibiades and the maintenance of these terms, 
alongside the complication of erotics and ethics, throughout much of the Platonic corpus provides 
intellectual context for Persius’ philosopher-youth relationship. Alcibiades declares his continued 
servile status in his notional encomium of Socrates in which he also accuses the philosopher of 
injustice and ambition. Plato as a resource for humor and the satirical has been increasingly an 
area of interest. Bracht Branham has elucidated the comic and satirical elements in the Platonic 
corpus broadly in service of his examination of Lucian’s “reinscribing philosophical dialogue in a 
variety of comic traditions.”228 Lucian’s assessment of his own work is that he “saved Dialogue 
from the Academy;”229 in other words, Lucian saves Plato from Philosophy. We may see Persius’ 
project in the satires along similar lines: Persius seemingly rescues Stoicism from its own 
institutional lethargy by revivifying and restaging and, most important of all, reorienting the 
endless circularity of the problems of speaking, writing, teaching, and even of being in a way that 
his prosaic fellows at Rome would not.230  
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230 A possible analogue might be Seneca’s tragedies in contrast with his prose treatises, but this comparison 




In Symposium, Alcibiades has the distinction of delivering the sole speech featuring eros 
of and for an individual, a real-life, non-mythological exemplum. The party guests who precede 
him praise love along the more general lines of origin myths and social conventions. Their 
speeches, however, provide a variety of vocabulary and themes that Alcibiades’ speech ultimately 
distorts or inverts in the face of his overwhelming desire for this ugly older man. When he sees 
Socrates his “heart starts leaping in my chest” (215e) and he is so stirred that his life is equivalent 
to the abjection of slave bondage (ἀνδράποδωδῶς, 215e). The line is important because it is the 
strange slavery/attendant discourse that Alcibiades seeks to explain.  
 Both Branham and Andrea Nightingale have gestured towards the ways in which humor 
arises from the discomfort of the friction of different types of language presented in the dialogues. 
Plato dramatizes humor of an intellectual kind in the very process of argument and refutation, in 
the clash of mutually incompatible languages. This “dialectical humor” differs from the humor of 
character in that it is produced by the confrontation of alien perspectives rather than by the 
presentation of personality.”231 The clash of genres more broadly is the motivator of dialogues 
such as Menexenus, in which eulogy is dismantled, and Symposium, in which encomium after 
encomium fails until real tribute is demonstrated in elenchos.232 But as Michael Mader has shown, 
humor is not only an ancillary phenomenon; laughter and comedy are themselves of interest to 
Plato. Further to intellectual humor, but also situational and physical humor, Sonja Tanner 
observes.233 Tanner has usefully opened the question of laughter in the Platonic dialogues and 
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proposes that Comedy and philosophy may be mutually engaged and complementary.234 Both are 
about critical assessment. Aristotle, Quintilian, and Diogenes Laertius attribute to Plato some 
significant taste for mimes, the low-register comic forms, with Quintilian reporting that the comic 
texts of Sophron formed a pillow for his head on his deathbed (Inst. Orat. I, 10.17).235 While 
Andrew Ford has argued that anecdotes associating Plato and the mimes of Sophron are late, even 
Hellenistic, and thus apocryphal, the interest here is that this association of Plato and the comic 
was available to Persius.236  
Persius’ nights with Cornutus are an ideal symposium of two that take place in Socrates’ 
lap—are they just the sort of evenings that Symposium’s Alcibiades had wished for? Alcibiades 
recounts the evenings he shared with Socrates, over meals, “talking late into the night,” lying on 
the couch together (217c-219d). The passion with which Alcibiades describes his desire to be in 
Socrates’ company runs deep: “I mean my heart, or my soul, (τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ψυχὴν) or whatever 
you want to call it, which has been struck (πληγείς) and bitten by philosophy” (218a). Alcibiades, 
after one of these evenings together, admits that Socrates is the “only worthy lover (ἐραστὴς ἄξιος) 
I have ever had…” (218c), recapitulating and confirming Socrates’ assertion in Alcibiades. The 
younger man condemns Socrates, however—his “amazing arrogance and pride” (219c). 
Alcibiades’ inability to captivate Socrates, however, leads him to believe that “no one else has ever 
known the real meaning of slavery (καταδεδουλωμένος)” (219e). That line is a real-world 
instantiation of Pausanias’ general principle of “the lover’s total and willing subjugation to his 
beloved’s wishes” but shows that, contrary to Pausanias’ civic estimation, his pursuit does not 
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exhibit the nobility of voluntary enslavement (δουλεία ἑκούσιος) (184c). The real evidence of the 
relationship between the philosopher and the younger man subverts the social expectations (and 
excuses/ or the glossings-over) provided by society. Or perhaps Alcibiades’ behavior is servile 
because the roles have been partially switched, in that he is behaving as an erastes even as he is 
structurally the eromenos. Pausanias’ speech also reminds us that the relationship of the erastes 
and eromenos is embarked upon in the service of improving the character of the younger man and 
his progress towards virtue and wisdom. (184d-e). The reason why all of this is important is 
because the Persius: Alcibiades equation reminds us of all that underlies the philosopher-youth 
relationship, and that enslavement is indeed a very relevant evil twin to “Platonic” love—in as 
many ways as “Platonic” may be construed. 
 
Conclusions 
Cicero once staged a dialogue on rhetoric at the feet of Plato (Brutus 24). The presence of the 
Greek philosopher looming over the Roman interlocutors, provided a measure for the orator’s own 
success and the legitimation of his mission to historicize and systematize rhetoric. But it was, 
importantly, an image of Plato that Cicero used—a particular representation, one acceptable and 
adaptable to Roman purposes. The very setting—on a meadow—brought the activity of 
philosophical discourse outside the city, to a country-seat, from which distance the history of 
oratory—and even intellectual history more generally—might be more clearly perceived.237 
Persius’ is, of course, a radically different treatment of the Platonic philosophical heritage: rather 
than invoking the authority of the Athenian philosopher as a static, finished object, he 
tendentiously engages with his texts, providing a critique not only of the fictiveness of Platonic 
                                                          




dialogue but also of the sanitizing treatment of the genre and of Socrates by the Stoics. He does so 
in ways that we might consider Persius’ Satires as being part of the tradition of “Socratic” 
literature.  
Just as parody is reflected in both the visual and literary traditions, this sanitizing strain is 
reflected too in the philosophical traditions discussed above. We may now see, at this chapter’s 
conclusion, just how far Persius’ satire is from his teacher Cornutus’ measured critique of fallible 
social and civic conventions and institutions, carefully balanced with a pragmatic approach to full 
integration with the establishment, in the Epidrome.238 It is important to remember—in all of these 
belated interpretive struggles—that Persius writes to elicit a laugh.  The parody of—or the anxiety 
over—the schoolmaster who surfaces on a classical wine-cup239 in Chapter Four persists through 
the Neronian period. Quintilian, Persius’ younger contemporary, reminds parents contemplating 
sending their sons away for education to beware the pederastic goings-on among boarders and the 
deviance of schoolmasters (Inst. Orat. I, 2.4ff.).240    
With crede (Sat. IV.1), Persius theorized Platonic dialogue. In the fifth satire, he shows 
himself to be both Alcibiades and Plato. Alcibiades I, which underpinned the fourth satire, 
presented the backstory—the prequel—to the relationship so passionately described by Alcibiades 
in Symposium, in which the younger man professes and despairs over his fundamental—and 
seemingly intractable—enslavement to his desire for the philosopher. That relationship is some 
inversion of relationship erastes and eromenos which had already been developed in Pausanias’ 
speech. The significant structural difference between the fourth and fifth satires is that the principal 
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(indeed, the only) speaker of Satire IV is the philosopher whereas the student dominates the fifth 
satire. Satire V follows the model of Satires I and III, opening with an exchange. The interruption 
(Sat. V.5-18) in this case appears to be supplied by Cornutus, who is identified when the opening 
voice resumes speaking (Cornute, Sat. V.23).  The satire begins with a dialogic premiss but 
explicitly overturns the generic expectations for dialogue, as it is conventionally dubbed.241 
Coming after Satire IV, in which the Platonic philosopher is shown to be an out-of-control control-
freak, this poem turns the tables on the lessons of Socratic personages. As with the idea of 
παιδαγωγεῖν at the end of the Platonic Alcibiades, the roles of philosopher and youth are 
importantly switched between the fourth and fifth satires. In Satire V, the student controls the 
negotiation of dialogue, encomium, and diatribe in this, the longest of the poems; this control puts 
him in a position of ideological strength from which to make his final renunciation in the sixth 
satire. The seeds of Plato’s own problematization of the philosopher-youth relationships in 
Alcibiades continue to germinate in the fifth satire; another Platonic question, the value of praise 
genres, which emerges from among dialogues such as Symposium, Lysis, and Menexenus presents 
a further problem for Persius’ Socratic relationship. 
 Satire V, like Satires III and IV, has standardly (if loosely) been identified as a 
“dialogue”,242 but as with those poems, Persius uses interruption and response as one of several 
ways of destabilizing the philosophical lessons transmitted. In this, the longest of his satires, the 
diversity of genres includes his characteristic take on (or display of) Stoic diatribe but also the 
philosophically unsound and destabilizing genre of encomium. Persius’ engagement with Platonic 
and Socratic questions is profound, but rather than solely lending authority to the piece, the 
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summoning of that body of thought in fact undermines the virtues of his philosophical relationship 
with the Stoic teacher Cornutus’ and the putative project of teaching libertas. At the end of this 
rapid cycling through genres of speaking and persuading, which frequently utterly diverts and even 
thwarts ethical progress, the pedagogical labor of Persius’ “Socrates” is shown to be fruitless in 
the context of the overriding dynamic[s] of Romans and (or over) Greeks. Persius is demonstrating 
the ways in which his practice flouts Socratic and philosophic convention, this time not first 
through diatribe, but rather through encomium. 
 Recognizing that Satire IV is not a dialogue enables a more flexible reading that may make 
sense of Persius’ manipulations of philosophical discourses. He invokes the dialogue in a form that 
plays with dialogue but is not a dialogue, ironically and even tendentiously so. Satire IV transmits 
a great deal about philosophy—but not what Stoicism wishes us to recall: eroticism, confusion, a 
confrontational Socrates. Satire V shows that ethical pedagogy is an exercise in futility.  
Shadi Bartsch has gestured towards some of these similarities and allusions to the 
Alcibiades-Socrates encounters in Plato’s dialogues but sees Persius’ appropriation of the 
quintessential and problematic Platonic relationship as de-sexualizing and de-problematizing, 
which is to say, humorless. For her, the relation of Satires IV and V to the Alcibiades and Platonic 
corpus more generally is one of revision and pointed transcendence. On her argument, Persius’ 
choice of a model of education represented in Alcibiades indicates the satirist’s approval of the 
educational practice on display on the dialogue: Persius’ own experience of pedagogy (and, 
implicitly, the project of Roman Stoicism) is new and improved. Bartsch’s Persius condemns 
Plato’s erotic metaphors and over-sexed Socrates (whom she identified as the sun-tanner) “in the 
service of a less compromised and purer philosophical stance.” Xenophon, she points out, 




and gaster, against the charge of sexual corruption; and Xenophon himself admitted that Socrates 
might have ensured Alcibiades’ capacity for sophrosune before discussing politics. Persius, like 
Xenophon, revises Alcibiades in Satire IV and proposes “a new, desexualized, and particularly 
Stoic model” for pedagogy in philosophy in Satire V to replace the erotic dialectic of the Platonic 
Socrates. 243  
But Persius’ engagement with the Platonic corpus is subversive in ways that Plato himself 
anticipated. It is not the case that the philosopher may not be a figure of fun.244 Satire IV’s treatment 
of dialogue parodies and (thus) theorizes that genre; and Satire V’s treatment of the teacher then 
involves “Cornutus” in the problems set up in Satire IV. For all of the pre-determined Stoic 
principles here related (libertas, 73, ratio 96, 119, sapiens, 114, publica lex, 98, natura, 98, 
ius…sui, 176,245 and The Right, recti, 121), Cornutus’ own teaching may be viewed as hazardous. 
From the perspective of authorship, whereas in Satire IV Persius’ philosopher staged the dialogue 
and played all the roles, in Satire V Persius steals the show, playing not only the young 
speechifying Alcibiades but also playing Plato.  
Laughter is not entirely outside of the philosophical project, either. Laughter is part of the 
Platonic project. Plato himself—through Alcibiades—offers us ways to laugh at Socrates. He is a 
Silenus. He has a thing for attractive young men. He creepily follows you around. This is not to 
laugh solely at Socrates, of course: Alcibiades makes himself utterly ridiculous in these scenes, 
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244 Bartsch (2012: 218) has said that for Persius, the “Stoic philosopher is not a figure of fun,” recalling 
Plaza’s assertion that laughter in satire is generally authorized with the exception of laughter directed at the 
philosopher in Persius. See Plaza (2006: 232).  
 




too—this strapping, godly young man practically apoplectic—though still able to rant—at the mere 
sight of some below average borderline pervert.  
 Persius ends his fifth satire with laughter and an admission of the pointlessness of the 
discourse he has been advertising.  The final poem will pursue this literary self-destruction. If we 
start from the evident premiss that the last satire is part of the book of which it is, manifestly, a 
structurally crucial part, what is there in it that “book ends,” so to speak, the text? To begin with, 
Persius starts all over with the question of inspiration. He is fully embodied at this point and that 
embodiment takes over from the book. The sixth satire is a letter; the book is in a new form, 
ready to go out into the world, like Ovid’s little Tristia. It is the finally “packaging” of the 
satires. But what does any of this have to do Satire V? The reopening of the question of 
inspiration seems to come from the Prologue but it also comes from the fifth satire. In the fifth 
satire, poetic convention and inspiration turned out poorly for philosophical speech. All things 
Greek are a dime a dozen, anyway. So Persius removes to the western coast and wraps up his 




CHAPTER SEVEN: The Birdman lives on (Satire VI) 
This chapter establishes the place of the final satire within the structure of the libellus, an epistolary 
satire which revisits and meaningfully develops topoi from the earlier poems, making it a 
retrospective of sorts.246 Importantly, the poem recycles thematic elements—major and minor—
with which Persius built his libellus: his recusatio from the league of inspired poets; characters 
and stock-types; mercenariness; his own and other poets’ somatic markers; plant vs. animal foods; 
fear for the fate of his work. Topoi from the literary-critical oriented prologue and first satire are 
reformulated in the sixth satire’s interest in literary survival through manifest thematic, structural, 
and aural resonances. The poem is contextualized in a tradition of literature on the twin themes of 
poetic inspiration and poetic survival. Finally, we shall see how the fate of the earlier poems is 
crucially bound up in the fate of the present poem. 
As many have observed, though perhaps overstated, the poet restrains his discourse in a 
“Horatian” manner. But such relative restraint lasts only until the poem’s end, where we read an 
envoi as obscene, aggressive, and joking as anything we have encountered in the earlier poems, 
rivaling even the graphic, sexually explicit language of Satires I and IV.  Persius’ apparent revision 
to his manner of speaking is short-lived. The concluding line of the satire is characteristic of his 
style in earlier satires; the obscene diatribist is resurrected.  
  The satire provides a direct reference to Ennius in a quotation of his satire and the last look 
at his dream.  The allusion to Ennius’ dream of Homer that opened the first poem (Prol. 1-6) is 
revisited and revised by the quotation of Ennius that opens the last poem (Sat. VI.9-11); the trope 
that opened the Prologue comes back in the sixth satire and therefore frames the entire book. 
Ennius reappears not as the lampooned epicist but rather as the awakened satirist through a 
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quotation that Persius uses to let his reader—whether the addressee, Bassus, or the so-called “over-
reader” —know where he is. This has much greater significance than has been previously allowed: 
(1) to quote Ennius is to redeem him from his own epic pretension and (2) to show that Ennius 
awakes from his fantasy, is also to give him that afterlife which he desired and asserted for 
himself—as part of satire. For Persius, Ennius qua epicist is dead, but Ennius qua satirist lives on.  
 Persius allows for the survival of the elder satirist early in this poem even as he comes to 
disavow his interest in survival. The significance of Persius’ rejection of Pythagorean survival is 
all the greater because the emergent project of the sixth satire is to address the question of his 
legacy, therefore, his death. Through the Ennian peacock, Persius suggests Pythagorean 
interpretations of his book, probing the limits of his own literary afterlife. Ennius is reintroduced 
along with his characteristic body part, the heart, an organ that completes Persius’ somatic theory 
of literature. The return of diatribe in the last stages of the poem reintegrates it stylistically with 
the graphic images of the central poems—food, fat, sex.  
 
Life Issues 
The critical commonplaces on the sixth satire are perplexing, but so entrenched that they are worth 
mentioning: the sixth satire is unrelated to the rest of the book; the sixth satire retreats from the 
satirical mode; the sixth satire is a truncated poem; the sixth satire is truncated because of the early 
death of the poet.  One of the reasons for this style of interpretation of the sixth satire is the alleged 
evidence of its unfinishedness presented in the Vita, which contains information of varying degrees 
of credibility. In order to assess this, it becomes necessary to deal with what the Vita tells us more 
broadly. The Vita contains several types of information which we might distinguish and assess 




historical events, others general or conventional enough possibly to have emerged from generic 
conventions from the lives of poets. Unique to Persius’ biography are details such as dates of birth 
and death (4 December 34 and 24 November 62, Vit. 1-3), birth place (Volaterrae,), social status 
(equestrian), location of his property (Vit. 4-6), extraordinary composition of his library (Vit. 38-
39), sums of testamentary disbursements (Vit. 35-39), the composition of his family (father’s early 
death; female relatives including Arria, stepfather, Vit. 7-9 and 32-34), intellectual associates 
(Remmius Palaemon, grammaticus, Verginius Flavus, rhetor, Caesius Bassus and Calpurnius 
Statura, poetae, Cornutus, tragicus,247 and through him Servilius Nonianus, Lucan, fellow auditor 
Cornuti, Claudius Agathinus, medicus, Petronius Aristocrates of Magnesia, and, finally, Thrasea 
Paetus, with whom he traveled abroad, Vit. 10-31). Even here, however, the labeling of Cornutus 
as tragicus (Vit. 29) is confusing at best, and perhaps evidence against the Vita’s reliability or 
interpolation. I also add to this “unique” category qualitative information that is not deducible from 
the text of the Satires, such as Persius’ reverence of Servilius Nonianus ut patrem (Vit. 17), his 
colleague Lucan’s over-the-top (i.e. Lucanian) amazement at Persius’ poemata (Vit. 20-22), his 
emulation of Agathinus and Aristocrates (Vit. 24-28), his disregard of Seneca (Vit. 23), his sense 
of pietas in respect of his mother, sister, and aunt (Vit. 32-34). Some personal qualities, however, 
begin to bridge the area between the particular and the literary. That he was morum lenissimorum 
is probably not deducible from the bitter poems, for example; but that he was moral and chaste 
(fuit frugi, pudicus, Vit. 32-34) might well be so, from the many lines inveighing against the habits 
of others.  
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wrote tragedies; it is not inconceivable, but it is unlikely, that Cornutus did, too. See Boys-Stones 




On the other hand, his manner of writing et raro et tarde (Vit. 41) might well be entirely 
deduced from the impressions of the grumbling poet late to his writing desk in the morning of 
Satire III and even from the statement si forte quid aptius exit,/ quando haec rara auis est, si quid 
tamen aptius exit (Sat. I, 45-46). Indeed, Lefkowitz has argued at length that ancient biographies 
of the poets are mythicizing forms of the poets’ own first person stances.248 The study of biography 
does reveal the structures of the genre, with its own mythic models. Other literary claims in the 
Vita might well be, if not wholly constructed, at least assimilated to biographical conventions about 
poets—inspiration from a predecessor (in this case Lucilius) and posthumous editing (in this case 
by Cornutus and Bassus, two of his three named addressees).  
The Vita has perhaps unduly influenced the interpretation of Satire VI because it has raised 
the specter of posthumous editing and intervention, even total rearrangement, given the early death 
of the poet. The Vita says that the liber was left imperfectus at Persius’ death (Vit. 41-42) and that 
it was tightened up, lightly, by Cornutus before publication by Bassus (leuiter contraxit Cornutus 
et Caesio Basso, petenti ut ipse ederet, tradidit edendum, Vit. 43-44). This has been taken to mean 
that Cornutus removed parts from Satire VI; this is possible, but also part of the tradition in poetic 
biographies of posthumous editing by friends and literary heirs, as with Vergil and Varius, so 
Suetonius tells us, or Lucretius and Cicero, supposed by Jerome. But the degree to which the poems 
were “unfinished” and the degree to which Cornutus “abridged” the text are entirely open to 
interpretation, however. Imperfectus may not refer to the last poem alone or it may just as well 
refer to some turn of phrase or half-lines.  
The other strand of the Vita’s presentation of the sixth satire (which is in more than one 
way a farewell to vita—the depiction of Persius as virtue hero—also deserves reconsideration. 
                                                          





Credence in this uirginalis poeta not only skews the way we think about the poet but also limits 
what we notice about a particular poem. In the case of the sixth satire it facilitates a blind eye to 
the poem’s obscene end and an overemphasis on symptoms of the poet’s reformation – something 
that has been commonplace throughout the scholarship, leading to the idea of the sixth satire as 
somehow separate from the rest of the book.  
 
Critical Background 
“The satiric program described by Persius in the first part of the satire is complete by the end of 
the fifth.”249 Morford repeats the worn idea that the satire has been truncated and then offers 
evidence precisely to the contrary, observing that the final reference to Chrysippus in VI forms a 
ring with the opening of the piece: “Persius’s use of the acervus (“heap”) to end his satire is 
brilliant” because, he says, the Stoic paradox forms a ring with the lines of Epicurean moderation 
at the beginning of the poem.250 For her part, Bartsch explains the contents of her monograph thus: 
“Even satire 6 is left aside as nonrepresentative of the project of satires 1–5; its epistolary form, 
its imagery, the change in its tone, all mark it as part of a new direction—perhaps one cut short by 
Persius’ fatal stomach ache of 62 CE.”251  
Statements like the above can rest only on a reading of the poem’s first several lines, which 
set a relatively tranquil tone; nonetheless aggression is incipient soon after and is in full force by 
the poem’s end. It is possible that the neglect of the poem’s close represents the last frontier of 
prudishness. After a methodical close reading of the bulk of the satire, Morford elides Persius’ 
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most obscene lines 61-74 with a restrained one-sentence paraphrase.252 The biting end seems to 
play no role in the interpretation of the poem that it concludes.  
Dan Hooley did see fit to include the poem in his monograph, where it is paired with Satire 
IV. Hooley reads the epistolary and lyrical opening of Satire VI as a “denouement” from the heady 
obscenity of the fourth satire. While previous scholars interpreted the poem as a genial variation 
on a genial Horatian exemplar, Epistle II, 2, Hooley notes the “inconcinnity” of Persius’ attack on 
his heir and uses that observation as an opportunity to re-evaluate how the poem’s supposedly 
moderate opening is related to Horace.253 While the lyric language in which Persius describes his 
addressee, the lyricist Caesius Bassus, is unquestionably Horatian (much of it from Epistle II, 2), 
the context of Persius’ adaptation should discomfit Bassus. In that epistle, Horace goes on to limit 
the value of lyric aesthetics; by composing lyrics himself, Bassus, Hooley argues, “has not listened 
to his master.” Bassus’ position as Persius’ fellow is thus ironized – he is not a true disciple of 
Horace. The satirist, by contrast, has done a more thorough reading of their shared predecessor; 
the allusions to the epistle that he applies to himself reflect ethical rather than aesthetic 
considerations, showing off his deeper understanding. His is a morally sounder choice of object 
for mimesis than Bassus’; he is the disciple who has performed the rigorous close reading of 
Horace, who is able to produce a poem that reflects the tensions between satire and letter, theory 
and practice.254 Hooley’s interpretation is one way of moving us away from the idea that the sixth 
satire is broken-backed and out of place, suggesting that Persius is using his final poem to 
contemplate his own place in the Roman satiric and poetic tradition. As we look in more detail at 
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Persius’ allusions to Horace, his invocation of Ennius and his final, searing return to invective 
form, we can get to the heart of Persius’ considered, complex sign-off from satire.  
 
Digest 
Winter. Have you retreated yet to your hearth, my friend? The opening lines are addressed to the 
lyric poet (Caesius) Bassus. The addressee is conspicuously absent and Satire VI is thus an 
epistolary poem. These lines suggest that this book of satires has become a letter to another 
contemporary “Horace,” perhaps a more mature “answer” to the variations on the Sermones that 
have preceded this poem. Persius asks after Bassus’ hibernation and song making, and lets him 
know that he himself is safely tucked away in Liguria. Both writers have withdrawn from city life 
and are engaging in poetic activity. This Bassus was the only Latin lyricist after Horace (perhaps) 
worthy of mention, Quintilian tells us (Inst. Orat. X, 1.96). Bassus, therefore, appropriately winters 
at a Sabine hearth (1). To prove his credentials and virtuosity (he is an opifex),255 he strums his 
lyre in a way that is Roman, i.e. masculine (marem strepitum fidis intendisse Latinae, 4; egregius 
lusisse senex, 6) yet Greek,256 i.e. subtle, (numeris ueterum primordia uocum, 3), mournful 
(tetrico… pectine) and yet humorous (iuuenes agitare iocos, 6).257 An honorable figure, his 
character allows him to traverse the range of these modalities without being at risk of turning into 
one of the Greekish hyacinthine poets of the first satire.  
                                                          
255 We might see a shade of irony in the construction opifex…intendisse (4), which recalls the artifex sequi 
(Prol. 11). 
 
256 Ennius, who will appear shortly, was called egregius poeta by Cicero (Tusc. Disp. III, 45). 
 
257 Rudd (2008: 378, n. 2) concurs with Jahn (1843) and Braund (2004) that the better reading is mox iuuenes 
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Clausen’s reading). The poetic effect on Rudd’s reading is a reference to Roman comedy’s typical targeting 




 The opening lines are tuned to Horace, the Horace of the odes. Rudd observes that here the 
Augustan poet’s lyric diction surfaces and, strikingly, that uiuunt marks the survival of lyric poetry, 
the first glimpse of a topic—literary legacy—that will involve much of the poem.258 The verses’ 
musical temperament is modulated through lyra, pectine, and chordae (2), numeris (3), fidis (4), 
and pollice (5). Persius also winters in Horace’s lyric world with some subtle exchanges of 
meaning, for example what it means to winter (hibernatque meum mare, VI.7; cf. Hor. Serm. II, 
2.2.17 hiemat mare). Even his choice of location, the Ligus ora (6) is perfectly melodic: the space 
he occupies is Liguria, and also λιγύς. A good place, in short, for a Muse or a lyre (λίγεια μὲν 
Μοῖσ’ ἀφα, Pi. Fr. 52o; φόρμιγγι λιγείῃ, Hom. Il. IX.186, et passim). Plato played a similar 
etymological game, once: ἄγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι’ ᾠδῆς εἶδος λίγειαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν 
τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετ’ ἐπωνυμίαν (Phaedr. 237a).  
Persius describes his present location—Come, get to know Moon Bay!—by quoting line 9 
apparently from Ennius; these are words of the heart of Ennius awakening from his Pythagorean 
dream of Homer qua peacock.259 (We will return to the significance of Ennius further on.) We are 
sent back to the Prologue by line 11: Maeonides Quintus pauone ex Pythagoreo, where dreamed-
up inspiration and a birdlike poet are served up at once. Here in Luna is where he is unbothered by 
the crowd (securus uolgi, 12; securus, 13), again as Hooley points out, a Horatian pose; the lyric 
mode persists for another moment: he is unconcerned by the unpredictable (quid praeparet auster/ 
infelix pecori, 12-13). Even if—and here we get a hint of the satirist within—the rabble enrich 
themselves, he’d reject concerns about what they’re doing. We’ve seen this Persius before: in Sat. 
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I. 40-49, Persius refused to care what the crowd might think of his poetry and to desire their praise. 
Here, Persius perseveres in refusing to have anything to do with hoi polloi. From his formal 
recusatio in the Prologue to his continual recusals (I.5-7, 41, 48), recusare is a very Persius thing 
to do and he’ll do it till his last breath—a moment that is about to be more vividly on the horizon 
than ever before. He wouldn’t even care if everyone of lower status should acquire wealth greater 
than his—still even then, he wouldn’t stop enjoying life; safely away in his retreat, he refuses to 
shrivel up over social degradation, or to dine without condiments and have only a whiff of wine 
(adeo omnes/ ditescant orti peioribus, usque recusem/ curuus ob id minui senio aut cenare sine 
uncto/ et signum in uapida naso tetigisse lagoena, 15-17). The new moderation and reasonable 
indulgence that he allows himself is concomitant with his turn away from the aggressive persona 
of much of the earlier satires. Similar to his admission of grease to his plate, he allows himself 
pleasure, too. His assertion of security belies the fact that Persius is nevertheless very much 
noticing changing conditions and girding for the possibility that those of humble origins are hot 
on his aristocratic heels; indeed, just how close they are to succeeding him will shortly become the 
subject of the poem.  
It is only natural that someone is bound to disagree with his careless attitude, since infinite 
variation and disagreement are possible: a single birthday, he observes, produces people of 
different dispositions in spite of their shared birthsign; here he plays on the double meaning of 
gemini: even twins may have a varo genio (18-19); remember his special relationship with 
Cornutus (Sat. V.47-51). One, a miser, only takes out the oil and pepper for his cabbages on 
birthdays; while another even as a boy liberally applies a tooth to his ample store (19-22). The 
banal crowd still represents ill judgment, but now that is ill-conceived abstemiousness. Dry 




of Persius’ resolve to enjoy his own estate includes not to live lavishly as a show off (22-24); he’ll 
enjoy himself without turning into a snob (nec tenuis sollers turdarum nosse saliuas, 24). Persius 
likes words like sollers (V.37 and 5.14; VI.24, VI.75) and uafer, “key words,” but—Cornutus’ 
craftiness notwithstanding—cleverness is not in itself a virtue for the satirist. The miser is uafer, a 
word used of the dumb joker (I.132) but also of Horace (I.116).  In Satire I, Horace was clever at 
ribbing a friend just in the right place; in Satire V, Cornutus was tricky with pedagogy. Here, sollers 
describes the gourmand who is expert at distinguishing among flavors of the delicacies before him. 
What you are expert at, what you take time to discern, is an important question for Persius, as we 
have seen and shall see. It was the crucial point in Satire IV. But the poet’s last look at cleverness 
seem indifferent to its value. Also, we have read about saliva before as a bodily response in Satire 
V (112) and it made its filmy appearance in the mouths of disdained poets and grandmothers (I.104, 
II.33), whose parochialism is thus contracted by the foodie. Everyone’s vice looks the same and 
has the same symptoms as every other person’s vice, whether a sophisticated urbanite or 
provincial. 
 In lines 25-26 he finally turns to an anonymous (diatribic) addressee: live, use your goods in 
proportion to your bounty—but remember, there will always be a new harvest.  It’s OK—fas—to 
eat the contents of your pantry. Fas has been a loaded issue for Persius in this book (I.8, 61, 119; 
II.73; III.69; V.98, 122). But its last instantiation, in the poem of this less intense Persius, is not 
existential, philosophical, or political. It’s just that you’re allowed to eat what you’ve got. “What 
could you be afraid of?” (26). The naufragus whom we encountered in Satire I returns. There he 
was disdained and rejected by the satirist for the quality of his destitute, streetsinging verse:  cantet 
si naufragus, assem/ protulerim? cantas, cum fracta te in trabe pictum/ ex umero portes? (“If a 




you on a broken mast?” Sat. I.88-90). In Satire VI the sailor returns, but here the satirist imagines 
him as a friend to be saved from desperation:  trabe rupta Bruttia saxa/ prendit amicus 
inops…largire inopi, ne pictus oberret/ caerulea in tabula, (“His mast busted, a down-and-out 
friend takes the Bruttian rocks… give something to the pauper, lest he wander about painted on 
the blue picture,” Sat. VI.27-28 and 32-33). A new thought for satire: Be merciful. Perhaps Persius 
really has changed! Give the poor pauper some land. So you spend down some of the estate: Who 
cares whether an heir might give you a low-cost funeral in retaliation for your “excesses” (Sat. 
VI.33-37)?  
Someone bestial (bestius) blames the whole problem of excess and indigence on the 
Greeks—whether trained in philosophy or gourmanderie. This Bestius is a Horatian character (Ep. 
I, 15.37) but also reminiscent of a Persian centurion, a member of the goatly tribe (de gente hircosa 
centurionum, Sat. III.77), who pointed out the chewing and lunching habits of learned Greeks—
Arcesilas, Solon —and declared quod sapio satis est mihi (Sat. III.78). But there’s a twist here: 
This Bestius is making the sort of criticism that Persius himself might have made before: Roman 
manhood has yielded to too-soft taste. His diction and syntax are even Persius-like:  
…ita fit; postquam sapere urbi 
cum pipere et palmis uenit nostrum hoc maris expers,260  
fenisecae crasso uitiarunt unguine pultes. (Sat. VI. 38-40) 
“That’s the way it happens; after this, our in-the-know, came to the 
city with its pepper and dates, haycutters ruin their oatmeal with 
thick oil.”  
 
cf. tum cum ad canitiem et nostrum istud uiuere triste 
aspexi ac nucibus facimus quaecumque relictis,  
cum sapimus patruos. (Sat. I. 8-11) 
“Then, when I’ve looked upon our grays and this, our sad being alive 
and whatever it is we do once games are left behind, when we smack 
of uncles…”  
and  
                                                          




haec fierent si testiculi uena ulla paterni 
uiueret in nobis? summa delumbe saliua  
hoc natat in labris et in udo est Maenas et Attis 
nec pluteum caedit nec demorsos sapit unguis.  
 
“Would these things happen so if any vein of our fathers’ balls 
survived in us? This castrated bit floats atop saliva on the lips and in 
the damp is Maenas and Attis, he neither bangs the desk nor tastes 
bitten-down nails.”  
 
The railings of Persius’ interlocutors in this satire—against spice and “taste,” against the 
effeminate, against care for the naufragus—are the types of criticism that Persius himself might 
have offered in the earlier poems. As we gear up for the poem’s blistering end, the satirist has come 
to his more reasonable senses—reformed (albeit in another guise?)! 
Should he fear posthumous consequences, what happens beyond the ash (41)? With lines 
26 and 37, this is the third time fear of the consequences of expenditure is raised. This time Persius 
makes the addressee of his reply specific—it’s his heir—and then again anonymous—whoever 
he’ll be—emphasizing the reversal by enjambement (at tu, meus heres,/ quisquis eris, 41-42). 
Listen up: Haven’t you heard that expenses are now required to celebrate Caesar’s victory? The 
cold ash is being swept away for new sacrifices and games (43-49). Answers the earlier question—
what happens beyond the grave?—with an image of utter carelessness: ashes to ashes. Persius will 
spend on that, too, and take no objections from the heir as he puts on a show, dispensing oil and 
meat-pie (50), a picture quite opposite to his moralizing anti-meatplatter vegan offering that closes 
the second satire. Just try and stop him, too: there’s a pile of stones next to him—in other words, 
he has weapons at hand.261 This is the point at which Persius’ enlightened generosity becomes an 
act of aggression.  
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 And if he has no heir to fill in the place of quisquis? Family all run out? There’s always 
someone at hand to fill in (Sat. VI. 52-56). A cunning beggar (Manius) approaches and weaves a 
line of descent in order to make a claim to the estate—Persius has finally been shown his uncle—
a man of the soil.262 
 
The Satire Strikes Back 
“Why are you demanding the baton while it’s still my turn?”  
 
(qui prior es, cur me in decursu lampada poscis? 60-61)  
 
The shift from more or less sanguine life advice to taunting attack picks up speed. Back off: Persius 
isn’t dead yet. We have been misled to think that the aggressive Persius is on the wane, but his 
afterlife turns out to be just as aggressive as his first go. The return of the obscure satirist is more 
vengeful and less didactic than ever before. His heir demands the torch too early in the relay race 
(61). “I am your Money God, just like you’ve seen him in the paintings.” This apotheosis is a new 
role for the mercurial poet, the final complement to the mysterious semipaganus of the Prologue 
who was a spleen in Satire I and then overwhelmingly body in Satire III. Now Mercury, Persius is 
playing the role of temptation. Before, you might just happen to stumble upon a nummus on the 
road of satire and have to gulp back your saliuam Mercurialem in order to ward off a visible drool 
(V.112). Now it is Persius who deliberately jingles the money bag before you in a test that you 
will never pass. You, now, are a compilation of all the variously mercenary interlocutors and 
targets, the hypocrite buying off the gods (II.29), the trader chasing profit across the seas (V.132-
150), the birdie eyeing the glint of the coin (Prol. 12). Think he shouldn’t be wasting wealth on 
what we know (from Satire II) to be inane rituals? Try and stop him. He dares you. Want to know 
                                                          
 




what’s left in the storehouse? Watch him pour it out: nunc nunc inpensius ungue,/ ungue puer 
caules (“now, now, thickly pour, pour it on my cabbage, boy,” VI.68-69). It’s a spiteful move. We 
know that Persius prefers a lighter dish; he disapproves of oils and oiliness in general (cf. IV.17-
18 and 33; II.29-30). But he’d rather pour out the oil than to gratify his ever watchful heir. 
 The heir complains about the diminishment of the estate. He’ll get whatever he gets, is 
Mercurius’ reply (VI.64-65). The complaints of the heir only egg Persius on to drown his 
heretofore healthy vegetables in oil. His register is sinking even faster to the satiric. The style of 
his final provocations (nunc nunc inpensius ungue/, ungue, VI.68-69) mimic his invective best hits 
(e.g. tunc tunc…, Sat. I.11; nunc nunc properandus…, Sat. III.23-24). His turn to decadence turns 
out to tick off his heir as much as living in enlightened Horatian moderation does. He’ll use 
anything as ammunition against his new fictive foe, even adopting what he openly despises (e.g. 
lactibus unctis, Sat. II.30; opimum/pingue, Sat. III.32-3, etc.) if it will increase terror—nothing is 
off-limits now. Persius again modifies his earlier take on the best proportions of vegetable to 
animal—no off-cuts for him (69-70). In spite of his recommendations of salutary beets, cabbages, 
and the like in the earlier satires, Persius has turned out to be no vegetarian at all in this poem. This 
is provides a nice lifestyle analogue to his literary rejection of Pythagoreanism, in which the 
philosopher advised that we lay off the meat lest we eat a relative (Met. XV.174-175). If we rid our 
poetics of Pythagorean literature, let’s rid ourselves of Pythagorean vegetarianism, too.  
 The behavior and thoughts and judgments of others won’t lead him to tread more carefully 
or to write more pleasantly but rather to do the opposite. The smoked ear (fissa fumosum sinciput 
aure) of VI.70 brings us back around to the steamed ear that was so important in Satire I (uaporata 




breath, Persius unleashes a boiled-down best hits of his most explicit, vulgar satire. Should he eat 
such paltry meats so…  
ut tuus iste nepos olim satur anseris extis,     
cum morosa uago singultiet inguine uena, 
patriciae inmeiat uoluae? mihi trama figurae  
sit reliqua, ast illi tremat omento popa uenter? (Sat. VI.71-74) 
 
“…that one day, stuffed with goose livers, some prodigal grandson 
of yours can take a whizz in lady flaps whenever the fickle vein of 
his dissolute groin may let go a sob? Should I be left with a cobweb 
for a figure, but his sponge of a stomach jiggle with fat?”   
 
If we were wondering where Hipponax had gone, we now have our answer. This final sausage fest 
makes this the iambicist’s re-reincarnation. Persius’ basest images have returned: the 
outstandingly fat potbelly (pinguis aqualiculus propenso sesquipede extet, Sat. I.57), a good 
pissing off (extra/ meiite, Sat. I.113-114), the parade of privates—some lexically identical (uoluas, 
IV.36; inguinibus, IV.38, testiculi uena, I.103), others implied (intima, I.20, penemque arcanaque 
lumbi, IV.35, etc.). So much for reform of Persius’ poetics, the “change in its tone,” and “new 
direction.” If Persius is succumbing to his “fatal stomach ache,” he’ll leave us on (and in) his 
terms.263 What type of inheritance will Persius leave? Whatever he wants—and less, to spite his 
heir. For us that means, he’ll leave less than Horace did—less generic variety, so few lines that 
they’re incompressible (quite apart from being incomprehensible).  
Of course satur for the grandson is important. We’ve seen stuffed dishes before—vividly 
in the greasy meat platters and fatty offerings of the satire on prayer (pulmone et lactibus unctis, 
II.30; tuccetaque crassa, II.42; omenta, II.47; extis et opimo, II.48)—and we’ve seen the 
metaphorical dishes and dumplings (escas, Sat. I.22, offas, Sat. V.5) that a poet might cook up for 
the likes of Romulidae saturi (Sat. I.31). The poet leaves us with the chockfull platter of the genre: 
                                                          




the platter of foods that apocryphally provided the metaphor for the vulgar, distasteful miscellany 
characteristic of Roman satire. Persius has loaded his heir with the ugliest bits of satire; the heir 
will be a walking satura now. Persius has moved from commenting on ugly things to creating an 
ugly thing. As another (if less smooth) Alcibiades he sells himself (uende animam lucro, mercare 
atque excute sollers omne latus mundi, “sell your soul for profit, make a trade, and clever shake 
down every part of the world, VI. 75-76; cf. penemque arcanaque lumbi/ runcantem populo 
marcentes pandere uuluas, IV.36) as he wanders through the world clever (that key word sollers, 
again) at gaining as much as profit as possible—not unlike that prefatory bird poet), buying Greeks 
who are requisitely fat (Cappadocas…pinguis, VI.77). The heir imagines himself to be amassing 
his estate (doubling, quadrupling, tentupling, VI.78-9), but is himself an amassing of satirical 
properties, overeating, oversexed, overambitious. He adopts the linguistic ticks of the genre to 
which he belongs: repetition and imperative (iam… iam…/ iam… depunge VI.78-79; cf. nunc 
nunc, III.23; nunc nunc…ungue/ungue; VI.68), abuse of philosophy (Chrysippe, 80). 
 Chrysippe is Persius’ last breath, too—his encyclopedic and laborious philosophy. His heir 
frantically invests and endlessly compiles to his wealth as a never-ending exercise in the logical 
puzzle of defining “heap” (aceruus, σωρίτης).264 The poet offers his fellow Stoics their own 
famous paradox converted into an endless piling of death, sex, and money. If seemed that the line 
of attack that he would choose from among his embarassment of critiques would be literary self-




                                                          




Ennius, always a Classic 
The appearance of Ennius towards the beginning of this satire is clearly a crucial moment for 
Persius’ exploration of poetry generally and satire particularly. It recalls both Ennian satire itself 
and also the invocations of Ennius in Persius’ other satiric predecessor, Horace. Having set the 
stage with nods to the Horatian Ennius, Persius can go on to build his own interpretation of that 
this great Roman poetic forebear means for his own work. After his epistolary opening, Persius 
tells Bassus that he’s in Liguria. He next returns us to the central motif of the Prologue, poetic 
inspiration:  
‘Lunai portum, est operae, cognoscite, ciues.’ 
cor iubet hoc Enni, postquam destertuit esse 
Maeonides Quintus pauone ex Pythagoreo. (Sat. VI.9-11) 
 
“Get to know the port of Luna, citizens, it’s worth your while.” This 
is what the heart of Ennius commands, after Quintus has snored 
away being Maeonides out of the Pythagorean peacock. 
 
Hooley has suggested that Ennius’ awakening is a gentle nudge to Bassus that he exit his own lyric 
fantasy.265 It is also a reflection on his own fantasies. Indeed, in these lines, Persius re-opens the 
theme of epic-poetic inspiration that we recently saw most roundly rejected in Satire V. The idea 
has been an important one from the start however: in the Prologue, Persius rejected inspiration—
whether emanating from Muse or Stomach. Included amid that prefatory density of allusion to 
poets and their sources was the tradition surrounding Ennius. That tradition is multiple, and, since 
we no longer have the Ennius, not likely to be recoverable. It is not disputed that in his Annales 
Ennius reported that he, sleeping on a mountain, was approached by Homer, who informed him of 
their metempsychotic bond: Ennius, epic poet, bore the soul of Homer himself. The secondary 
strain, reflected in and perhaps arising from Lucretius and Propertius, says that Ennius drank from 
                                                          





the spring of the Muses on Helicon.266 A third, peculiar variant has Ennius’ Homer appearing after 
a metempsychotic life in the form of a peacock. It is of course the most peculiar path that our 
peculiar poet has pursued.  
The origin of Lunai portum… has been debated. The scholiast and Jahn attribute it to the 
Annales, the latter observing the epicizing cor which Persius offers as the verse’s source. Perhaps 
more astute, however, is Housman’s observation on its style: a call to attention like cognoscite, 
ciues is more characteristic of satirical and, as we saw in Chapter One in “Hipponax’s” 
Ἀκούσαθ’…ὦ]νδρες οἳ νῦν (Iamb. 1.1 and 6), of more generally invective style.267 The diatribist 
of Persius’ own third satire uses the address: discite et, o miseri,… cognoscite (Sat. III.66). But 
there is a patent difference in register: Gowers observes that cor, though it appears frequently 
throughout the fragments of Ennius, does not appear in the extant satirical fragments, whose body 
parts incline towards the mouth and foot.268 In other words, our satirist has paired a satirical 
fragment with a pointedly epic identification. Both Jahn and Housman can be right in this way: 
Housman does not have to disavow cor as epic (which it is) in order for cognoscite to be satirical 
(which it is). Regardless of the actual relative dating of Ennius’ works, Persius clearly seems to 
imagine that his satirical predecessor had some resurrection from his epic delusion. Persius uses 
the verse of an awakened Ennius, the Ennius who has snorted himself to back to life and his lucid 
persona (destertuit) after a Homeric dream. Unlike the epicist to whom the Prologue alluded, the 
satirist is useable by Persius.  
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267 Housman (1934: 50-51) argues that the scholiast’s comment need not imply attribution to the Annales. 
In any case, Housman writes, “even if he or any other authority did assign it to the annals, we should be 
bound to disbelieve him.”  
 




And yet it is not merely that Persius can use the verse of a satirical, post-delusion poet. 
Notice in particular the way in which Ennius wakes up from his fantasy: destertuit. We’ve seen a 
satirist snoozing in this libellus before—crabby Persius himself, who opened the third satire 
snoring off a hard Falernian (stertimus, indomitum quod despumare Falernum/ sufficiat, Sat. III.3-
4). In one of his many self-serving literary histories, Horace reminds us that poets like to drink—
are better, even, when drunk. Ennius, he says, hit the bottle especially hard when writing epic 
(Ennius ipse pater numquam nisi potus ad arma/ prosiluit dicenda, Epist. I, 19.7-8). In Satire III, 
Persius pulled the curtain back on his own “process,” and he does now for Ennius pater, too: 
Ennius, arriving late to this libellus, well after early birds Lucilius and Horace (Sat. I.115-118), 
turns out to have been sleeping off what looks very much like a hangover, in the style of his satirical 
successor.  
Why Ennius in this form? The line quoted (9) is plainly satirical, perhaps even diatribic in 
that it faces its contemporaries. Foundational Ennius occupies a nice locus for a poet seeking to 
situate himself in a literary tradition; Persius’ choice of this otherwise somewhat unremarkable line 
to describe his place is thus perhaps doubly motivated. Horace had recalled Ennius as a figure in 
the literary tradition subject to critique by subsequent poets such as Lucilius and also, by extension, 
himself (Serm. I, 10.54-55). Similarly, Lucretius establishes his superiority over his generic 
predecessor by exhibiting his “superior knowledge of dreams, visions, and death”—precisely the 
sites upon which Ennius had predicated his Annales; but Ennius and his dream also become a topos 
in an “apologetic” tradition that Lucretius develops in these lines.269 In a largely similar, but more 
difficult passage, Horace asserts that Ennius seemed rather careless of whether his poetry would 
                                                          





live up to the expectations that he raised by claiming his Homeric heritage (Epist. II, 1.50-52).270 
Horace reminds us that Ennius’ claim to be an alter Homerus was predicated on the Pythagorean 
theory of the transmigration of souls—somnia Pythagorea, as the Augustan puts it (Epist. II, 1.52).  
Characteristically, Persius has combined two Horatian passages: the drunk Ennius of Epist. 
1 and the Pythagorean Ennius of Epist. II. But for all that, as I show next, the Pythagorean Ennius 
has a further, two-fold significance for Persius: thematic to Satire VI and structural to the libellus.  
 
Pythagorean Poets 
Throughout the sixth satire, Persius, as we have seen, has been preoccupied with his own afterlife, 
dwelling first on Horace’s afterlife by weaving it in with his own poetry, and ending up by 
embodying his own vituperative style as intensely as possible. In the middle of all of this, Ennius 
and his dream of Homer provide a central point of contact for the theme of past and future lives. 
The dream’s background in Latin literature and thought deserves some further attention, as we 
examine exactly what it meant to Persius in his final poem.  
Ennius’ choice of metempsychotic dream must have been informed by the discourse around 
Pythagoreanism among second century Romans, whose lively interest in and mythologies about 
the sixth century philosopher have recently been elucidated by Katharina Volk.271 In this section, 
I walk through other poets’ discussions of Ennius and his dream (Lucretius and Propertius) in order 
to show the range of possibilities that is available to Persius. I also review Ovid’s talkative 
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Pythagoras who narrates much of latter part of the Metamorphoses. What is important about Ovid 
is that he presents us with the most thorough and recent explication of the Pythagorean myth. The 
passage is not, obviously, about Ennius, but it is a major site of the tradition through which Ennius 
emerges in Persius; the passage may even, for Ovid, provide a space within which Ovid may 
displace the foundational figure of epic. 
Early in De Rerum Natura, a text recalled by Persius in the first line of his first satire (O 
quantum est in rebus inane! Sat. I.1), Lucretius asserts that ignorance of the universe, and in 
particular ignorance of the material nature of the soul, is a form of oppression by religion and 
superstition (DRN I.102-112). This power is wielded by the priests (uates), named twice in this 
passage (DRN I. 102 and 109), who create delusions (somnia) for the people. Lucretius cleverly 
capitalizes upon the double meanings of both uates and somnium in this passage in order to indict 
not only religious institutions but also the poets who support them. Vates as prophet becomes uates 
as poet; somnium as fantasy becomes somnium as dream, as Lucretius moves seamlessly, in the 
same sentence, from the warnings of the uates to the seemingly—and only seemingly—less 
harmful work of Ennius who propagated the notion of the eternal soul. Here, Lucretius, without 
fully narrating Ennius’ dream, uses the notion of the somnia uatum as a preface to that poet’s 
apparent assertion that he descended, crowned, from Helicon, after an encounter with evergreen 
(semper florentis, 124) Homer. Here we might recall Persius’ cryptic and ironical assertion in the 
Prologue that his work is a “contribution” to the uates (Prol. 7). As it is in close proximity to his 
presentation of the Lucretian (secondary) variant of the tradition of Ennius’ dream, the variant in 
which the poet encountered the Muses on Helicon in addition to (or instead of) Homer, I suggest 




 Persius’ proemial pretension to be a uates also recalls Propertius’ entry into his third book of 
elegies as a sacerdos with a request for inspiration from the holy spirits Callimachus and Philitas 
(III, 1.1-3), which I have touched upon in Chapter One. He has found a new path to the Muses 
with his polished page, which itself marches down from the mountain. Propertius has a rude 
awakening from his fantasy of being inspired in a wholly Ennian manner: Apollo informs him 
otherwise within two poems (III, 3). Propertius adds to the tradition that Ennius drank from the 
fount of Bellerophon in his own recusatio. Apollo steers him away from it and guides him to a 
new place for writing on his page: Propertius is not allowed to live out the Ennian dream; in 
Persius, neither will Ennius be.272 
The lengthiest instantiation of a metempsychotic appearance, however, is of course 
Pythagoras’ own in his cameo as narrator in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (XV.60ff.). Ovid names his 
new narrator the Samian man (Met. XV.60), as will Persius in his brief nod to his ancient moral 
didactic device (III, 56). The mystical philosopher’s disquisition is described in conventional 
didactic language similar to what we find in both Lucretius and Persius: magni primordia mundi/ 
et rerum causas et quid natura docebat,/ quid deus, unde niues, quae fulminis esset origo… (“He 
was teaching the elements of the great world and the origins of the universe and what nature be, 
what god, whence the snows, which the cause of lightening…,” Met. XV.67-69)273. The cosmology 
of Lucretius is pointedly revised in Ovid’s rerum… natura. But this Pythagoras delivers the lecture 
to a stupefied audience (coetusque silentum/ dictaque mirantum…, Met. XV.66-67) who fail to 
believe the speech he offers in Ovid (primus talibus ora/ docta quidem soluit, sed non et credita, 
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273 Also cf. discite et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum:/ quid sumus et quidnam uicturi gignimur, ordo/ 





uerbis, 73-74). Don’t be afraid of death: the body feels nothing, whether destroyed by cremation 
or old age, and the soul lives on, finding ever new homes (corpora, siue rogus flamma seu tabe 
uetustas/ abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis;/ morte carent animae semperque priore 
relicta/ sede nouis domibus uiuunt habitantque receptae, Met. XV.156-159). 
Beyond these poets’ shared generic and didactic convention, however, I suggest that there 
is a further way in which Persius has played at the edges of didacticism and Pythagoreanism before: 
memory. In his discussion of metempsychosis, the Ovidian Pythagoras apparently conforms to 
other didactic techniques in the assertion of personal experience through memory (memini). But 
uniquely for him, this authority rests upon his memory of a past life: he remembers being the 
Trojan Euphorbus (ipse ego (nam memini) Troiani eram belli/ Panthoides Euphorbus eram…, Met. 
XV.160-161).274 We might see that Ovid simultaneously builds his own authority upon Homer, by 
re-narrating the Iliadic scene, marking his allusion not just in subject matter but also in verse: for 
example, the Homericizing patronym appears in the first position in Metamorphoses as it does in 
the scene of his slaying in Iliad XVII.81.  
Persius pokes fun at his reincarnated poet, Ennius, even as he redeems and revivifies him, 
by attributing to him an initial Homeric patronymic, Maeonides, which frames its line with the 
final Pythagoreo.275 Persius gently ribs his transmigrator by invoking his Homeric credential 
against him. It is worth considering, since this is after all study of satire, the possibility that Ovid 
gently undermines his Pythagoras, even as he capitalizes on the philosopher’s narrative work. In 
spite of his use of the Homeric passage, John Miller points out, subtle differences arise between 
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275 Again, Lucretius provides an interesting comparandum, with his simultaneous praise and 




the Homeric and the Ovidian renderings: for example, Homer’s Euphorbus is killed by a spear to 
the neck rather than, as Pythagoras has it, to the chest. Miller suggests that the “factual” 
forgetfulness of the Homeric scene ultimately ironizes the philosopher’s assertion of extraordinary 
memory.276 A further ironization might be that in Pythagoreanism “proper,” to the (limited) extent 
that we understand it, souls do not remember past lives.  
Ennius’ pretension to be Homer is like Pythagoras’ to be Euphorbus. Lucretius’ Ennius 
frames his account of his interaction with Homer as a remembering (commemorat, 126). Ovid’s 
Pythagoras, too, remembers—he remembers being a character in a poem (Iliad XVII); this 
Pythagoras’ memory of continuity is perhaps a critique of the Lucretian material soul.277 Assertion 
of memory, which we saw in the memini of Persius’ third satire (Sat. III.44ff.), gestures to a broader 
literary allusion: there, memini was a memory of Horace’s life through satire, not of an episode 
from Persius’ own. Literary memory in Persius is allusion to and retexturing of Horatian verse, not 
experience. Nonetheless, our satirist was not merely remembering his Horace, but also 
remembering being Horace. Persius perhaps sets up a lifecycle for satire that epicists have long 
claimed; remembering is not mere play on allusion and intertext as much as a re-embodying and 
reclaiming. If the afterlife were indeed to exist, for Persius, it would not be such a solemn affair—
you’ll find yourself getting up to the same tricks as you did the first time around.  Paradoxically, 
for Persius, Ennius may speak again once he has awoken from the delusion that he will survive; 
letting go of poetic survival ensures it. The Ennian motif is recycled not as an image of the source 
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of poetry (as in the Prologue) but rather as the afterlife of poetry, precisely where Persius treats 
the fate of his own body—in this poem in which he foregrounds ashes. 
 
Cor Values 
Housman’s argument for the satiric (rather than epic) provenance of the Ennian line (Lunai 
portum…cognoscite…, 9)—to which I have gestured above—was based in part on cor iubet hoc 
Ennii, postquam destertuit esse/ Maeonides (Sat. VI.10-11). Where Jahn pointed out that Persius 
uses cor as an epic affect, Housman focused on Persius’ marking the line as quotation of the post-
dream Ennius. Whether Persius was aware of the chronology of the satirist-epicist’s corpus is 
immaterial: he clearly distinguishes an epic Ennius the dreamer—and perhaps even a parroter of 
convention—from Ennius the alert critic. The significance of Ennius’ heart exceeds the 
conjunction of epic and satire: the heart had been an important part of that poet’s self-presentation, 
his “quintessential biological organ.” Emily Gowers has examined the cor Ennii, which appears 
with significant frequency among the fragments. The heart is, she argues, “intimately connected 
with Ennius’ conception of himself.” 278 
 Beyond the heart, Ennius also associates himself with other internal “organs of 
consciousness,”279 such as the brain and marrow to communicate “concentrated strength, 
authenticity and vitality.”280 While the heart is partly a conventional metonym for character—it is 
upon his own praecordia that Persius claims Cornutus does his work of fashioning (Sat. V.22)— 
importantly it is Ennius’ last word about himself: upon his self-composed epitaph Ennius left us 
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with his tria corda. The cor thus also represents Ennius beyond the epic persona.281 By assigning 
to Ennius his heart in Satire VI, Persius admits him finally into the physiognomic league of 
satirists, which I have discussed at length in Chapter Two. The line is now complete. Ennius’ heart 
now precedes Lucilius’ jaw, Horace’s nose, Persius’ spleen.  
Importantly, Persius is more like Ennius than Lucilius and Horace on this revised scheme: 
they are both internal organ satirists. And their insides sound out: they snore. The comic use of 
destertuit with an object clause reminds us of Persius’ use of stertimus with an object in the opening 
of Satire III. Furthermore, we learned in Satire III what the real reason is for a poet to sleep late 
and snore—it’s the hangover—so Ennius’ activity is recontextualized as also potentially the hoax 
of a lazy writer, further aligning the two poets. As I have suggested above, the peacock recalls the 
birds of the Prologue, which also recalled by the divine inspiration motif. Bizarre enough to satisfy 
a Persius, the peculiar peacock tradition has the further advantage of providing him with a 
conclusory bird poet—and, moreover, a bird that begins with p-! The pauo takes his place among 
the psittacus (Prol. 8), coruos poetas et poetridas picas (Prol. 13), and, of course, most importanty, 
the peeping Persius. In reciting Ennius, Persius is “parroting”—or peacocking, in this case. 
 
Ring Cycle 
Importantly, the resurfacing of Ennius just here means that the figure frames Persius’ book, 
appearing as he does at the beginning of the prologue through Persius’ recusatio of an Ennian 
dream and at the beginning of the final poem through direct quotation. Now that he has been 
brought back to life (in the same manner as Persius at the start of Satire III), he may participate in 
Persius’ satire. A touch of Pythagoreanism is all the more significant when we consider its 
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placement in the final poem. Just as Pythagoras monopolizes the final book of Metamorphoses, a 
structurally significant place that sets up Ovid’s discussion of his own longevity, so too does the 
post-Pythagorean Ennius preface a discussion of Persius’ longevity.  
Andrew Feldherr has emphasized the structural importance of Pythagoras’ cosmological 
narration of the passage from Greek mythology into and through Roman history. The recapitulation 
of the Metamorphoses’ own events allows the audience to review what they themselves have been 
reading and the enormous scope of this new work before the poet asserts its achievement and future 
endurance. Beyond the opportunity that Pythagoras’ speech offers the audience of the 
Metamorphoses, the embedded narrator also offers something to Ovid: a gnomic and theoretical 
restatement of Ovid’s poetic project.282 Not the stuff of fancy: all things, the philosopher confirms, 
are indeed constantly adopting new forms (Nec species sua cuique manet, rerumque nouatrix/ ex 
aliis alias reparat natura figuras, Met. XV.252-253; cf. In noua fert animus mutatas dicere formas/ 
corpora, Met. I.1-2). That it is a philosopher of endlessness, of rebirth and renewal, who makes 
this assessment of the universal condition (and therefore of the poem) argues in advance for Ovid’s 
concluding lines, which assert that both his work and the poet will be eternal. The aggression of 
this assertion lies in its consumption of both the Callimachean Horace and the epic Ennius: 
Iamque opus exegi, quod nec Iouis ira nec ignis 
nec poterit ferrum nec edax abolere uetustas. 
cum uolet, illa dies, quae nil nisi corporis huius  
ius habet, incerti spatium mihi finiat aeui:  
parte tamen meliore mei super alta perennis  
astra ferar, nomenque erit indelebile nostrum,  
quaque patet domitis Romana potentia terris,  
ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama,  
siquid habent ueri uatum praesagia, uiuam. (Met. XV.871-879) 
 
The lines patently recall the final poem of Horace’s third book of Odes:  
Exegi  monumentum aere perennius 
                                                          




regalique situ pyramidum altius,  
quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens 
possit diruere aut innumerabilis 
annorum series et fuga temporum.  
Non omnis moriar multaque pars mei 
uitabit Libitinam; usque ego postera 
Crescam laude recens, dum Capitolium  
scandet cum tacita uirgine pontifex. (Carm. III, 30.1-9) 
 
But both poets, in particular Ovid, because of his generic choice and recent narration of the history 
of Rome, appropriate Ennius through the classic pun perennis/perennius, from Lucretius’ Ennius… 
/detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam (DRN I.117-118). Persius avoids this tired—and, 
what’s worse, imitative—joke: no one is perennius, or even perennis, especially when pretending 
to epic proportion. Horace claimed Ennius’ leafy crown (mihi Delphica/ lauro cinge uolens, 
Melpomene, comam, Carm. III, 30.15-16); Persius has rejected this, too (illis remitto quorum 
imagines lambunt/ hederae sequaces, Prol. 5-6).  
Beyond the mere reawakening of Ennius, the Prologue is also reinvented by Persius’ 
insertion of the Pythagorean “peacock” (Sat. VI.11)—a changed (i.e. Ovidian) form—where for 
Horace the straightforward Pythagorean “dream” had sufficed (Epist. II, 1.52). Ennius, it turns out, 
had been one of those disdained bird poets, parroting the conventions of Homer. The younger 
satirist aligns himself with one strand of Ennian lineage—not the epic but the satiric—and also 
shows how the Ennian tradition may be manipulated by one and the same figure. The tension 
between epic and satire, of Satire I and Satire V is here resolved through the satire’s consumption 
of epic—not only its tropes but even its poets’ deepest fantasies. Satire has consumed epic’s tropes, 
its Muses, many mouths, and foundational figures. The best poets are parodists, the best epicists, 






Fate of the Body 
The trope of Pythagorean rebirth recapitulates and revises the poet’s program. Coming as it does 
at both the beginning and end of both the Metamorphoses and the Satires, the theme has proven 
its utility beyond providing a mere “ring” structure; the trope itself is about beginning and end, 
cyclicality and renewal. Rebirth, of course, also implies a death. Persius, unlike Ovid the epicist, 
writes on the dark, crabbed end of the literary spectrum; his use of the trope is inverse: as a source 
of inspiration and beginning, it useful only insofar as those may be pointedly rejected; it is more 
useful where it offers an opportunity to reflect on closure and death. Persius’ preoccupation with 
the fate of his body towards the end of the sixth satire is bound up with his reflections on poetic 
afterlives throughout the poem. He has resurrected Horace, only to reject that reincarnation in favor 
of a return to invective; he has resurrected Ennius only to cast doubt on the possibility of dead 
poets being able to live again in any authentic way. Now what is going to happen to him? 
After Ennius divulges Persius’ location and after Persius confesses his disengagement from 
the rat race, the poem takes up the subject of legacy, what res to leave behind to a successor. It 
turns out that the new, moderate tone of Epicurean enjoyment and generosity was a pretext for 
castigating the heir who licks his chops at the prospect of the estate to come and who objects to 
every expenditure from it made in advance of his inheritance. Persius’ death as the requisite for 
inheritance and the relation between the two raises physical questions that might make an 
abstracting Horace or Ovid uncomfortable: How will his body be treated after death? How do his 
current actions affect his posthumous potential? Doesn’t he fear some retaliation in memoriam for 
having gone his own way? If his heir perceives resents him, what sort of funeral will he have 




will they be swept away once cold, like the vestiges of old sacrifices in anticipation of the new 
(aris/ frigidus excutitur cinis, VI. 44-45)?  
Persius marks his unconcern for his dead body by raising its specter, again and again, a 
repetition that perhaps belies that unconcern. I suggest that this treatment concludes the 
metamorphoses of Persius’ body that we have seen across the book. As we have seen in his first 
and last poems, Persius draws upon the tropes of Propertius III, 1. In that poem, moreover, 
Propertius reflected on his body and ashes, involving Lucretius and, especially, Horace’s 
concluding ode. But where Horace, Richardson points out, only passed over death and pointed to 
posthumous survival (non omnis moriar III, 30.6), the elegist took the opportunity to reflect also 
upon his physical death.283 Soon after his appeal for inspiration, his prophetic carmen (III, 1.5) 
turns into a book (pumice, III, 1.8). His glory ought to be assured, like the winner of a poetic chariot 
race, a narrow win (non datur ad Musas currere lata uia, III, 1.14). His Callimachean dream rejects 
Ennian ambition as too common (multi, Roma, tuas laudes annalibus addent, III, 1.15). The book 
replaces the poet: it is the pagina, not Propertius, that descends from the Muses’ mountain (III, 
1.17-18). Propertius will be paid with interest after death (III, 1.22). His grave will not be 
neglected: illum post cineres auguror ipse diem./ ne mea contempto lapis indicet ossa sepulcro. 
Age will increase his fame which will proceed better on the lips of men after his funeral (III, 1.23-
24). He knows this from observing the fate of earlier literature, e.g. the Iliad: envisioning epic 
fame, Propertius claims for himself an increasing repute among future generations of Rome (seros 
nepotes, III, 1.35). His bones will be well cared for, under the protection of Apollo (III, 1.37-38).  
 Whether coincidental, Persius’ frame poems (Prologue and Satires I and VI) engage in 
Propertius’ tropes: inspiration, posthumous fate at the hands of grandsons, and emphasis on the 
                                                          




book. Persius, however, comes up with an answer opposite to Propertius’. Where Propertius cares 
very much about his literary afterlife, Persius’ literary afterlife is a matter of indifferent to the poet, 
as he declared in response to the challenge of the fictional interlocutor in Satire I: no concern for 
the popular reception of his poems, whether they be praised, trashed, or burned. The aural and 
thematic correspondence between the lines on the literary afterlife in the first satire and the lines 
on the bodily in the last form a frame further to the Pythagorean: 
VI. 41-42 
haec cinere ulterior metuas? at tu, meus heres 
quisquis eris, paulum a turba seductior audi.  
 
Beyond the ash should you fear these things? But you, my heir, 
whoever you’ll be, hear this, a bit further aside from the crowd.  
 
I.41-44 
… an erit qui uelle recuset  
os populi meruisse et cedro digna locutus 
linquere nec scombros metuentia carmina nec tus? 
quisquis es, o modo quem ex aduerso dicere feci 
 
… or will there be someone who’d refuse to hope to have won the 
voice of the people and to’ve said something worthy of embalming 
and to leave behind poems fearing to be used for neither fish nor 
incense? Whoever you are, you whom I’ve just made to speak from 
the opposition… 
 
The last satire’s recollection of the first is unmistakable: Persius makes his interlocutor explicitly 
fictive at the same moment that he considers the futurity of his corpus, whether literary or somatic. 
The lexical and aural arrangement of VI.41-42 reformulates that of I.43-44: metuas…tu becomes 
metuentia… tus and quisquis es, quisquis eris. Indifference to fear for his posthumous fate—poetic 
in the first satire, physical in the last—is closely connected at the level of verse across the poems. 
What is happening in the lines from Satire I? Lines 41-44 follow the representation of the 




recited by an affected, Greekish lector: The songs will have an afterlife; the poet’s ashes may rest 
secure.  
If we broaden our scope but slightly the fate of the poet’s ashes provide an implicit 
alternative for Persius’ funeral: 
I. 36-40: 
nunc non cinis ille poetae 
felix? non leuior cippus nunc inprimit ossa? 
laudant conuiuae: nunc non e manibus illis,  
nunc non e tumulo fortunataque fauilla 
nascentur uiolae?  
 
“Doesn’t the great ash of the poet rest happy now? Now doesn’t his 
tombstone rest lighter upon his bones? The dinner partiers give 
praise: aren’t the violets growing from his ghost, aren’t they now 
growing from his tomb and and blessed cinders?” 
 
VI.33-36: 
… sed cenam funeris heres 
negleget iratus quod rem curtaueris; urnae 
ossa inodora dabit, seu spirent cinnama surdum 
seu ceraso peccent casiae nescire paratus. 
 
“Whether the cinnamon waft dull or the cassia is spoiled from 
cherry—he’s prepared to pay no attention.”  
 
The body is treated like a bad meal—one of the many rancid or ill-dressed dishes we have seen 
throughout the book. Persius’ lack of concern for the body is in some ways a Lucretian ending: he 
cares nothing for death; he is fearless, i.e., he has learnt the principal lesson of De Rerum Natura; 
he has even learnt to enjoy an Epicurean life, even if only out of spite. But Persius one-ups 
Lucretius, too: he is equally uninterested in the fate of his text, in competing for the status of 
aeternis uersibus, accessible only through epic. The ashes of the text become the ashes of the body 
as the fate of the body takes the place of the fate of the text. We were introduced to the embodied 




in his central poem (Satire III). Through the consequent identification of his book with his body, 
Persius’ bodily legacy becomes his literary legacy. Burn it.  
The end of the book-body we have been reading exhibits a satirist armed with all his 
invective strategies but shed of all virtuous pretenses, a splintering off of the decent Horatian. 
Satire VI very much belongs to the book of this Mercurius, this mercurialis poet. In fact, I would 
argue that it is impossible to have a full understanding of Persius’ project without it. Restraint is 
left to one side as Persius recklessly veers ever closer to the margin of the perverse. While he 
hedged about the quality of his reader (quisquis) in the first satire, by the last, Persius assumes a 
bad quisquis: Quisquis es (lector) may possibly be found with the proper literary and aural 
credentials; quisquis eris (heres) is simply already beyond the pale. The identity of the poet’s 
literary project with his body is carried to its logical conclusion. At the same time that the satirist 
decisively rejects Pythagorean metempsychosis, bodily and literary afterlives, and the concerns of 
his future and fictive heir, he establishes his longevity by returning with full satirical force at the 
end of his book. The poet exits this piece about dying with a revivifying of his former self. He will 
die, but that is all that he shall give to death. 
 
finis 
Persius lampoons the desire to be perennial, the escapist fantasy of poets (the escapist fantasy 
belongs perhaps to all humans, but Horace, Ennius, and Ovid are all Persius’ clan). But 
nevertheless he, too, has a fantasy that he cannot escape: it is not that he wants to be eternal, but 
rather that he wants to be able to control the afterlife of his work. If a poetic afterlife includes 
manipulation by someone of Persius’ lot, or worse, it is something to be avoided at all costs. Instead 




demolition is the destruction of his body-book. At the same time, Satire VI offers two afterlives 
for this poet, a reincarnation and an apotheosis. The forceful return of the hater offers a re-
reincarnation of Hipponax—his humor that makes the truly obscene a matter of course. And 
Persius’ claim sum tibi Mercurius (62) is his final, evasive self-identification—he is now the god 
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